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HOLLYWOOD’S DISAPPEARING ACT: INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME
Claire Wright*

I. INTRODUCTION
Hollywood has a dirty little secret: a great many of the U.S.’ cultural and entertainment products are not even “Made in the USA” anymore,1 and Hollywood itself appears to be for sale to the highest bidder.
In November 2005, the Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation reported that approximately 33% of U.S.-developed feature films
are filmed outside of the U.S. today,2 and there are indications that this
figure could be much higher.3 Forty-five percent of all major studio
*
Assistant Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. I was aided by helpful comments from
Professor Robert Lutz of Southwestern University School of Law, Professor Alan O Sykes of the
University of Chicago, The Law School, and Professor Paul Weiler of Harvard Law School.
1. A movie shot in another country possesses the country of origin of that other country. See
Tariff Act of 1930 § 304, 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (2005); 19 C.F.R. § 134 (2005). The country of origin
of an imported product is the country of manufacture. See 19 C.F.R. § 134.1(b) (2005).
2
2. Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation, Film Industry Profile of California/Los
Angeles County 6, 14 (November 2005) [hereinafter Film Industry Profile] (utilizing data obtained
from the Tuesday edition of the Hollywood Reporter), available at http://www.laedc.info/pdf/Film2005.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006). These data reveal that this percentage was 32% in 2003. Id. at
14. The Hollywood Reporter monitors feature film production by major studios as well as independent companies. For each feature film, the trade magazine reports the film location (or locations, if applicable). Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation, What is the Cost of RunAway Production? Jobs, Wages, Economic Output and State Tax Revenue at Risk When Motion
Picture Productions Leave California 15 (August 2005) [hereinafter What is the Cost of Run-Away
Production?], available at www.film.ca.gov/ttca/pdfs/link_overview/ cfc/California_Film_Commis
sion_Study.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006). See also Letter from Tim McHugh, Executive Director,
et al., Film and Television Action Committee, to Ronald Lorentzen, Acting Director, Office of Policy, Import Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 12 (June 28, 2004) [hereinafter FTAC
Letter] (generally commenting on Unfair Trade Practices Task Force 69 Fed. Reg. 30,285 and noting on page 12 that data maintained by the Directors Guild of America (DGA) shows that one-third
of movies shown in theaters in 2003 and shot under DGA contracts were made outside of the U.S.),
available at www.ftac.org/files/FinalTaskForceLetter.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006).
3. See infra Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 (portraying data compiled on May 15, 2005 from the international movie data base, which can be found at www.imdb.com, which indicate that, by the 2004
release year, 65% of U.S.-developed feature films were shot outside of the U.S.). Note that these
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films were shot outside of the U.S. during 2004,4 and for a number of
years, an even higher percentage of U.S.-developed television programs
and movies-of-the week (MOWs) were filmed in other countries.5 For
example, at least one study reported that, in 1999-2000, the percentage
of U.S. - developed MOWs made outside of the U.S. was 59%.6
A great many of the films shot outside of the U.S. are shot in Canada,7 which has the most established film incentive programs, both on
the federal and provincial level.8 The list of U.S.-developed movies
filmed in Canada is long and impressive.9 So many U.S.-developed
movies are filmed in Canada that it is referred to in the industry as “Hollywood North,”10 and Canada’s actors’ union, the Alliance of Canadian
Cinema Television and Radio Artist (ACTRA), even offers a workshop
to teach Canadian actors how to use American accents, so that fewer
American actors need be hired on any film that is shot in Canada.11
A sample of the big budget, well-known feature films shot there
within recent years includes Brokeback Mountain, Good Will Hunting,
Catwoman, My Big Fat Greek Wedding, The Day After Tomorrow, I,
charts do exaggerate the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film industry in the sense that the searches
performed did not account for the fact that a film may be made in multiple foreign locations, and
hence such a film is counted multiple times in the charts. However, it is not common for a film to
be shot in multiple foreign locations. The author is not aware of any other manner in which the exhibits may be based on incomplete or inaccurate data. At the same time, as it isn’t clear how and
when data is entered into this data base, the reader is cautioned that there is no guarantee that the
data on which these exhibits are based are otherwise complete and accurate.
4. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 15.
5. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, The Migration of U.S. Film and Television Production
27-29 (January 18, 2001) [hereinafter U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE] (citing The Monitor
Company, The Economic Impact of U.S. Film and Television Runaway Film Production (June
1999) [hereinafter The Monitor Company] and Letter fromRobert Solomon, Chairman, Governmental Affair, Southern California Chapter of the Association of Imaging and Technology and Sound
(ITS) to Michael Fink, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (July 5, 2000) [hereinafter
Solomon Letter]). The U.S. Department of Commerce and The Monitor Company reports are both
available at http://www.ftac.org/html/2a.dgasag.html (last visited May 5, 2006).
6. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, note 6, at 28 (citing the Solomon Letter).
7. The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that, in 1998, Canada captured more
than 80% of all U.S.-developed feature film and television projects); see also infra Exhibits 5 and 6
(showing that, by 2001, Canada produced 19% of all feature films filmed worldwide that year); see
also infra Exhibits 7, 8, and 9 (illustrating that Canada produced 31% (20% of the 65%) of all U.S.developed feature films produced outside of the U.S.).
8. See infra Section V (Canadian PSTC Film Incentives).
9. See sample list of U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada during 2000-2005,
attached as Appendix A (compiled from data maintained in the international movie data base, which
can be found at www.imdb.com).
10. CTV, Canada the New Hotspot for Video Game Creators, available at http://www.ctv.ca/
servlet/articlenews/story/ctvnews/1110995669946_56 (last visited November 4, 2005).
11. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 19 (citing Tamsen Tillson, Canuck Thesps Get Earful:
Gross Gives ACTRA Keynote, DAILY VARIETY (June 2, 2004)).
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Robot, Cinderella Man, Electra, and Armageddon.12 Even many quintessentially “American films” have been shot outside of the U.S., primarily in Canada.13 The outsourcing of the U.S. feature film industry for
economic reasons, which began in the early 1990s and picked up considerable steam in the late 1990s,14 is continuing unabated. The fact that in
the spring of 2005 Jennifer Garner was in Vancouver filming Catch and
Release, Brad Pitt was in Calgary filming The Assassination of Jesse
James, and Ben Affleck was in Toronto filming the movie Truth, Justice
and the American Way15 illustrates the pervasiveness of this phenomenon.
In fact, the outsourcing of the U.S. film industry is so wellentrenched and accepted by film industry management that there are reports that U.S. film industry workers who have organized activities promoting the retention of film production in the U.S. have been “blacklisted” in Hollywood.16 Just as in the McCarthy era in the 1950s, these
film industry workers say that they are being accused of being Communists and of engaging in potentially dangerous “un-American activities.”17 As a result, they claim that they are finding it difficult, if not im12. See supra note 9; see also database of film productions and production locations maintained by the publisher Variety. The database can be searched for specific titles or by films filmed
outside of the U.S. Variety Home Page, available at http://www.variety.com (follow “Film Production” hyperlink; then follow “Film Production” hyperlink under “Charts and Data”) (last visited
November 6, 2005).
13. See Variety Home Page, available at http://www.variety.com (follow “Film Production”
hyperlink; then follow “Film Production” hyperlink under “Charts and Data”) (last visited November 6, 2005). Examples of such movies include Rudy: The Rudy Giuliani Story, which portrays the
life of Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City, Chicago, which depicts the true-crime
story involving Velma Kelly and Roxie Hart in Chicago in the 1920s, Miracle, showing the U.S.
hockey team triumph over the Soviet team at the 1980 Olympics, Independence Day, which was
released on July 4, 1996, and portrays a fictitious attempted takeover of the world by aliens, and
Cold Mountain, which concerns the Civil War period of U.S. history. All of these films were shot
in Canada, except for Cold Mountain, which was shot in Romania.
14. The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 2-3; but see Neil Craig Associates, International
Film and Television Production in Canada: Setting the Record Straight About U.S. ‘Runaway’ Production” 1 (October 2004) (“The total direct and indirect economic impact of this activity on the
United States in 1998 was CAN$1.7 billion, only a fraction of the US$10.3 billion claimed in the
Monitor Report. That report contains contradictory claims and basic arithmetic errors, double
counts figures and uses methodologies that are highly unusual in standard economic analysis.”),
available at http://www.filmontario.ca/news.php (last visited May 8, 2006).
15. Review of Catch and Release, available at http://www.tribute.ca/synopsis.asp?m_id=106
99 (last visited November 6, 2005). Review of The Assassination of Jesse James, available at
http://www.tribute.ca/synopsis.asp?m_id=12064 (last visited November. 6, 2005). Review of Truth,
Justice, and the American Way, available at http://www.tribute.ca/synopsis.asp?m_id=10632 (last
visited November. 6, 2005).
16. Author’s interview with Film and Television Action Committee (FTAC) members Gene
Warren, Tim McHugh, and Ann Champion, Burbank, California (July 9, 2005).
17. Id.; see also Interview on August 4, 2004 of Brent Swift, Former President of FTAC, by
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possible, to find work in the film industry in the U.S.18 If these reports
are true, the meaning of “un-American activities” clearly has been
turned on its head. What could be more American than arguing that one
of America’s premier industries should remain in America? Or, more
specifically, that American actors should actually portray Americans in
stories that reflect and promote American culture and values?
This article addresses whether the film incentives offered by other
countries are consistent with those countries’ obligations under international law and can be countered with countervailing duties under U.S.
domestic law. In particular, this article discusses in some detail whether
the foreign film incentives are consistent with these countries’ obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement).19
To be sure, it is not illegal for a U.S. film company to film a movie
in a foreign location for artistic reasons. In addition, at the present time,
it is not illegal to produce a film project in a foreign location in order to
take advantage of lower wage rates and/or a favorable currency exchange rate. Furthermore, some countries and commentators argue that
there is, or should be, a “cultural exemption” to the international trade
rules, such that incentives provided by a government to domestic producers in order to promote local cultural items are outside of the scope
of any international obligations.20 That argument is not at issue here,
Andrea R. Vaucher, reported in Using Trade Pacts to Stem Loss of TV and Film Jobs to Canada,
New York Times (August 5, 2004), available at http://www.ftac.org/html/2-news.html (last visited
May 8, 2006).
18. See supra note 16.
19. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 275
(1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [not reproduced in I.L.M.] [hereinafter SCM Agreement], available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/gen-home.asp (follow “Search for Documents: Simple Search” hyperlink;
then enter “LT/UR/A-1A/9” into “Document Symbol” search field) (last visited May 5, 2006).
20. See, e.g., The Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade, Further
Opportunities: New Strategies for Culture and Trade Canadian Culture in a Global World,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA (FEBRUARY 1999), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/canculture-en.asp (last visited May 6, 2006). In the WTO case of Canada – Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R, adopted on March 14, 1997, paras. 3.67-3.71, Canada essentially argued before the Panel that there is a “cultural exemption” to the WTO rules. That is, it alleged that Canadian cultural products such as periodicals are unique and therefore cannot possibly
be “like products” to cultural products produced in other countries; hence, Canada’s differential
treatment of such products does not violate the National Treatment Principle incorporated in the
first sentence of Article III.2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 17 91999), 1867 U.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
The Panel in that case, however, rejected Canada’s argument that there is a “cultural exemption” to
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however, because there is no requirement that the film maker include
any minimum amount of local content in order to obtain the incentives
that are the subject of this article.21
The question addressed in this article is whether, under U.S. and
WTO law, a foreign government can artificially lower the costs of production in an industry to such an extent that a number of U.S. companies
choose to establish local production companies in that country and
forego production in the U.S., thereby decimating the industry in the
U.S. Specifically, as a case study, this article focuses on the Production
Services Tax Credit (PSTC) film incentives that Canada offers to domestic and foreign film companies alike to produce films that need not possess any Canadian content.22 These incentives are based on the percentage of Canadian labor utilized. They are exceedingly generous, and they
have been very successful in attracting U.S. film companies to film their
movies in Canada.23 Of course, if the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
were to find that the PSTC Programs in Canada are counter to Canada’s
obligations under the SCM Agreement, similar incentives provided by
other WTO Members (and indeed the film incentives provided by the
U.S. federal government and several U.S. states) may also have to be
the WTO rules and went on to conclude that the Canadian-origin periodicals and the U.S.-origin
periodicals at issue were in fact “like products.” See id. at para. 6.1. Canada appealed the latter conclusion of the Panel. See WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted on June 30, 1997, p. 2 (II.A Arguments of the
Participants – Canada). The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s decision on the “like products”
question on the basis that the Panel had not considered appropriate or sufficient evidence on the
issue.Id. at pp. 14, 22 (VIII. Findings and Conclusions – (b)). However, it went on to conclude that
the Canadian-origin periodicals and the U.S.-origin periodicals were directly competitive and substitutable products in any case and therefore Canada had violated the second sentence of Article III.2
of the GATT 1994. Id. at p. 22 (VIII. Findings and Conclusions – (c)).
21. See infra Section V (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives). Some commentators argue that
governments should at least be permitted to subsidize their own cultural industries, including their
film industries, when those industries are in their embryonic stage. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER,
SPEAKING FOR FUN AND PROFIT, ch. 12 Leveling the Entertainment World 8 (West forthcoming
2006). (“[The] special economic features of the entertainment industry’s production and marketing
costs certainly justify a small and poor Senegal providing government assistance to try to create an
Oscar, not just a World Football, contender.”). However, this argument is not relevant to the subsidies that Canada currently is providing to its film industry, as that industry is no longer in its infancy
stage. See, e.g., Canadian Film and Televisions Production Association, in association with PricewaterhouseCoopers, L’Association des Producteurs de Films et de Television du Quebec, and the
Department of Canadian Heritage, The Canadian Film and Television Production Industry: A 1999
Profile 5 (February 1999) (“Canadian feature films . . . are recognized internationally as among the
finest in the world.”); CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE (CAVCO), 2001-02
CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT: ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE
PERIOD APRIL 1, 2001 TO MARCH 31, 2002, AT 4 (2002) (“The Canadian government has long recognized the importance of film and video as a cultural resource . . . .”).
22. See infra Section V (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives).
23. Id.; see also supra note 9.
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abolished. In general, whether any other WTO Member’s film incentives contravene that Member’s WTO obligations would depend on the
magnitude of the harm caused by those incentives to the feature film
production industry in one or more other WTO member(s).24
In any case, many of the film incentive programs offered around the
world have been enacted specifically in order to counteract those provided by Canada.25 For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, both
Australia and New Zealand created similar film incentive programs.26
These programs were quite successful in luring U.S. film producers to
film their movies in Australia and New Zealand.27 In response, the Canadian federal government increased its film subsidy amount from 11%
to 16% of qualifying Canadian labor costs in February of 2003.28 Next,
in November of 2004, the U.S. federal government responded by enacting Section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code as part of the Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allows producers of smaller budget films to deduct 100% of film production costs in the year incurred.29 Then, the
three Canadian provinces where the majority of U.S. films are shot, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, all raised their subsidy percentages
in January of 2005.30 While approximately 30 out of the 50 states have
had some local film incentive programs in place for some time, several
states, including California, recently have increased their subsidies or are
considering doing so.31 This round-robin effect is the predictable outcome of the U.S.’ failure to challenge Canada’s film incentives in the
first place. Thus, even if the WTO Dispute Settlement Body were to
rule that all of these film incentive programs cause adverse effects and
should be abolished, the overall effect of such a WTO ruling essentially
24. See infra Part VI, Section D.2 (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be
Causing Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry).
25. See FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 10-11.
26. See Appendix D for a description of some of the major film incentive programs in other
countries.
27. See FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 12.
28. Id. at 11.
29. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) [hereinafter American Jobs Creation Act of 2004] (Section 244 of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
created a new Section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code, codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §181
(2005)).
30. See infra notes 93–95; see also Appendix B, which lists the major film incentives offered
by the Canadian provincial governments.
31. See What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 16 (Illinois, Louisiana,
New Mexico, New York and Pennsylvania have been the most enthusiastic suitors, courting production companies . . . . More than 17 other states have introduced legislation that would create similar
enticements.”); see also Appendix C, which lists the major film incentives offered by the various
U.S. states.
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would be a return to the status quo ante - Canada’s rich film incentive
scheme.
The article concludes that the above-described foreign film incentives, and the PSTC film incentives in Canada in particular, most likely
are inconsistent with those WTO Members’ obligations under WTO law,
as they adversely affect the U.S. feature film production industry. The
U.S. Government could therefore pursue a dispute settlement case on
this issue in the WTO, requesting that Canada (and other countries with
similar film incentive programs) be ordered to abolish those incentives.
In the U.S., the U.S. Government could also initiate an action to impose
countervailing duties on the subsidized films when they are imported
into the U.S. After providing an analysis supporting this conclusion, this
article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the various remedies that could be pursued, considers the obstacles to a legal challenge to
the film incentive programs, and provides recommendations for how interested parties in the U.S. might proceed.
II. ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES32
From an economic standpoint, subsidies provided by a government
to a particular domestic enterprise or industry interfere with the free
market economy principles of supply and demand. In particular, the
subsidies support companies and products that otherwise would not exist
in the marketplace, and therefore the subsidies are an inefficient use of
government, and hence ultimately taxpayer, funds. In addition, the
benefits that the recipients receive may be considered to be unfair both
by the recipient’s competitors and by the taxpayers who are not directly
involved in the subsidized company or industry and thus are disproportionately burdened by the taxes assessed to pay for the subsidies. Empty
sports stadiums around the country that were built with taxpayer money
(and which in some cases are still being paid for by the local taxpayers)
provide a good example of the economic disadvantage of government
subsidies.33
Specifically in the global trade arena, goods that have been subsi32. In the case of government subsidies to the film industry, there is also a significant noneconomic disadvantage inherent in such subsidies. This is the danger that governments, through
their economic support of the film industry, will pressure film producers not to produce movies
critical of those governments. This point has been made by a number of commentators. See, e.g.,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 8.
33. See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, RADICALLY MODERATE LAW REFORM, Insulating Taxpayers
from Both Teams and Studios (forthcoming). (Copy on file in Law Review office at the University
of Akron Law School).
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dized by their home countries do not compete fairly with unsubsidized
goods in the international marketplace.34 Companies producing a “like
product” in a country into which the subsidized goods are imported may
find that they cannot compete with the subsidized imports and as a result
both domestic production and exports of the domestic product may be
hampered. As indicated above, this unfair trade advantage often leads
an importing country to establish its own competing subsides, which, in
turn, can lead to the establishment of even more generous foreign subsidy programs.35
In summary, domestic subsidies tend to distort international trading
patterns through encouragement of the production and exportation of the
subsidized product, and discouragement of the production and exportation of products manufactured in non-subsidizing countries.36 This imbalance in the global economy leads affected nations to respond with
their own subsidy programs, and the ensuing subsidy war has the same
trade-distorting effect in the global economy as do undisciplined tariffs
and quota increases.37 From an economic perspective, then, domestic
subsidies tend to decrease the economic welfare of competing industries
and workers in non-subsidizing nations, taxpayers in the subsidizing nations, and the global economy as a whole.38
In the instant case, for example, if the government subsides to the
film industry remain in existence, a number of nations could end up with
empty sound stages and recording studios and yet their taxpayers could
be left paying the debt incurred by their governments to build these
stages and studios for many years to come. From an overall economic
standpoint, it would seem preferable for all of the WTO trading partners
to refrain from providing subsidies to their domestic film production
companies (other than perhaps for the production of local cultural films)
and simply allow the best film production companies in the world to
survive.

34. JOHN JACKSON, WILLIAM DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 767-68 (4th ed., West 2002).
35. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
36. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 767-73 (citing articles on economic rationale behind prohibition against
actionable subsidies such as follows: Gary Hufbaur & Joanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies in International Trade, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 5-6 (1984), Warren F. Schwartz &
Eugene W Harper, Jr., The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV.
831 (1972); Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Critique, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
199 (1989)).
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III. SIGNIFICANCE OF FILM INDUSTRY TO U.S. ECONOMY AND CULTURE
The entertainment industry clearly is one of the most important industries in the U.S. Historically, it has made a substantial contribution
to both the U.S. gross domestic product and U.S. export sales. In 2002,
the entertainment sector employed approximately 4.7 million people and
generated sales of over half a trillion dollars.39 This constituted more
than five percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.40 Furthermore, international sales generated approximately half of these revenues.41
These export earnings are quite significant, in light of an overall U.S.
trade deficit of $726 billion by the end of 2005, which constituted an
18% increase over 2004.42
The U.S. film industry, as a component of the entertainment industry, in 2002 employed between 153,000 and 353,076 people and paid
these people between $9.3 billion to $21.2 billion.43 More than half of
these people lived in California and earned two-thirds of these salaries
and wages.44 The film industry, at least until recently, has also contributed significantly to the economies of several other states, including
most importantly New York and Illinois.45 These direct salaries and
wages have a multiplier effect throughout the economy, which often is
estimated to be between 2 and 3 times.46 The industry as a whole generated revenue of $52 billion in 2002.47 A significant portion of these figures is attributable to the feature film industry.48
Without question, U.S. entertainment products are enjoyed by peo39. The Office of the United States Trade Representative, Zoellick Joins Entertainment Industry Launch of Free Trade Coalition, Press Release 1 (May 13, 2003), available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-726528.html (last visited May 5, 2006).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Robert E. Scott, with research assistance from David Ratner, Trade Picture: Rapid growth
in oil prices, Chinese imports pump up trade deficit to new record, Economic Policy Institute 1
(February 10, 2006) (citing U.S. Department of Commerce statistics).
43. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 5, at 2 (citing Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) figures for each of the higher numbers and U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census, figures for each of the lower numbers).
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 8. Motion picture economic activity accounts for more than 13 percent of New York’s information industry establishments and some
seven percent of Illinois’ information sector establishments. Id.
46. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 5 at 23 (discussing various multipliers used in the entertainment and film industries).
47. Film Industry Profile, supra note 2, at 1 (citing figures published by U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of the Census).
48. See Film Industry Profile, supra note 2 (reporting employment and wage data for various
segments of the entire film industry over the course of several years).
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ple all over the world,49 and it is often said that, as a nation, the U.S. is
best known for its entertainment industry.50 Although moviemaking was
first created in France in the late 1800’s, Thomas Edison brought this
technology back to the U.S.,51 and the U.S. has been the predominant
player in the industry worldwide since World War I.52 U.S. travelers, for
example, cannot help but marvel at the reach of the U.S. film industry
into even the remotest corners of the globe. For example, one can travel
many hours by plane to some non-English-speaking country, where
communication with the taxi driver at the airport is a very trying experience, and yet the local theatres nonetheless primarily exhibit U.S.developed feature films.
The U.S. entertainment industry, and especially the U.S. feature
film industry, unquestionably is the envy of many other countries around
the world.53 Consequently, many other countries have attempted to
emulate the U.S.’ success in this arena.54 In particular, they have offered
their own feature film industry, as well as the U.S. feature film industry,
very generous incentives to produce films in their countries in order to
compete directly with the U.S.-developed feature films produced in the
U.S.55 As discussed further below, the U.S. film industry, and the U.S.
feature film industry in particular, have suffered a significant contraction
in recent years, largely due to the outsourcing of the film industry to
other countries.56 Again, Canada has the most established film incentive
program,57 and this article focuses on the PSTC film incentives that are
provided by the Canadian governments.
IV. U.S. FILM INDUSTRY
As a case study, this article focuses not only on the PSTC film in49. See, e.g., GEORGE CLACK, PORTRAIT OF AMERICA, UNITED STATES INFORMATION
AGENCY, Exporting Popular Culture 1 (“For better or worse, many nations now have two cultures:
Their indigenous one and one consisting of the sports, movies, televisions programs, and music
whose energy and broad-based appeal are identifiably American.”).
50. See id.
51. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 2-3; see also Frank Wicks, Picture This: Scientist? Businessman? The Inventor Who Popularized His Fortune Well., MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, available
at http://www.memagazine.org/backissues/july04/features/pictthis/pictthis.html (last visited March
9, 2006).
52. See WEILER, supra note 21, at 2-3.
53. See supra note 49.
54. Id.
55. See Appendix D.
56. See infra Section VI, Part D.2 (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be
Causing Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry).
57. See infra Section V (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives).
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centives in Canada, but it also focuses on the harm that these incentives
are causing to a subset of the entire U.S. film industry – the feature film
industry. The entire film industry in the U.S. generally refers to the production of at least the following:
(1) full-length feature films;
(2) movies of the week (again, otherwise known as MOWs or
made-for-television movies);
(3) series television shows;
(4) television commercials; and
(5) music videos.58

These various types of films are produced by either one of the
seven “major” film studios or one of the numerous smaller production
companies called “independents.”59 The “majors” are members of the
Motion Picture Association of American (MPAA), while many of the
independent film companies are members of the American Film Marketing Association (AFMA).60
Also, whatever the film genre, usually there are three phases to the
development of the film: pre-production, production, and postproduction.61 Pre-production tasks include script writing, set design, selection of cast, crew, and location, costume design, and budgeting.62
U.S. film companies tend to perform some of the pre-production tasks in
the U.S., even in those situations where they decide to shoot the film
outside of the U.S., but relatively few people are needed to perform
these tasks.
Once the above tasks have been completed, the “film” can be pro58. The description of the film industry relies heavily on information reported in U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 9-16 and in Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Career Guide to Industries, Motion Picture and Video Industries (2006-07 Edition,
last modified on December 20, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs038.html (last
visited April 28, 2006).
59. Id.
60. Id. The websites of these associations are http://www.mpaa.org and
http://www.afma.com. The MPAA’s members are Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Sony Pictures
Entertainment Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios LLLP, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. See
MPAA, Members pages, available at http://www.mpaa.org/ABoutUSMembers.asp (last visited
March 10, 2006).
61. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 15.
62. Id.
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duced or shot in the U.S. or elsewhere.63 The actual shooting of the film
is a very labor-intensive process.64
When principal photography on a film is shot outside of the U.S.,
that film has to be sent to the U.S. for storage, distribution, and sometimes the performance of the post-production activities. Today, this usually means the importation into the U.S. of a physical good, such as a
film reel, a DVD, a CD or a computer drive or disc.65 When the film is
completed, the production company usually stores the physical product
in a secure “film vault,” so as to ensure against its damage, loss, theft
and piracy.66
For nearly a century, motion pictures were shot onto a strip of lightsensitive, perforated film stock which was then developed to produce a
negative. From this negative, a print was struck and various scenes were
spliced together by the editor to create the final product.
Today, while the majority of motion pictures still originate on film,
there is a rapidly growing trend to use digital video (high-definition)
cameras for production. It is too early to predict the complete demise of
film as the originating medium, but we are beginning to see its sunset.
Once the principal photography on a film has been completed, the
post-production activities must be performed. Post-production activities
include editing, color imaging, and the addition of soundtracks, visual
effects, musical scoring, titles and credits, and dubbing.67 This phase has
almost entirely moved into the digital world. The computer has replaced
the editing machine (Moviola) and the optical lab. Former industry
standard items such as grease pencils, tape splicers and film rewinds
have gone the way of the dial telephone. Today, U.S. film companies
sometimes perform these post-production activities in the U.S. and
sometimes they perform these post-production activities outside of the
U.S. In any case, proportionately fewer people are required to perform
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 14.
65. Not that today, the majority of feature films still even originate on motion picture film.
See, e.g, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 58, at 2.
66. See, e.g., John Borland, New Technology a Boon for Big Screen, CNET News.com 4
(June 30, 2003) (“Magnetic storage is still unstable compared with film, which can last hundreds, or
even thousands, of years. Studios store many of their archival films in vaults deep underground at
an old salt mine in Kansas or at a former limestone mine in Pennsylvania.”), available at
http://news.com.com/Vision+ Series+Hollywoods+digital+blockbuster/2030-1070_3-1001643.html
(last visited April 29, 3006); see also King Content: Don’t Write Off Hollywood and the Big Media
Groups Just Yet, THE ECONOMIST 1 (January 19 2006) (“‘Pain is temporary, film is forever.’”),
available at http://www.economist.com/opionion/displaystory.cfm?/story_id=5411930 (last visited
May 6, 2006).
67. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 15.
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modern post-production tasks and the time required has also shrunk
dramatically.
V. CANADIAN PSTC FILM INCENTIVES
The federal and provincial governments in Canada for many years
have offered a large variety of incentives to attract foreign film producers, as well as encourage domestic production.68 For example, Canada
has provided some direct financial grants, working capital loans, favorable loan rates with guarantees provided by the Canadian government,
waivers for local costs and fees, funding for equity investment, and aggressive marketing campaigns promoting Canada.69 Canada has also offered a wide range of tax incentives in order to entice both domestic and
foreign film companies to shoot their films in Canada.70
In the past, most of the film incentives offered by Canada were
conditioned on inclusion of a minimum percentage of Canadian content.71 There are still some incentive programs that require Canadian
content,72 and U.S. film producers not infrequently take advantage of
these incentives. The Canadian content tax incentives are the most generous of all of the incentives offered by Canada, generally equivalent to
25% of qualifying labor expenses,73 which are the wages and salaries
paid to Canadian residents or taxable Canadian corporations (for
amounts paid to employees who are Canadian residents).74 However,
several of the film incentive programs in Canada no longer require Canadian content.75
The most generous incentive not conditioned on inclusion of Canadian content offered by the Canadian federal government is the Federal
Film and Video Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC).76 This program
was established in 1997, and it first became available for films shot in

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See, e.g, id. at 71.
Id. at 71-73.
Id. at 71-72.
See The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 20.
CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT:
ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003, TO
MARCH 31, 2004, at 8 (2004), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpaccavco/pubs/2003-04/activ_03-04_e.pdf (last visited May 5, 2006).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 16.
76. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Services
Tax Credit (PSTC), (August 2, 2004), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpaccavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm (last visited March 30, 2006).
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Canada on or after January 1, 1998.77 In order to qualify for the tax
credit, the production costs for the proposed project must be at least $1
million (CAN),78 and the tax credit awarded is equal to sixteen percent
(16%) of “qualifying labor costs,” defined above.79
The PSTC Program is actually structured as a transfer of funds
rather than as a rebate of taxes paid, but the funds ostensibly are to be
used to help the company pay future employment taxes owed to the Canadian federal government. Hence, the PSTC Program acts as a direct
reduction of the employment costs associated with shooting a film in
Canada, and, today, film companies often receive a check equal to 16%
of the qualifying labor costs within a few weeks of filing their PSTC application, sometimes even prior to their commencement of filming in
Canada.80
Applicants for the PSTC tax incentive must be either a taxable Canadian corporation or a foreign-owned corporation with a permanent establishment in Canada.81 Accordingly, many U.S. film studios have
formed a Canadian branch of their corporations, such as Sony Pictures
Home Entertainment-Canada and SKG Studios Canada, Inc. Others
have partnered with Canadian production companies, such as Alliance
(Universal), TVA International (20th Century Fox), Remstar (Universal),
and Cineplex Odeon (Universal). U.S. producers can also simply contract for productions services directly with Canadian companies.82
The PSTC Program is co-administered by the Canadian AudioVisual Certification Office (CAVCO), which is part of the Department
of Canadian Heritage, and the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA).
CAVCO determines the eligibility of the production and issues an accreditation certificate.83 Then, the CRA distributes the funds to the film
company.84
77. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpaccavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm (last visited August 13, 2005).
78. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC) Guidelines, available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpaccav
co/progs/cisp-pstc/pubs/guide_en.pdf (last visited November 4, 2005).
79. Id. at 3-4 (gives overview of PSTC tax credit).
80. Id. at 13-19 (discussing Canada Revenue Agency’s processing of PSTC claims).
81. Id. at 4-5 (discussing how PSTC works).
82. See The Canadian Motion Picture Distributors Association, available at http://www.cmpd
a.ca/index.jspa (last visited March 30, 2006).
83. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, Film or Video Production Services
Tax Credit (PSTC), (August 2, 2004), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpaccavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm (last visited August 13, 2005).
84. See http://www.pch.gc.ca/progrs/ac-ca-progs/bcpac-cavco/progs/cisp-stc/pubs/pstc/1_e.
cfm#2 (last visited March 20, 2006).
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Most of the productions that receive PSTC funds are fiction or
dramatic programs, and the total costs of production for projects that
qualified for PSTC funding by the end of March 2004 was $16.1 billion
(CAN).85 The portion of these budgets that had been spent in Canada
between 1998 and March of 2004 was $8.1 billion (CAN), or 50.1% of
the total.86 For the fiscal year commencing April 1, 2003 and ending
March 31, 2004, the cost of production for films receiving PSTC funds
was $2.3 billion (CAN) and the amount spent in Canada on PSTC productions that same year was $1.2 billion (CAN).87 The overwhelming
majority (approximately 95%) of originating copyright holders of
CAVCO-certified PSTC productions have been from the United States.88
Similarly, most if not all of the provinces in Canada provide a tax
credit or a tax rebate of an additional percentage of the qualifying labor
expenses incurred in the province. This percentage (with occasional
maximum amounts based on the aggregate dollar amount of the credit or
a percentage of total production expenses) ranges from 18% to 50%.89
The federal and provincial PSTC funds are cumulative, so the PSTC
funds received by a film company can be quite substantial.90
As indicated above, at least partly in response to new generous film
incentives in other countries,91 the Canadian federal government raised
the PSTC percentage from 11% to 16% in February of 2003.92 Then, in
2005, the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario,
where the overwhelming majority of foreign films are shot in Canada, all
amended their own PSTC programs to make them more generous. British Columbia and Ontario raised their PSTC percentage from 11% to

85. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, supra note 72, at 16.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Appendix B.
90. DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Production in Canada 9 (March 2005).
91. For example, the U.K., Ireland, Australia, and a number of other countries provide similar
incentives to their domestic and foreign film companies in order to entice them to shoot feature
films in those countries. See Appendix D. Some of these other film incentive programs are even
more generous than the incentive programs in Canada. These incentives include, by way of example, low interest loans, loan guarantees, income tax breaks, free training, free use of film stages and
sound studios, and outright cash grants. See id. At the time that the Canadian federal government
raised its PSTC subsidy rate, however, the Canadian dollar was also gaining in strength, so that the
costs of producing a film in Canada were also increasing. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL
CERTIFICATION OFFICE, 2002-2003 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered
by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2002, to March 31, 2003 16 (2003).
92. CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE, supra note 78, at 3-4.
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18%,93 and Quebec raised its PSTC percentage from 11% to 20%.94 Apparently, the provinces raised their rates at least in part to counter the
U.S. federal government’s new federal tax incentive for producers of
smaller-budget films. Again, in the Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the U.S
Congress enacted Section 181 of the Internal Revenue Code.95 This allows producers of feature films with budgets of $15 million or smaller to
deduct 100% of the costs to produce such a film in the years in which
these costs were incurred, so long as 75% or more of the production
costs of the film are incurred in the U.S.96 The maximum budget of the
film is $20 million if the film is shot in an economically depressed
area.97 This federal incentive is in addition to various incentives that exist in approximately 30 of the 50 U.S. states.98
From the point of view of the Canadian governments, the purpose
of allowing the U.S. film companies to participate in these incentive
programs is two-fold. First, the PSTC Program “is a mechanism designed to encourage the employment of Canadians . . . .”99 Second, Canadian governments are using the PSTC Program to enhance the development of their own local film industries over time.100 The Canadian
governments readily admit both of these goals, at least when defending
the incentives to their own taxpayers.101 In the short term, however, they
are using U.S.-developed stories, major U.S. stars, and some U.S. writers and directors to teach them the trade. That is, they are using Holly93. British Colombia Film Commission, Tax Credits, available at http://www.bcfilmcom
mission.com/finance (last visited August 13, 2005); Ontario Media Development Corporation, Tax
Incentives, available at http://www.omdc.on.ca/English/page-1-61-1.html (June 2, 2005) (last visited August 13, 2005).
94. Quebec City Film and TV Commission, Incentives, available at http://www.filmquebec.
com (last visited August 16, 2005).
95. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, supra note 29.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Appendix C.
99. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 72, at 16.
100. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 72, at 4-5 (the Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO) was created in part to administer the PSTC Program and thereby promote the development of the film industry in Canada).
101. See, e.g., Ontario Ministry of Finance, Ontario Budget 2006: Budget Paper C Details,
Section entitled “Corporations Tax Act,” subsection entitled “Enhancing the Ontario Production
Services Tax Credit” (“This Budget proposes measures that would foster economic growth and job
creation in the entertainment and creative cluster . . . As announced on February 9, 2006, the government proposes to extend the 18 per cent tax credit rate for the [Ontario Production Services Tax
Credit] OPSTC until March 31, 2007. This proposed extension reflects the government’s commitment to support Ontario’s film and television industry, and to help ensure that it remains competitive.”), available at http://www.ontariobudget.ca/English/paperc.html (last visited on April 29,
2006).
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wood to put Hollywood out of business.
VI. THE CONSISTENCY OF CANADA’S PSTC FILM INCENTIVES WITH
THE SCM AGREEMENT
All WTO Members are required to sign the SCM Agreement when
they join the WTO. Hence, as the U.S. and Canada have been Members
of the WTO since its inception in January 1995, they have been parties
to the SCM Agreement since that time. In order to demonstrate that
Canada’s PSTC film incentives are inconsistent with the SCM Agreement, it first must be illustrated that these incentives constitute a “subsidy” as Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines this term. Then, it
must be demonstrated that the PSTC incentives are provided in connection with the manufacture, production or export of merchandise or
goods102 – namely, feature films. Finally, it must be demonstrated that
the PSTC incentives constitute either a prohibited subsidy or an actionable subsidy provided to a specific industry that causes adverse effects to
the interests of another WTO Member.103 A graphical depiction of the
legal analysis required to demonstrate that Canada’s PSTC film incentives contravene Canada’s obligations under the SCM Agreement follows, and the remainder of this section of the article proceeds accordingly:

102. See SCM Agreement, Article 10, n. 36; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Art. VI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 91999), 1867 U..T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT 1994].
103. See SCM Agreement, Articles 2, 3, 5.
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SCM Agreement Analysis
Good or
Service?

Good

Service
SCM Agreement
Doesn’t Apply

SCM Agreement Applies
Meet Definition of Subsidy?
Yes

Consistent w/ SCM
Agreement

No

Meet Definition of
Prohibited Subsidy?

Specific to
Enterprise or
Industry?

Yes
Yes
Inconsistent w/
SCM Agreement

Cause Adverse
Effects (Material
Injury/Serious
Prejudice/
Nullification of
WTO Benefits)?
Yes

Inconsistent with SCM
Agreement

No
Consistent w/ SCM
Agreement

No

Consistent w/
SCM
Agreement

A. Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Constitute a Subsidy
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines a subsidy as “a financial
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a
Member . . . [for example,] where: . . .government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax
credits) . . . [ ] and a benefit is thereby conferred.”104 Clearly, the PSTC
film incentives benefit the film companies that receive them. Furthermore, the PSTC film incentives provided by the Canadian governments
104. SCM Agreement, Articles 1.1(a)(1)(ii), 1.1(b).
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are, in fact, a financial contribution by the Canadian governments to
these companies. Finally, as the incentives specifically are tax credits,
they are a named example of government revenue that otherwise would
be due that is foregone.105 Hence, there can be no question that Canada’s PSTC film incentives meet the definition of a “subsidy” set forth
in Article 1 of the SCM Agreement.
B. Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided in Connection with the
Manufacture, Production or Export of Goods – Namely, Feature Films
Article 10, note 36 of the SCM Agreement indicates that the SCM
provisions apply only to subsidies granted by WTO Members in connection with the “manufacture, production or export of any merchandise . . . .” The term “merchandise” is used interchangeably with the
words “good” and “product” throughout the SCM Agreement.106 For the
sake of convenience, the word “good” or “goods,” as applicable, will be
used throughout the remainder of this article unless otherwise noted, but
the word “merchandise” or “product” could just as easily have been
used. None of these terms is defined in the SCM Agreement. Yet, the
conclusion that the SCM Agreement applies only to the manufacture,
production or export of goods is further evidenced by the fact that the
SCM Agreement is one of the Uruguay Round Multilateral Agreements
on Trade in Goods included in Annex 1A to the April 15, 1994
Marakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.107 Article XV.1 of the
Uruguay Round General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),108
105. The fact that the PSTC film incentives are employee tax credits is evidenced by the text of
the applicable Canadian tax laws as well as the name of these tax programs. See, e.g, Canada Income Tax Act, Section 125.5 (2006). On both the federal and provincial level, the programs are
referred to as the Production Services Tax Credit Programs. (Emphasis added).
106. For example, Articles 1.1(a)(1)(iii), 3.2(b), and 14(d), paragraphs (d) and (h) of Annex I,
and notes 58 and 59 of the SCM Agreement all contain the word “good” or “goods.” Articles 3 and
5 of the SCM Agreement use the word “product” or “products,” and note 36 of the SCM Agreement
utilizes the word “merchandise.” Note also that note 36 of the SCM Agreement indicates that it is
derived from paragraph 3 of Article VI of the GATT 1994, and paragraph 3 of Article VI contains
the word “product” while note 36 of the SCM Agreement contains the word “merchandise.”
107. See supra note 19. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that SCM Agreement is
the successor agreement to the Subsidies Code (Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII), which was signed by the Members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1, T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947]
during the 1979 Tokyo Round of Multinational Trade Negotiations. As its formal name indicates,
the Subsidies Code was an elaboration of the subsidies provisions contained in Articles VI, XVI,
and XXIII of the GATT 1947. As the GATT 1947 applied only to goods, there is no question that
the SCM Agreement, which superseded the Subsidies Code, applies only to subsidies regarding a
“good.” The GATT 1994 itself superseded the GATT 1947 in the WTO era.
108. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
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which clarifies that the WTO Members have not yet made any commitments to reduce or eliminate subsidies provided to the service industries,109 also confirms this conclusion.
Should the U.S. challenge the Canadian governments’ PSTC film
incentives in the WTO, Canada is likely to claim that its incentives are
not provided in connection with the production or export of the feature
films themselves, but rather are provided in connection with the film
workers contributing their services in the creation of those films. Then,
as the SCM Agreement applies only to goods, not services, Canada
could claim that its incentives do not contravene the SCM Agreement.
Canada made a very similar argument in the WTO case of Canada Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals.110 In a WTO proceeding on
this issue, Canada might also claim that feature films in any case do not
constitute “goods.”
There is no evidence that Canada provides the PSTC incentives in
connection with the exportation of films, and thus this possibility is not
discussed further in this article. However, should Canada argue that its
PSTC incentives are not provided in connection with the films per se but
rather in connection with the production services contributed by Canadian film workers, this argument is likely to fail for the same reasons
that Canada’s argument failed in the case of Canada – Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals. Furthermore, should Canada argue that feature
films in any case are not “goods,” there are plausible arguments that can
be made to support such a conclusion.111 At the same time, there is
overwhelming support for the contrary conclusion. Each of these two
objections that Canada could raise to avoid application of the SCM
Agreement provisions to its PSTC incentives is discussed further below.
In the case of Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
Canada originally had imposed an import ban on certain foreign-origin
periodicals. The WTO Panel in that case found that this ban violated the
quantitative restrictions provision set forth in Article XI of the GATT
1994, and Canada did not appeal this conclusion.112 The WTO Appeling the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.LM. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
109. The WTO Members, with respect to subsidies provided to the service industries, are prepared only “to enter into negotiations with a view to developing the necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid . . . trade-distortive effects.” GATS, Article XV.1.
110. WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted on June 30, 1997, at 3 (II.A.1 Arguments of the Participants –
Canada – Applicability of the GATT 1994 to Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act).
111. See infra notes 162 -163 and accompanying text.
112. See WT/DS31/AB/R supra note 110, at 1-6 (I. Introduction and II.A Arguments of the
Participants – Canada).
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late Body, in its report in this case, pointed out that when Canadian government officials had learned that some foreign publishers had evaded
Canada’s import ban by electronically transmitting the content of their
magazines to Canada and printing their magazines there, Canada had
then imposed a very high excise tax on the advertising revenues received
by those publishers from Canadian advertisers. Canada did not impose
any excise tax on the advertising revenues received by the publishers of
Canadian-origin periodicals.
The U.S. then challenged Canada’s excise tax as violating the National Treatment Principle contained in the first sentence of Article III.2
of the GATT 1994, on the ground that the Canadian–origin periodicals
and the U.S.-origin periodicals in question were “like products” and the
excise tax imposed on the foreign-origin periodicals was in excess of
that imposed on the Canadian periodicals.113 The National Treatment
Principle contained in Article III.2, first sentence, of the GATT 1994
provides that “[t]he products [of any WTO Member] imported into the
territory of any other [WTO Member] shall not be subject . . . to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied . . .
to like domestic products.”114 In the alternative, the U.S. claimed that
the Canadian-origin periodicals and the U.S.-original periodicals in
question were at least “directly competitive or substitutable products”
and thus Canada’s excise tax on the U.S.-original periodicals violated
the second sentence of Article III.2 of the GATT 1994.115 The second
sentence of Article III.2 of the GATT 1994 states that WTO Members
should not afford protection to domestic goods vis-à-vis foreign-origin
goods that are directly competitive or substitutable with those domestic
goods. Canada responded to the U.S.’ allegations, in part, by arguing
that its tax was imposed not on the periodicals themselves but on the advertising services contained in those periodicals. 116 Furthermore, as
Canada had not yet agreed to comply with the National Treatment Principle with respect to the advertising services industry, Canada concluded
its excise tax could not violate the National Treatment Principle.117
In response to Canada’s argument regarding its excise tax, the Appellate Body first conceded that advertising services were an important
113. Id. at 7-9 (II.B.2 Arguments of the Participants – United States – Applicability of Part V.1
of the Excise Tax Act with Article III.2 of the GATT 1994).
114. GATT 1994, Article III.2.
115. See WT/DS31/AB/R supra note 110, at 8-9 (II.B.2 - Arguments of the Participants –
United States – Consistency of Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act with Article III.2 of the GATT 1994).
116. Id. at 2-6 (II.A.1 Arguments of the Participants – Canada – Applicability of the GATT
1994 to Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act ).
117. Id.
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service component of the good at issue – a periodical.118 In addition, the
Appellate Body clarified that certain government measures could affect
the international trade in both a “good” and a “service” and hence implicate both the GATT 1994 and the GATS.119 It then went on to hold that
Canada’s excise tax affected the international trade in the good – the periodical, and thus the tax had to comply with the provisions of the GATT
1994.120 The Appellate Body explained that its decision in this regard
was based on the fact that Canada’s excise tax was imposed on, and collected from, the publishers of the periodicals, not the advertising companies.121 Furthermore, the Appellate Body pointed out, the tax was collected on the basis of the advertising revenues that the foreign publishers
received in connection with each separate issue of a periodical.122
As discussed above, with respect to the PSTC film incentives, the
production companies, not the film workers, must apply to the applicable
Canadian governments in order to receive the incentives.123 The tax
credit granted by each of the governments is equal to a stipulated percentage of the qualifying labor expenses (or, in some cases, total production expenses)124 incurred by the producer to create each separate film.125
Some of the Canadian provinces even cap the incentive at an absolute
dollar figure or a percentage of the total production expenses incurred on
the film,126 which further illustrates that the relevant unit of measure is a
feature film, rather than the production services contributed during the
creation of the film. Additionally, the Canadian governments pay these
incentives to the producers of the films, not to the film workers involved
in the production of the films.127
Furthermore, as discussed above, the various Canadian governments clearly target their promotional materials regarding the PSTC film
incentives to the film production companies, and they market the incentives on the basis that these companies can significantly reduce a film’s
total production costs by shooting the film in Canada.128 The Canadian
governments also have often touted the success of the PSTC film incen118. Id. at 11 (IV. Applicability of the GATT 1994).
119. Id. at 12 (IV. Applicability of the GATT 1994).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 11 (IV. Applicability of the GATT 1994).
122. Id.
123. See infra note 176.
124. See Appendix B (Alberta).
125. See Appendix B.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 78, at 4-5 (discussing how PSTC works).
128. See infra note 303.
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tive programs by pointing to the significant number of films that have
been shot in Canada as a result.129 These governments have explained
that they provide the PSTC film incentives, specifically because the incentives result in more films being shot in Canada, and those films then
create immediate jobs for their people as well as assist in the development of the Canadian film industry.130 These are clear admissions on
Canada’s part that its PSTC film incentives are granted in connection
with the feature films themselves and hence affect the international trade
in feature films.131
In light of the above, if the U.S. were to bring a case in the WTO
challenging Canada’s PSTC film incentives and Canada then claimed
that its governments provide the incentives only in connection with film
production services, a WTO Panel almost certainly would follow the
Appellate Body’s decision in Canada – Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals132 and conclude that the PSTC incentives are a subsidy that
is provided in connection with the feature films themselves. This is especially likely, given the fact that the “services” at issue here – the film
production services – are even more intimately related to the production
of a feature film than advertising services are to the production of a periodical. That is, Canada had a stronger argument in the case of Canada –
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals that its excise tax affected a
service distinct from the good in which the service was incorporated, and
yet the Appellate Body nonetheless rejected Canada’s argument.133
129. See, e.g, Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Production in Canada 4 (March 2005) (“The foreign location production sector has exhibited the most
rapid growth – roughly 350 percent over the past ten years . . . .”); see id. at 9 (“A key factor in the
appeal of Canada as a location of choice for foreign productions was the introduction of the Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC) by the federal government, in 1997.”).
130. See CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE supra note 72, at 4-5, 16.
131. Note that Canada does not claim that it provides the PSTC film incentives in order to encourage the distribution of the completed films. Once a film has been produced in Canada, Canada’s stated goals in providing the incentives have been accomplished. Accordingly, there is no
argument or concern that the PSTC film incentives may be provided in connection with film distribution or film projection services (whether effected through digital or non-digital technology).
132. It is recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis is not applicable in international dispute
resolution bodies, including the WTO. See Richard Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO:
Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 A.J. I.L. 247, 254, n. 51 (April 2004) (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-29 (6th ed. 2003)). In practice,
however, WTO panels and the Appellate Body very often follow prior WTO decisions. Id. at 254,
n. 54 (citing Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decision and International Trade Law (Part One of a
Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 853 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto
Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y
1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication
(Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 873, 910-13 (2001)).
133. Note that Canada itself even argued in this case that advertising services are a more dis-
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Should the U.S. challenge Canada’s PSTC incentives in the WTO,
it also would be very helpful to the U.S. that Canada, in Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, conceded that the printed version of a periodical is a “good.” This is the case, because a feature film
is directly analogous to a periodical. Both items require that numerous
service providers dedicate their time and effort in the production of the
finished item. In the case of a periodical, these service providers include, for example, journalists, editors, designers, graphic artists, advertising salespeople, and photographers. In the case of a feature film, such
service providers include, by way of example, set designers, set builders,
casting directors, costume designers, make-up artists, stunt people, writers, directors, producers, actors, special effects experts, sound technicians, photographers, and editors.
In the case of both a periodical and a feature film, however, once
the service providers have completed their various tasks, the item in
question is recorded on some tangible, movable carrier medium. In the
case of a periodical, this medium typically is a series of pages of paper
on which words are printed and photographs are displayed. In the case
of a feature film, the medium today is usually motion picture film, at
least initially. It then can be copied onto a videotape, a hard drive, a
floppy disc, a compact disc (CD) or a digital video disc (DVD). With
respect to both a periodical and a feature film, the finished item consists
primarily of artistic and editorial content that is protected by the copyright laws, and at least in the case of a feature film, the owners of the
film typically store one or more tangible form(s) of the film in a secure
storage vault, so as to protect against its damage, loss, theft, and piracy.
Both periodicals and feature films have tariff classifications assigned to
them in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
(the Harmonized System or HS)134 that is utilized by WTO Members,135
and this latter point is significant, as the HS lists only “products” that
tinct service related to the production of a periodical than are services contributed in the production
of the periodical itself. See W/DS31/AB/R 3 (adopted June 30, 1997) (II.A.1 Arguments of the Parties – Canada – Applicability of the GATT 1994 to Part V.1 of the Excise Tax Act).
134. See, e.g., HS heading 3704 (exposed but undeveloped film); HS heading 3706 (exposed
and developed motion picture film); HS heading 8524 (recorded videotapes, compact discs (CDs),
digital video discs (DVDs), and floppy discs); HS 8471 (hard drives); HS 4902 (periodicals).
135. The WTO Members are not required to follow the HS, but they all do so, as it provides an
internationally recognized classification scheme for the goods that are traded among the Members.
See, e.g., Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, A Guide to Navigating
the AUSFTA Tariff Schedules and Rules of Origin Annexes 3 (“Members of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) use the Harmonised System (HS) for tariff classification”), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/us_fta/guide_tariff/index.html (last updated March 6,
2004) (last visited May 3, 2006).
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can be transported across international borders.136
Then, following the production of either a periodical or a feature
film, a variety of service providers typically assist in the marketing, sale,
and distribution of the item. Both items can be distributed in a physical
or digital form,137 and, in the case of a feature film, service providers
also assist in the projection of the film in theaters. Given all of these
close similarities between a periodical and a feature film, the Appellate
Body’s decision in Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
which treats a periodical as a “good” under the GATT 1994, provides
very strong support for the conclusion that a feature film likewise is a
“good” under the WTO Agreements, including the SCM Agreement.138
This conclusion is further supported by the WTO Appellate Body
decision in U.S. - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect
to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada.139 This case was brought by
Canada against the U.S. under the SCM Agreement, and the Appellate
Body opinion addressed the meaning of the word “good” contained in
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement at some length.
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement states that a subsidy
under the SCM Agreement may consist of a government’s provision to
an enterprise or industry of goods or services other than general infrastructure, or, alternatively, a government’s purchase of goods from an
enterprise or industry.140 The item in question in that case was standing
136. See Werner Antweiler Jr., Policy Analysis Division, Faculty of Commerce and Business
Administration, University of British Columbia, Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System (HTML version) 1 (“The Harmonized System is an international six-digit commodity classification developed under the auspices of the Customs Cooperation Council. Individual countries
have extended it to ten digits for customs purposes, and to 8 digits for export purposes.”) (emphasis
added), available at http://pacific.commerce.uba.ca/trade/HS.html (last visited May 3, 2006); see
also U.S. – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted on January 19, 2004, at para. 61 (“Article II of the GATT
deals with the binding of tariffs in respect of particular “products . . . .”).
137. As indicated above, the Appellate Body decision in Canada – Certain Measures Regarding Periodicals revealed that some publishers had, in fact, evaded Canada’s import ban on certain
foreign-origin periodicals by transmitting the content of their magazines to Canada via the internet
and printing their magazines in Canada. The Appellate Body nonetheless treated these magazines
as if they had been imported into Canada, because Canada should have permitted their importation
in the first place. See WT/DS31/AB/R 15-20 (adopted on June 30, 1997) (“Imported” split-run and
domestic non-split-run periodicals of the same type are directly competitive or substitutable, the
imported periodicals are taxed in excess of the domestic periodicals and this discriminatory tax
measure clearly affords protection to the domestic periodicals; hence, Canada’s excise tax violates
the second sentence of Article III.2 of the GATT 1994).
138. See supra note 132.
139. WT/DS257/AB/R 1 (adopted on January 19, 2004).
140. The SCM Agreement, Article 14(d) further explains that “the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall not be considered as conferring a benefit unless
the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
WRIGHT1.DOC

764

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:739

timber that various Canadian provinces had agreed to allow specific
companies and individuals to harvest and sell in exchange for the payment of a fee that allegedly did not constitute adequate remuneration to
those provinces. The agreements entered into by the Canadian provinces
and harvesters were referred to as “stumpage contracts.” The U.S. considered the stumpage contracts that Canada was providing to these harvesters to constitute a “subsidy” as defined by the SCM Agreement, and
the U.S. proceeded to assess countervailing duties on imports into the
U.S. of the finished lumber that had been derived from the standing timber. Canada responded that the standing timber which was the subject of
the stumpage contracts was not movable and hence was not a “good”
under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement. Thus, according to
Canada, the U.S. had violated the SCM Agreement by imposing countervailing duties on imports of finished lumber from Canada.141
The Appellate Body in that case rejected Canada’s argument that
the word “good” in the context of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) refers only to an
item that is tangible, movable, and capable of being assigned a specific
classification in the HS, which again is the tariff classification scheme
utilized by the WTO Members.142 The Appellate Body went on to point
out that “[t]he meaning of a treaty provision, properly construed, is
rooted in the ordinary meaning of the terms used,”143 and it noted that
Black’s Law Dictionary defined a “good” as “tangible or movable personal property other than money.”144 It elaborated “that the Shorter Oxadequate remuneration. SCM Agreement, Art. 14(d). The adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service in question in the country
of provision or purchase (including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation, and
other conditions or purchase or sale).” Id. Note also that Article 1.1(a)(1) lists various other items
that may constitute a “subsidy” under the SCM Agreement, including, for example, cash provided
by a government (Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)) and tax reductions and exemptions granted by a government
(Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)).
141. WT/DS257/AB/R para. 61 (adopted on January 9, 2004).
142. Id. at paras. 62-67.
143. Id. at para. 58 (quoting Article 31(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.M. T.S. 331, 8 International Legal Materials 679 [hereinafter the “Vienna Convention”]) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and
purpose.”).
144. Id. at para. 58 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 701-02 (7th ed. 1999). See also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 714 (8th ed. 2004) (containing the same definition for “good”). This
definition of the word “good” provided in Black’s Law Dictionary is consistent with other internationally recognized meanings of the word “good.” For example, Article 3.1 of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the CISG) suggests that a “good” is
any item of personal property that can be “manufactured” or “produced.” See 52 Federal Register
6262, 6264-80 (March 2, 1987), United States Code Annotated, Title 15 Appendix (Supp. 1987),
Article 3.1.
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ford English Dictionary similarly offers a more general definition of the
term ‘goods’ as including ‘property or possessions’ especially – but not
exclusively—‘movable property.’”145 Then, in accordance with these
more general definitions of a “good,” the Appellate Body held that the
standing timber in question is a “good” as that term is used in Article
1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement and accordingly the U.S. was
within its rights to initiate a countervailing duty investigation regarding
the imports of finished lumber from Canada.146
While the Appellate Body, in U.S. - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,147
was careful to caution that the meaning it had adopted for the word
“good” in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement might not be
equivalent to the definition of the term “good” used elsewhere in the
SCM Agreement or in another WTO Agreement.148 The definitions for
the word “good” provided by Black’s Law Dictionary and the Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary are still useful with respect to the meaning of
the word “good” appearing in Article 10, note 36 and elsewhere in the
SCM Agreement. Furthermore, Black’s Law Dictionary’s definitions
for the words “product” and “merchandise” are similar. As stated above,
these words are used interchangeably with the word “good” in the SCM
Agreement. Specifically, the word “product” is defined in Black’s Law
Dictionary as “[s]omething that is distributed commercially for use or
consumption and that is usually . . . tangible personal property . . . .”149
Likewise, the term “merchandise” is defined as: “a movable object involved in trade or traffic; that which is passed from hand to hand by purchase and sale . . . This definition generally excludes . . . intangibles . . . .”150 Black’s Law Dictionary, in turn, broadly defines the word
“tangible” as “[h]aving or possessing physical form . . . or [c]apable of
being understood by the mind.”151
A feature film clearly is a movable object that can be sold and
traded, either domestically or internationally. Furthermore, the carrier
medium for a film (whether in the form of motion picture film, videotape, CD, DVD, or a software disc or hard drive) possesses a physical
form, and the information recorded on the medium is certainly capable
145. Id. at para. 58 (citing Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th ed., W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2002), Vol. I, p. 1125)).
146. Id. at para 67.
147. WT/DS257AB/R 1 (adopted on January 19, 2004).
148. Id. at para. 63.
149. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (8th ed. 2004).
150. Id. at 1008.
151. Id. at 1494.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

27

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
WRIGHT1.DOC

766

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:739

of being understood by the human mind. Thus, while recognizing that
WTO decisions are not binding on future WTO panels,152 the Appellate
Body decision in U.S. - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada provides further
strong evidence that a feature film is a good under the SCM Agreement.
Additional support for the conclusion that a feature film is a good
under the SCM Agreement is provided in Articles III.10 and IV of the
GATT 1994, as well as a number of U.S. statutes and cases. Article
III.10 and IV of the GATT 1994 (previously the GATT 1947) have long
provided that WTO Members can maintain “screen quotas.” A screen
quota is a minimum amount of time that local theatres are required to
exhibit domestically-developed feature films.153 These GATT provisions were considered to be necessary, as otherwise a Member’s use of
screen quotas, through which a Member can provide more favorable
treatment to a domestic feature film than to a foreign feature film, would
violate the National Treatment Principle contained in Article III of the
GATT 1994. While these GATT 1994 provisions refer specifically to
“cinematograph” or “motion picture” films, certainly it is understood by
the WTO Members that they can rely on these screen quota provisions in
the GATT 1994 with respect to locally-developed films recorded on a
medium other than motion picture film. A number of WTO Members
currently employ screen quotas on a regular basis,154 and some countries
have even extended the idea of screen quotas to actual import quotas for
foreign feature films. China, for example, maintains an annual import
quota of 20 foreign films,155 while India maintains an annual import
quota of 100 foreign films.156 These GATT 1994 provisions specifically
referring to feature films provide especially strong support for the conclusion that a feature film is a good under the SCM Agreement.
As indicated, a feature film has also been treated as a good
throughout much of U.S. domestic law. For example, a film must be
considered to be a tangible “good” in order to receive copyright protection under Section 102(a) of Title 17 of the U.S. Code.157 A film also is
considered to be a “good” under the antitrust laws (see, e.g., United
152. See supra note 132.
153. See, e.g., various screen quota systems discussed at http://www.terramedia.co.uk/law/quot
as_and_levies.htm (last visited May 6, 2006).
154. Id.
155. See GATS/ SC/135, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/Schedules of Concessions/Trade in Services/All Commitments/China, p. 19 (last visited May 9, 2006).
156. See GATS/ SC/42, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/Schedules of Concessions/Trade
in Services/All Commitments/India, p. 6 (last visited May 9, 2006).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
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States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)), and under the U.S. Customs
laws, given that there are several Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the
U.S. (HTS) classifications assigned to feature films recorded in different
formats.158 The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is replete with references
to films, with most of these references concerning the depreciation of
films and videotapes.159 As only products can be depreciated, these IRC
provisions provide strong support for the conclusion that a feature film is
a good. Furthermore, § 263A(b)(2)(C) of the IRC160 specifically states
that “the term “tangible personal property” shall include a film, sound
recording, video tape, book, or similar property.” A stronger statement
on the issue of whether a feature film is a good or a service is difficult to
imagine.161
At the present time, the strongest argument supporting the conclu158. See supra note 134.
159. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 167, 168, 263A, and 465 (West Supp. 2005).
160. 26 U.S.C. § 263A (West Supp. 2005).
161. An interesting discussion of how Lew Wasserman, President of MCA, and Jack Valenti,
President of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), succeeded in convincing the
courts, the Internal Revenue Service, and Congress that a feature film should be considered to be
tangible property entitling film investors to an investment tax credit, is provided by Connie Bruck in
Profiles, The Personal Touch, Jack Valenti has fought Hollywood’s battles in Washington for thirtyfive years. Can he still get his way?, NEW YORK MAGAZINE (August 13, 2001) (cited in The Center
for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film Production From the
U.S. to Canada: Year 2000 Production Report 5 (2001)). Jack Valenti also at least initially opposed
any type of exemption in international trade agreements for cultural items such as feature films, allegedly stating at times that if a film is “just a toaster with pictures” (a phrase first used by former
U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Mark Fowler in an interview in Reason Magazine on November 1, 1981 (See, e.g., http://www.terramedia.co.uk/quotations/Quotes_F.
htm (last visited on May 7, 2006)), then it should be treated as such by the international trade laws.
See, e.g, Kerry A. Chase, Globalization versus Localization: Cultural Protection and Trade Conflict
in the World Entertainment Industry (draft of paper presented at panel “Hollywood and Hegemony:
Cinema, Capitalism and World Power” at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Westin Bonaventure Hotel, Los Angeles, March 14-18, 2000) 18, n. 40 (citing Senate Committee on Finance, Review of the Uruguay Round commitments to open foreign markets, hearings before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, 102nd Congress, first session, April 17 and
18, 1991, S. hrg. 102-105, pp. 61-2); see also House Committee on Ways and Means, North American Free Trade Agreement, hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means and its Subcommittee on Trade, U.S. House of Representatives, 102nd Congress, second session, September 9, 15,
17, and 22, 1992, Serial 102-135, pp. 179-180 (“Valenti told Congress that ‘if Canada . . . [insists]
that a cultural exclusion be part of that North American Free Trade Agreement, our government
must walk away from that table, or sign an agreement with Mexico only.’”); see also PAUL WEILER,
RADICALLY MODERATE LAW REFORM, INSULATING TAX PAYERS FROM BOTH TEAMS AND
STUDIOS, 19 (forthcoming) (“Hollywood leader, Jack Valenti once remark[ed] that since television
is just a ‘toaster with pictures, . . . if we’re now guaranteeing free trade for the toaster, we should be
doing the same thing for television pictures.’”). See also, speech delivered by FCC Chairman Reed
E. Hundt to the National Press Club, (Washington, D.C. July 27, 1995) (“Putting his point more
colorfully, [former FCC Chairman ] Mark [Fowler] said the TV is just a ‘toaster with pictures.’”),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh517.txt (last visited May 7, 2006).
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sion that a feature film is not a good is that while the carrier medium of a
film possesses a physical form, the message conveyed in the film can
only be perceived by the mind.162 Canada could point out that Section 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code in the U.S. (the UCC) essentially is
based on this concept with respect to computer software. This provision
of the UCC, which concerns secured transactions, provides that a software program, other than one embedded into a machine or other physical
good, is a “general intangible” rather than a good and hence does not
serve as adequate security for a debt.163 In light of all of the arguments
162. This is in contrast even to a periodical, at least when the carrier medium for the periodical
is a magazine. When one holds a magazine, s/he does not need to imagine the news articles and
photographs contained therein. They are all reflected on the printed page.
163. Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter the UCC], Art. 9, § 9-102(1). Article 2, Section 2105 of the UCC more generally provides that goods are “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities . . . and things in action.” UCC Art.2,
§ 2-105. Note also that when computer software was first added to the U.S. tariff code, duties were
assessed on software imported from all countries only on the value of the carrier medium. See, e.g.,
N.Y. A81783 (Customs ruling in 1996 that software was classified under HTS subheading
8524.91.0030 and was dutiable at the rate of 5.8 cents per square millimeter of recording surface),
available at http://rulings.cbp.gov – CROSS Customs Rulings Online Search System (last visited
May 4, 2006). Other countries disagreed with this approach, and charged duties on the entire value
of a software program, and “[h]istorically, the World Trade Organization Committee on Customs
Valuation sanctioned the practice of valuing carrier media bearing data or instructions (i.e., software) for use in data processing equipment either inclusive or exclusive of the value of the software
recorded on carrier media.” PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Trade Intelligence:Americas 11 (January/February 2006), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/eng/tax/its/M060043WMSNewsletterFin.
pdf (last visited May 4, 2006). After the Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products was signed by a number of WTO Members, including the U.S. and Canada, however,
the issue of whether all or only part of a software program constitutes a “good” essentially became
moot under the trade laws, as the WTO Members agreed in the ITA to reduce to zero all duties assessed on information technology products, including software. See WT/MIN(96)/16, Singapore,
December 13, 1996, 96-5438 [hereinafter the ITA], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/
legal_e/itadec_e.doc) (last visited May 4, 2006); see also subheading 8524.99.4000 of the HTS,
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 33 (2006) (software is classifiable under this
subheading and is dutiable at the rate of zero for countries entitled to the most favored nation
(MFN) rate of duty), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0602c.85.pdf (last
visited on May 5, 2006). Today, the U.S. still assesses duties on software imported from countries
not entitled to the MFN rate of duty at the rate of 86.1 cents/square millimeter of recording surface.
See id. Even so, the fact that the U.S., with respect to such countries, has chosen to assess duties
only on the value of the floppy disc rather than the entire value of a software program contained on
a disc can be interpreted as simply a preference to encourage trade in a new technology, rather than
as evidence that the U.S. agrees that software programs do not constitute “goods.” Cf. Rita Hayes,
U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Statement to WTO on Electronic Commerce Proposal, WTO General
Council meeting, at 7-8 (February 19, 1998).
I am not discussing how we define what is an electronic transmission, that is, whether it
is a good, a service, or something in between. While it may prove to be fascinating theoretically, I am not proposing that we debate at this time the nature of electronic transmissions. There should be WTO work in this area and we want to work with others on
ideas . . . The growth of this environment has brought us into the Information Age. And
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set forth above, however, should the U.S. challenge Canada’s PSTC film
incentives in a WTO proceeding, Canada’s reference to this provision of
the UCC likely would not be accorded much weight. This is especially
the case, given that the U.S. Government itself has in the past treated
computer software to be a product for purposes of the U.S. trade laws.164
Moreover, the U.S. Government currently collects duties (at the rate of
2.7% ad valorem) on the full value of a feature film (rather than solely
on the value of the carrier medium) when it is recorded on a CD or
DVD.165 If only the CD or DVD containing a feature film is a “good”
when a feature film is imported into the U.S. on a CD or DVD, the U.S.
Government should be assessing duties only on the value of that CD or
DVD.166
In summary, as discussed above, it appears that the PSTC film incentives constitute a “subsidy” as that term is defined in Article 1 of the
SCM Agreement and the incentives are provided in connection with the
part of this environment has been that these electronic transmissions are not considered
as importations for customs duty purposes.
Id., available at http://www.geoscopeie.com/espaces/e998USinfotec.html (last visited May 4,
2006).
164. See CASE Software of Singapore decision, 54 Fed. Reg. 37013 (1989).
165. See subheading 8524.39.8000 of the HTS, 32, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION (2006), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/tata/hts/bychapter/0602c.85.pdf (last
visited May 4, 2006); see also NY R02791 (Customs ruling that DVDs containing early childhood
education information are classified under HTS subheading 8524.39.8000 and are dutiable at the
rate of 2.7%), available at http://rulings.cbp.gov – CROSS Customs Rulings Online Search System
(last visited April 21, 2006).
166. Assessment of duties on the entire value of the CD or DVD containing a film (rather than
simply on the value of the carrier medium) on the ground that the film as well as the carrier medium
is a good is consistent with the GATT 1994, Article IV, which treats cinematographic films as
goods. That is, the images recorded on cinematographic film are tangible in the sense that they are
perceptible to the human mind but they cannot be viewed or touched any more easily than can the
images recorded on a CD or DVD.
Canada’s PSTC films incentives clearly are provided in connection with the production of
the initial recording of a film in a tangible format. It is this tangible product that is produced in
Canada and then is copyrighted and stored by the owner of the film in a secure film vault. Accordingly, the issue of whether the electronic transmission of a feature film is a product is beyond the
scope of this article. As indicated above, an electronic transmission currently is not considered to
be an “importation” and the WTO members have agreed for the time being not to assess duties on
an electronic transmission. See paragraph 46 of WTO Ministerial Declaration, Hong Kong,
WT/MIN(05)/DEC (December 18, 2005) (“We declare that Members will maintain their current
practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions until our next Session.”), available at www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.htm (last visited May 6,
2006). This does not necessarily mean, however, that an item such as a feature film that can be
electronically transmitted across borders but can then be reconstituted into a physical form in the
importing country is not a “good.” See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 163. In general, it would seem that
anything that can be perceived by the human mind, has the capability of being manifested in a
physical form, and can be copied and counted, should be considered to be a good. This proposed
definition of a good, however, is also beyond the scope of this article.
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manufacture or production of feature films, which are goods. Assuming
that these criteria are met, the SCM Agreement167 is applicable and it
specifically provides that the incentives are inconsistent with Canada’s
WTO obligations if they constitute either a prohibited subsidy or an actionable subsidy that is provided to a specific industry and adversely affects the interests of another WTO Member.168 Thus, these two types of
subsidies are addressed further below.
C. Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Most Likely Do Not Constitute
Prohibited Subsidies
Prohibited subsidies are considered to be illegal per se under the
SCM Agreement, meaning that they are considered to be so tradedistorting by definition that an explicit demonstration of injury or “adverse effects” caused by these subsidies to the domestic industry of a
complaining WTO Member is not required. There are two types of prohibited subsidies: import substitution subsidies and export subsidies.169
An import substitution subsidy is a subsidy “based in substance or in
fact upon the use of domestic, as opposed to imported, components.”170
Similarly, an export subsidy is a subsidy “based in substance or in fact
upon a firm’s export performance.”171
There is no evidence that Canada’s PSTC film incentives are conditioned either upon the use of Canadian-origin components or upon the
167. See SCM Agreement, Articles 1, 2, 3, 5.
168. Note that on October 20, 2005, the great majority of members of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) signed the Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, CLT-2005/Convention Diversite-Cult
Rev., adopted at Paris (October 20, 2005) [hereinafter the Convention]. One of the main purposes
of the Convention is to exempt “cultural products and services” from the international trade laws.
In particular, Article 6.2 of the Convention provides that countries should be permitted to subsidize
their cultural products and services, including feature films, at least to some extent, without violating any international agreement such as the SCM Agreement. The U.S. and Israel voted against this
Convention, and Australia and a few other countries abstained. The U.K. signed the Convention,
but made so many reservations that it is not clear how the Convention would apply with respect to
the U.K. All other UNESCO members signed the Convention. This Convention is not binding on
the WTO (see Convention, Article 20), and it would take several years for the WTO Members to
amend the SCM Agreement so as to exempt cultural products. At the same time, the Convention
indicates that most countries desire some type of recognition that “cultural products” and “cultural
services” are different than other products and services and should be accorded special treatment
under the international trade rules. Even if the SCM Agreement were amended to provide that
countries could subsidize the production of their own distinct cultural products, however, Canada’s
PSTC film incentives still would be illegal under the SCM Agreement to the extent that they subsidize the creation of U.S.-developed films.
169. See SCM Agreement, Articles 3.1, 3.2.
170. SCM Agreement, Article 3.2.
171. SCM Agreement, Article 3.1.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

32

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

771

exportation of the films produced with the benefit of the PSTC film incentives. Thus, it is unlikely that Canada’s PSTC film incentives are
prohibited subsidies, and hence prohibited subsidies are not discussed
further in this article.
D. Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Most Likely do Constitute
Actionable Subsidies that are Provided to a Specific Industry and Cause
Adverse Effects
Government benefits meeting the definition of a “subsidy” under
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement but not constituting “prohibited subsidies” as defined above are referred to as “actionable subsidies.”172 Actionable subsidies are inconsistent with a WTO Member’s obligations
under the SCM Agreement only if they are provided to a specific enterprise (company) or industry173 and cause “adverse effects to the interests
of other Members.”174 As discussed below, Canada’s PSTC film incentives are provided to a specific industry. Furthermore, these incentives
clearly appear to be causing adverse effects to the U.S., which is another
WTO Member. Hence, it appears likely that Canada’s PSTC film incentives contravene Canada’s obligations under the SCM Agreement.
1. Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided to a Specific
Industry
Article 1.2 of the SCM states that a subsidy is not actionable under
the SCM Agreement unless it is “specific” in accordance with the provisions of Article 2. Article 2.1(a), in turn, provides that a subsidy “ is
specific to an . . . industry . . . [w]here the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain enterprises . . . .”
The various PSTC film incentive programs in Canada state that the
incentives are limited to Canadian operations producing certified film
projects.175 Without question, then, the PSTC film incentives are provided to a specific industry – namely, the Canadian film industry.
172. SCM Agreement, Part III. (Note that non-actionable subsidies, as set forth in Part IV of
the SCM Agreement, were discontinued as of December 31, 1999, per Article 31 of the SCM
Agreement).
173. See SCM Agreement, Articles 1.2, 2.
174. SCM Agreement, Article 5.
175. See, e.g, Canada Income Tax Law, Subsection 125.5 (2006) (Foreign film companies
wishing to avail themselves of these incentives must establish a Canadian operation, enter into a
joint venture with a Canadian film company, or subcontract the film production in question to a Canadian film company).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

33

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
WRIGHT1.DOC

772

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:739

2. Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be Causing
Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry
The SCM Agreement provides that “adverse effects” to the interests
of another WTO Member may be demonstrated by a showing of:
(a) injury to the domestic industry of another Member[ ];
(b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other Members under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of
concessions bound under Article II of GATT 1994 [ ]; [or]
(c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.[ ]176

It is possible that paragraph (b), above, is not relevant in this case.
Thus, the possibility of establishing adverse effects under that paragraph
is not discussed further in this article. On the other hand, it clearly appears that the PSTC film incentives in Canada are causing adverse effects to the U.S. feature film industry under both paragraph (a) and paragraph (c), above. “Injury” in paragraph (a), above, “mean[s] material
injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry . . . .”177 “Serious prejudice” in paragraph (c), above, “includes the
threat of serious prejudice”178 and essentially means that the products
from the subsidizing WTO Member are causing or threatening to cause
the market share of that Member to increase and the complaining Member(s) to decrease in various markets.179 Each of these two prongs of the
176. SCM Agreement, Article 5, paragraphs (a)-(c).
177. SCM Agreement, Article 15, n. 45 (“Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless
otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall
be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.”); see SCM Agreement, Article 5,
n.ote 11 (The term “injury” is used in Article 5 of the SCM Agreement in the same sense that it is
used in Part V (encompassing Articles 10 – 23) of the SCM Agreement).
178. SCM Agreement, Article 5, note 13.
179. See SCM Agreement, Article 6.3(d) (By its terms, paragraph (d) of Article 6.3 of the SCM
Agreement makes clear that market share data is determinative); SCM Agreement, Article 6.4 (“For
the purpose of [SCM Article 6] paragraph 3(b), the displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in which . . . it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in relative shares
of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized like product . . . .”); Indonesia – Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, Wt/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R,
adopted on July 2, 1998 [hereinafter Indonesia – Autos], paras. 14.210-14.211 (“[With respect to
whether “serious prejudice” can be found under Article 6.3(a) of the SCM Agreement,] market
share data may be highly relevant evidence for the analysis of such a claim.”), available at
http://www.wto.org/docsonline/gen-home.asp (follow “Search for Documents: “Simple Search”
hyperlink; then enter “WT/DS54/R” into Document Symbol” search field 9 (last visited May 6,
2006)). Certainly, market share data also is relevant on the fourth test for a finding of “serious
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“adverse effects” test is discussed further, below.
a. Material Injury
Again, the SCM Agreement180 provides that the determination of
injury in this context “shall . . . be taken to mean material injury to a
domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry.” 181 In addition, Article 15.1 of the SCM Agreement stipulates that such a determination shall “involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of
the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices
in the domestic market for like products[ ] and (b) the consequent impact
of these imports on the domestic producers of such products.”
More specifically, Articles 15.2 and 15.4 of the SCM Agreement
clarify that:
With regard to the volume of the subsidized imports, the investigating
authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase
in subsidized imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production
or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of
the subsidized imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall
consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the
subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like product of the
importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise
to depress prices to a significant degree or to prevent price increases,
which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one
or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
...
The examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors
and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash
flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital
prejudice,” set forth in paragraph (c) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, which is “the effect of
the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as compared with the price
of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market.” See SCM Agreement, Article 6.3(c).
180. See SCM Agreement, n. 11 (The term “injury” is used in Article 5 in the same sense that
it is used in Part V of the SCM Agreement).
181. SCM Agreement, n. 45.
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or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been
an increased burden on government support programmes.
This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.

In a subsidies case, there is no requirement that the different causes
of “injury” or “threat of injury” to a domestic industry be compared so
as to ascertain whether the subsidies provided are the most important, or
even one of the most important, causes of the injury or threat of injury.182 So long as the subsidized imports in question are one of the
causes of the injury or threat thereof (and the harm caused by other factors is not attributed to the subsidized imports), the subsidy program in
question is inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.183
As indicated, this article focuses on the harm that the PSTC film incentives provided y the Canadian governments to feature film producers
are causing to the U.S. Therefore, each of the various indicators of harm
mentioned above and discussed further below focuses on the harm occurring in that industry. To begin with, though, the product in the U.S.
that is “like” the subsidized Canadian-origin feature films must be ascertained. 184
(1) Like Product to Subsidized Feature Films
Article 15, note 46 of the SCM Agreement provides that:
Throughout this Agreement the term “like product” (“produit similaire”) shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e.,
alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in
all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product
under consideration.185

Furthermore, with respect to ascertaining whether a foreign and a
domestic product are “like products,” almost all GATT and WTO Panels186 have followed the approach set forth in the Report of the Working
182. SCM Agreement, Article 15.5; see also JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 34, at
728.
183. Id.
184. See SCM Agreement, Articles 6.3, 15.1 (“Serious prejudice” and “material injury” analyses concern the harm caused by a subsidy to the industry in the complaining WTO Member that
produces a “like product”).
185. SCM Agreement, Article 14, note 46.
186. See, e.g, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
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Party on Border Tax Adjustments, which was then adopted by the GATT
Contracting Parties in 1970.187 The relevant section of Border Tax Adjustments provides:
[T]he interpretation of the term should be examined on a case-by-case
basis. This would allow a fair assessment in each case of the different
elements that constitute a “similar” product. Some criteria were suggested for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a product is
“similar”: the product’s end-uses in a given market; consumers’ tastes
and habits, which change from country to country; the product’s properties, nature and quality.188

Additional criteria considered by other WTO Panels on the issue of
“like products” include whether the two products possess the same tariff
classification and how producers of the two products have analyzed
market segmentation.189
When a U.S.-developed feature film is produced in Canada rather
than in the U.S. on account of the exceedingly generous PSTC film incentives provided by the Canadian governments, the same feature film
would not actually be produced in the U.S. Thus, two separate copies of
the same feature film, one of Canadian-origin and one of U.S.-origin,
cannot be compared. One can compare, however, a feature film that is
produced in Canada with the same feature film, had it been produced in
the U.S. The feature film produced in Canada would not be identical to
the feature film that otherwise would have been produced in the U.S. To
be sure, though, the feature film, had it been produced in the U.S. would
possess characteristics closely resembling those of the subsidized feature
film. That is, the feature film, whether produced in Canada or the U.S.,
would portray the same story and contain essentially the same scenes.
Certain scenes and actors probably would be different. As discussed
above, however, the leading actors typically would be the same, whether
the feature film is produced in Canada or the U.S. There is no evidence
that the ultimate customer of feature films, the movie-going public, perceives that U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada are dissimilar to U.S.-developed feature films produced in the U.S. Moreover, if
the movie-going public were to ever perceive such a difference, U.S.
WT/DS11/R, adopted on November 1, 1996, at 11 (H.1 Article III:2) (citing Report of the Working
Party on Border Tax Adjustments, infra note 187).
187. Report of the Working Party, Border Tax Adjustments, L/3464, GATT B.I.S.D. (18th
Supp.), December 2, 1970, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/bordertax.
pdf (last visited May 4, 2006).
188. Id. at 97, para. 18.
189. Indonesia –Autos, supra note 179, at paras. 14.177, 14.197.
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film producers in all likelihood would no longer shoot their films in
Canada. Accordingly, a U.S.-developed feature film produced in Canada and the same feature film produced in the U.S., would appear to be
“similar” and hence “like” in accordance with the above-quoted broad
definition of “like products” in Article 15, note 46 of the SCM Agreement.
Moreover, with respect to a U.S.-developed feature film produced
in Canada and the same feature film produced in the U.S., they would
have the same physical characteristics, end use (high-quality film entertainment lasting approximately two hours), and tariff classification under
the HS. Furthermore, as there is no evidence that the movie-going public discerns any difference between a U.S.-developed feature film produced in Canada and a U.S.-developed feature film produced in the U.S.,
it would appear that both the public and the producers of the feature
films consider such films to be interchangeable. The factor of “consumers’ tastes and habits” would therefore also indicate that a feature
film produced in Canada is “like” the same feature film produced in the
U.S.
In fact, all U.S.-developed feature films produced in the U.S. possess characteristics closely resembling U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada and subsidized by the Canadian governments. They
possess the same physical features and tariff classification, and they all
have the same end use of entertaining people with a feature-length film
portraying U.S.-developed stories, cultural values, and themes. It even
appears that, to an extent, the movie-going public considers such feature
films as a group to be interchangeable with one another. This is demonstrated when a person is unable to view one feature film, either at the
theatre or the movie rental store, s/he will often chose another feature
film to view instead.190 Significantly, there is no evidence that the country of production of the film – U.S. or Canada – affects a person’s choice
of which feature film to view.
At the same time, it appears that people do not necessarily substitute a TV program for a feature film, especially as TV programs tend to

190. See review of the movie Last American Virgin, posted on Permalink, A Small Victory:
One Man’s Underrated Film is Another’s Piece of Crap (August 9, 2003). This movie often gets
tied in with the other teen sex movies of the 80’s; Valley Girl and Fast Times at Ridgemont High.
People often confuse the abortion story in Virgin with the abortion story in Fast Times. And they
confuse the soundtracks of all the movies and sometimes they think Nick Cage was in Virgin, but he
was in Valley Girl. They are all simply the same movie with interchangeable characters and plot
lines, but only one had Jeff Spicoli.”), available at www.asmallvictory.net/archives/004180.html
(last visited May 4, 2006).
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be shorter in duration than a feature film.191 To date, these two different
types of film products have been sold through different distribution
channels.192 In addition, film producers, at least until very recently, have
tended to segment the film market into “feature films” and “TV programs,” as is evidenced by the common division of film companies that
produce both types of films into the “Feature Film Division” and the
“TV Division.”193 Thus, U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada do not appear to be “like” U.S.-developed TV programs produced in
the U.S.
In light of all of the above, it appears that the proper domestic industry in the U.S. to investigate to determine whether the PSTC film incentives provided to Canadian producers of feature films (including U.S.
companies with operations in Canada) are causing material injury or a
threat thereof in the U.S. is the U.S. feature film production industry.
Therefore, all of the factors mentioned in Article 15 of the SCM Agreement as being relevant on the issue of material injury and discussed below focus on the harm suffered by that industry.
(2) Significant Increase in Subsidized Imports
Numerous reports demonstrate that Canada’s PSTC film incentives
have been successful in luring U.S. film producers north of the U.S. border to shoot their feature films in Canada. The figures compiled in the
191. See, e.g., The Mark Cuban Weblog, The Problem with unlimited on demand video (April
11, 2006).
Cut to the movie industry. The movie industry is non linear. Movies come out and essentially are available as PPV with the delivery mechanism being the theater or on DVD.
But as with any non linear network, the user has to proactively choose the content rather
than just turning to a channel and have it available to them . . . TV is about getting away
from hassles and relaxing. Its about choosing to be entertained, educated or informed.
Its not about working to do any of these. Its lean back experiences.
Id., available at http://www.blogmaverick.com (last visited May 4, 2006).
192. Historically, advertisers rather than viewers have paid for TV programs, and the available
TV programs simply have been broadcast at pre-announced times so that viewers can “tune in” if
they are interested in any particular program. In contrast, viewers have paid for movies, and the
viewers in one way or another have had to “order” a particular movie to watch. See, e.g., Matthew
Honan, Here Comes the iTunes Movie Store, Macworld (March 27, 2006) (“[NPD Techworld analyst Ross] Rubin . . . notes that films and TV shows have two very different distribution models.
‘[TV shows] were not really competing with any other media, the incremental revenue provided a
way to monetize access that didn’t exist before. With movies it’s a little different,’ . . . [with] existing distribution outlets, such as pay per view.”), available at http://playlistmag.com/feat
ures/2006/03/27/moviestore/index.php (last visited May 4, 2006).
193. See, e.g, Warner Brothers is divided into many divisions, two of which are “Warner Bros.
Pictures Inc.” and “Warner Bros. Television Distribution Inc.” See description of Warner Brothers’
divisions, available at http://www.warenrbros.co.uk/main/privacy/privacy_list.html (last visited
May 4, 2006).
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major reports documenting this phenomenon are discussed below. As
these films are then imported into the U.S. at the conclusion of filming,
there necessarily has been a significant increase in subsidized Canadianorigin feature film imports into the U.S.194
(a) CFTPA Reports
The most comprehensive figures published in Canada regarding the
feature film production industry since enactment of the PSTC Programs
are those found in the annual Profile reports published by the Canadian
Film and Television Production Association (CFTPA) (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “CFTPA Reports” or individually as the
“CFTPA Profile [Year] Report”).195 The CFPTA Profile 2006 Report
can be accessed directly from that home page, and past CFTPA Profile
Reports can be accessed by choosing “Newsroom” and then “Archives,”
starting from that home page.
The figures stated in the CFTPA Reports, as summarized below in
Exhibit 1, reveal that total feature film production in Canada grew from
$420 million in 1997, just prior to enactment of the federal PSTC Program, to $1.04 billion by the beginning of 2004. This represents a
growth rate of 148% in the Canadian feature film production industry
during that time period. During 2004 (the last year for which final annual figures are publicly available in Canada), total feature film production in Canada decreased to $801 million, which decrease, according to
the Canadian federal government, was attributable in part to (1) competing film subsidies offered by third countries; (2) competing film subsidies offered by the U.S. state and federal governments; (3) unusual external conditions such as the SARS panic; and (4) an unfavorable
exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.196 As a result, in 2005, several of
the Canadian provinces increased their PSTC incentive percentages significantly, and there is some evidence that these more generous incentives have already had some effect in halting this downward trend.197 In
any case, the growth rate in the Canadian feature film production industry between 1997 and the beginning of 2005 was still 110%, as revealed
in the CFTPA Reports.
The tremendous growth in Canada’s feature film production industry clearly is attributable to the growth in “foreign location production,”
194.
195.
196.
Canada
197.

See supra Part IV (U.S. Film Industry).
For general information on the CFTPA Report, see http://www.cftpa.ca.
Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Production in
1 (March 2005).
Id.
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which is defined as the shooting in Canada of feature films that were developed elsewhere.198This foreign location production sector grew approximately 350% between 1995 and 2005.199 Exhibit 1 demonstrates
that, in 1997, foreign location shooting constituted only 51% of total feature film production in Canada. Following implementation of the PSTC
Program in 1998, however, this percentage rose to 80% by 2003, before
dropping slightly to 76% in 2004. Furthermore, the Canadian Government reports that its generous tax incentives, in particular its PSTC film
incentives, are largely responsible for this significant growth in foreign
location shooting.200
Exhibit 1 also demonstrates that the production of U.S.-developed
feature films in Canada for the most part has been growing steadily since
commencement of the Canadian federal PSTC Program, until very recently, in 2004. In 1997, U.S. film companies spent approximately $202
million on the production of feature films in Canada. Then, with the exception of a slight decrease in production expenditures during 20002001 attributable to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and U.S. companies’ subsequent fears of doing business abroad as well as a writers’ strike in Hollywood, the production expenditures of U.S. film companies in Canada
increased 290% between 1997, and the beginning of 2004. During 2003
alone, U.S. film companies spent approximately $789 million shooting
feature films in Canada. The shooting of U.S.-developed feature films in
Canada dropped to $576 million in 2004, but, again, the enactment of
even more generous PSTC tax incentives in several of the Canadian
provinces in 2005 seems to have at least slowed this downward trend.

198. See, e.g., CFTPA Profile 2005 Report, at 17 (detailing growth in both foreign location
production and Canadian production in Canadian feature film production industry); CFTPA Profile
2006 Report, at 69 (“Foreign location production is film or video production shot in Canada by U.S.
or foreign studios and independent producers. In this type of production, the U.S. or foreign producer retains the copyright, but Canada benefits in the form of direct and spin-off jobs and economic activity.”); Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 196, at 3 (“Foreign location production . . . is film or video production taking place in Canada, but financed by a non-Canadian
owned and controlled company.”).
199. Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 196, at 4.
200. Id. at 9.
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EXHIBIT 1 201
Production of Feature Films in Canada (U.S. Dollars, Millions)
19971997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2004

420

530

760

714

632

824

1041

801

5722

148%

110%

110%

830

606

4247

290%

185%

185%

All Canadian Films
% Growth
from 1997
Total
Foreign
Location
Production

213

382

561

549

476

630

% Growth
from 1997
% For
Location of
all Canadian
Films

51%

72%

74%

77%

75%

76%

80%

76%

74%

202*

363*

533*

522*

452*

598*

789*

576*

4035*

290%

185%

185%

U.S.
Foreign
Location
Production
% Growth
1997-2004

201. Annual Profile reports published by Canadian Film and Television Production Association (CFTPA) for these years. Note that CFTPA reports figures in accordance with Canada’s fiscal
year, which begins on April 1 of each year. Accordingly, the figures reported for each year cover
nine months of the year indicated and three months of the following year. For example, the “1997”
figures are for the twelve-month period commencing on April 1, 1997 and ending on March 31,
1998. These reports are available at http://www.cftpa.ca. The CFPTA Profile 2006 Report can be
accessed directly from that home page, and past CFTPA Profile Reports can be accessed by choosing “Newsroom” and then “Archives,” starting from that home page (last visited on May 7, 2006).
As the 2001-02 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, at 20 (2002), the 2002-03 Activity Report:
Activities and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003,
at 16 (2003), and the 2003-04 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004, at 16 (2004) all state that the overwhelming majority (95%) of foreign location production is U.S.-developed, each of the figures highlighted
with an asterisk is simply 95% of the applicable total foreign location production figure. CAVCO is
part of the Department of Canadian Heritage, and all of CAVCO’s Activity Reports are available
on-line at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-cavco/act_reports_e.cfm (last visited May
7, 2006).
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(b) Department of Canadian Heritage Reports
Figures published by the Department of Canadian Heritage, as set
forth in Exhibit 2 below, confirm that approximately $830 million in total foreign location production expenses were incurred in Canada to produce feature films in 2003. Of this figure, approximately 95%, or approximately $800 million, was attributable to U.S.-developed feature
films produced in Canada during that year. As of the spring of 2006, the
Department of Canadian Heritage had not yet published figures for
2004. Assuming, according to figures published in the CFTPA Reports
discussed above, that production expenditures incurred by U.S. film
companies in producing feature films in Canada in 1997 totaled approximately $200 million, then the CAVCO Reports substantiate that
approximately $600 million in feature film expenditures migrated to
Canada from the U.S. between 1997 and the end of 2003.
EXHIBIT 2 202
Feature Film Production in Canada

(U.S. Dollars, Millions)
1998
Total Foreign
Location
Production
U.S. Foreign
Location
Shooting

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

382

561

549

476

629

830

363*

533*

522*

452*

598*

789*

202. Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location Production in
Canada 29 ( March 2005) (Annex D) (citing CFTPA Profile 2005 and Association of Provincial
Funding Agencies (APFA)). This report is available at www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ged-gol/index_e.cfm
(at this home page, choose “Publications”) (last visited May 7, 2006).
As the 2001-02 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, at 20 (2002), the 2002-03 Activity Report:
Activities and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003,
at 16 (2003), and the 2003-04 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by
CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004, at 16 (2004) all state that the overwhelming majority (95%) of foreign location production is U.S.-developed, each of the figures highlighted
with an asterisk is simply 95% of the applicable total foreign location production figure. CAVCO is
part of the Department of Canadian Heritage, and all of CAVCO’s Activity Reports are available
on-line at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-ca/progs/bcpac-cavco/act_reports_e.cfm (last visited May
7, 2006).
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(c) CEIDR Reports
The tremendous growth in the production of U.S.-developed feature
films in Canada following Canada’s enactment of the PSTC Program in
1997 is also demonstrated by a U.S. source, the Center for the Entertainment Industry Data and Reports (CEIDR), in three reports that the
CEIDR published in 2000, 2001, and 2002.203 These reports, hereinafter
referred to as the CEIDR Reports, cover feature film production in the
U.S. and Canada (including all feature-length films that grossed at least
$500,000 at the box office) during the production years 1998 - 2001.
These figures, as compiled in the CEIDR Report for 2001 (published in
2002), are reproduced in Exhibit 3, below.
These figures demonstrate that total feature film production expenditures incurred in Canada grew from $430 million in 1998 to $1.047
billion in 2001, resulting in an overall 144% increase in the production
of feature films in Canada during that four-year period.204 Furthermore,
the CEIDR Reports document that this approximate $617 million growth
in feature film production in Canada was accompanied by an approximate $683 million loss in feature film production in the U.S. during
those four years. This $683 million loss in the U.S. represented a loss of
17.4% of the U.S. feature film production industry during those years
alone, according to the CEIDR Report for 2001.205

203. Stephen Katz & Associates, 1999 Motion Picture and Movie-of-the-Week Production Survey (2000); The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature
Film Production From The U.S. to Canada: Year 2000 Production Report (2001); The Center for
Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film Production From The
U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report (2002). All of these reports can be found
at www.ceidr.org (last visited on March 17, 2006).
204. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE supra note 5, at 19 (The CFTPA, Department of
Canadian Heritage, and CEIDR Report figures are also substantiated in part by a U.S. Department
of Commerce estimate that $355 million was paid to Canadians working on the production of U.Sdeveloped feature films in the year 2000).
205. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data & Research, The Migration of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 201, at
3.
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EXHIBIT 3 206
Feature Film Production in the U.S. and
Canada (U.S. Dollars, Millions)

Budgets of Features
Produced in U.S.

Absolute %
2000 2001 Growth Growth

1998

1999

3928

3554 3365 3244
-683

1998-2001

17.40%

1998-2001
Budgets of Features
Produced in Canada
1998-2001
1998-2001

430

413

1022 1047
+617
+144%

(d) Los Angeles County Economic Development
Corporation Reports
The Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation (the
LAEDC) published a report in November 2005207 that provides strong
evidence that the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film production industry has continued unabated since 2001. Exhibit 4, shown below, reproduced from the above report, illustrates that “location production days”
in the Los Angeles area decreased from a high of 46,808 in 2000 to a
low of 43,976 in 2001, then increased very slightly to 44,415 in 2002,
and then decreased again to 44,231 in 2003. The number of location
production days then increased to 52,707 in 2004, but according to this
report, this recent increase in location production days was due primarily
206. Center for the Entertainment Industry Data & Research, The Migration of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report 4 (2002). All of
these reports can be found at www.ceidr.org (last visited on March 17, 2006).
207. Film Industry Profile, supra note 2.
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to “a jump in activity due to [reality] TV production.”208 “Location production days” are defined as off-studio lot film production activities (including TV and feature film production) in the City of Los Angeles, unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County, and the cities of Diamond
Bar, South Gate and West Hollywood. Included within these figures are
also production days in the Angeles National Forest and the facilities of
the Los Angeles Unified School District.209
As the figures in Exhibit 4 include TV production as well as feature
film production, they do not reveal the true state of the feature film industry. However, as TV production in the U.S. has started to increase in
recent years on account of reality TV, as indicated above, the figures
most likely mask a more serious outsourcing trend for the U.S. feature
film production industry. Furthermore, as indicated, these figures by
definition do not include feature films shot by the major studios, and, as
stated above, by 2004, 45% of major studio feature films were filmed
outside of the U.S.210
Furthermore, the LAEDC’s description of the state of the film production industry in the Los Angeles area during 2001-2004 only tells
part of the story, as filming takes place in many other areas of the U.S.,
and Los Angeles clearly has lost production to other states on account of
those states’ generous film incentives. At the same time, the overwhelming majority (87.5%) of California’s film industry workers works
and lives in Los Angeles County,211 and in 2002 California itself employed between 58% and 70% of all U.S. film workers212 and generated
between 69% and 81% of film industry earnings nationwide.213 Thus, as
the Los Angeles area clearly is the center of film production in the U.S.,
the substantial decrease in feature film production in the Los Angeles
area appears to provide even further evidence that there has been a significant outsourcing of the U.S. feature film production industry to other
countries, including Canada.

208. Id. at 4.
209. Id.
210. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 15.
211. Film Industry Profile, supra note 2, at 4.
212. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 2 (different percentages
based on different figures reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
and the MPAA).
213. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

46

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

2006]

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

785

EXHIBIT 4 214
Los Angeles Area Location Production Days - Off-Studio Lots
Production Days

60,000
47,669 45,658 46,410 46,808
43,976 44,415 44,231
43,982

50,000
days

40,000
30,000

52,707

33,982
26,640 26,698

20,000
10,000
0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
year

(e) Anecdotal Evidence
Overwhelming anecdotal evidence confirms the above statistics
documenting the significant decline of the feature film production industry in the U.S. For example, citing off-shore production of film projects,
the Directors Guild of America (DGA) removed the five cities of Atlanta, Boston, Dallas, Miami and Orlando from its list of “production
centers” in mid-2002.215 A DGA spokesman said that there simply was
not sufficient work in these cities “to merit continuing the production
center designation.” 216 Similarly, for several years, North Carolina was
third in the nation behind California and New York in terms of total film
production revenue from all sources (feature films, television, commercials, and industrial films).217 For example, in 1999, total direct spend-

214. Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation, Film Industry Profile of California/Los Angeles County 4 ( November 29, 2005), available at http://www.laedc.info/pdf/Film2005.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006).
215. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration Of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at
10 (citing Dave McNary, DGA Scratches 5 Cities From List, DAILY VARIETY (May 28, 2002)).
216. Id.
217. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 17 (citing Bashirah Muttalib, N.C. Prod’n Breezy in ‘00,
DAILY VARIETY (June 21, 2000); Bashirah Muttalib, Watering WB’s “Tree:” N.C. Beats Out Vancouver For New Series, DAILY VARIETY (June 19, 2003)).
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ing on film-making there came to approximately $300 million.218 By
2002, it was down 23% to $230.8 million.219
The DGA maintains figures regarding the U.S. share of feature
films produced under DGA contracts, and this data reveals that, in 2003,
of 154 feature films released under DGA contracts, 20 were filmed in
Canada, 8 in Europe, 3 in Australia or New Zealand and 6 in the
U.K./Ireland.220 The DGA’s figures also illustrate that the U.S. share of
total feature productions declined each year from 2001 to 2003.221
At the other end of the spectrum from big-budget films shot under
DGA contracts are small-budget independent films. Evidence regarding
the outsourcing of this type of film is just as alarming. At a meeting of
independent film producers, held in Beverly Hills on June 17, 2004,222
Tom Berry, president of Reel One Entertainment, explained that he intended to make 8 movies in 2004, all in Canada. Crystal Sky presidentCEO Steven Paul said that five years ago, he made all of his movies in
the U.S., but now he produces most of his 8-10 projects a year out of the
country. Andrew Stevens, president-CEO of Andrew Stevens Entertainment, reported that he was planning to shoot 12 pictures that year,
but only 2 to 4 of them were to be made in the U.S. Nu Image reported
that it was planning to produce 12 features in 2004, but only two of them
would be shot in the U.S. As Nu Image company co-chairman Avi
Lerner said, “It’s all about money[,]”clearly meaning that U.S. filmmakers can make more money by producing their films outside of the U.S on
account of foreign countries’ exceedingly generous film subsidies.
Again, by 2004, a number of other countries had copied Canada’s
successful film subsidy programs and the outsourcing of the U.S. entertainment industry picked up even more steam. A review of the June 10,
2004 issue of the magazine Production Weekly, for example, listed a total of 52 feature films with scheduled start dates. 223 Of these 52 features, 28 were scheduled to be shot in the Untied States, 20 were scheduled to be shot in foreign countries (including 5 in Canada) and 4 were
to be shot in unknown locations.” 224

218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 12.
221. Id.
222. Representatives of FTAC attended this meeting and recorded the comments attributed to
the various independent film producers at this meeting. These comments were subsequently reported in the FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 17.
223. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 16-17 (citing Production Weekly, Issue #421, available at
http://www.productionweekly.com (last visited June 10, 2004)).
224. Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

48

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

787

All of the above figures demonstrate that the outsourcing of the
U.S. feature film production industry to other countries, especially Canada, has been quite significant. Furthermore, as more and more U.S.developed feature films are shot in Canada and are then imported into
the U.S. for marketing, distribution and the occasional performance of
post-production services, importations into the U.S. of subsidized, Canadian-origin feature films have also increased significantly.225 Accordingly, the first prong of the material injury test – increasing imports of
the subsidized product – is met.
(3) Effect of Subsidized Imports on U.S. Prices
Typically, one part of a film company in the U.S. does not shoot a
movie and then sell it to another part of that same company for distribution. Thus, such U.S. “sale prices” are not available for comparison to
the price of U.S.-developed feature films produced in Canada and then
imported into the U.S. for distribution. In any event, though, an arm’s
length price for a feature film produced in Canada and then imported
into the U.S. and an arm’s length price in the U.S. for a feature film produced in the U.S. and then sold to another company in the U.S. for distribution would cover the costs of film production plus a reasonable
profit figure. Furthermore, as the profit figure included in both such
prices would be derived rather than actual in any case, the proper analysis for determining the effect of the increasing imports of subsidized feature films produced in Canada on U.S. “prices” essentially would involve a review of the effect of those subsidies on the costs of shooting a
feature film in the U.S. When viewed in this manner, there is no question that the costs of producing feature films in the U.S. have been suppressed so that they can compete with the heavily subsidized U.S.developed films produced in Canada and other countries.
One source reports that the average budget for a feature film produced in the U.S. declined by $3.9 million (13%) from $31.2 million in
2000 to $27.3 million in 2001.226 Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests
225. In the future, more and more feature films may be transmitted to the U.S. via electronic
means, and today, electronic transmissions are not considered to be “importations” and customs
duties are not assessed on such submissions. See supra note 167. Therefore, in the future, it may be
difficult to establish that importations of subsidized feature films into the U.S. are increasing. This
is beyond the scope of this article, however, as most feature films produced outside of the U.S. today are transmitted to the U.S. in a tangible format. See supra Part IV (US. Film Industry). At the
same time, given that a feature film can be reconstituted into a physical product following its electronic transmission, a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body still could rule, in the context of the SCM
Agreement, that electronic transmissions of subsidized feature films into a country constitute importations. See supra note 167.
226. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film
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that this downward pressure on the costs of production in the U.S. has
continued, and every cost component has been affected. For example, as
is discussed below, wages and salaries, as well as various fringe benefits,
of feature film production workers in the U.S. have decreased. Similarly, as explained below, businesses such as restaurants, hotels, and costume shops catering to the feature film industry in the U.S. have reduced
their costs to local film production companies in order to retain business
in the local area. Even so, many of these businesses nonetheless have
gone out of business entirely. Finally, as is discussed above, state and
local governments have provided all kinds of incentives and subsidies,
such as reduced fees for film permits and land rentals, grants, loan guarantees, and tax incentives to the U.S. movie houses in order to entice
them to retain film production in the U.S. Again, even the federal government, in the Jobs Creation Act of 2004,227 provided a tax incentive
for U.S. movie companies to film at least smaller-budget films in the
U.S. Of course, U.S. taxpayers, including, in particular, the film industry workers who live in the areas most affected by the outsourcing of the
U.S. film industry, ultimately pay the cost of these government subsidies, thereby reducing their wages and salaries even further. All of these
sacrifices on the part of film workers, companies providing services to
the film industry, and members of the public, have combined to lower
the costs of feature film production in the U.S. below what they otherwise would be. This phenomenon is discussed in detail below.
(a) Reduced Wages, Salaries and Fringe Benefits
of Film Production Workers
Numerous employees in the feature film production industry have
lost their jobs in the industry in recent years. Those workers, of course,
no longer receive any type of wage, salary or fringe benefit from the film
industry. In fact, many former film production workers in the U.S. are
no longer even eligible for unemployment insurance payments as they
have been out of work for so long.228 The magnitude of lost jobs in the
U.S. feature film production industry is discussed below in the section
entitled “Actual and Potential Negative Effects on Employment.”229
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at
1. In Canada, for the same period, there was a slight decline of $0.8 million (-3%) from $27.6 million in 1998 to $26.8 million in 2001, as Canada began to suffer its own runaway production problem. Id.
227. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 108 Cong. § 244 (2004).
228. See supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh,
and Ann Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)).
229. See infra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(4).(d) (Actual and Potential Negative Effects on Em-

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

50

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

789

In addition, many of those individuals who have been able to obtain
work in the U.S. feature film production industry have had to make significant wage, salary, and benefit concessions in order to obtain this
work. The Screen Actors Guild (the SAG), for example, reports that its
members for several years have had to forego wage increases and at
times even agree to reduce their wage rates and overall benefits in order
to decrease the production costs for U.S. feature film makers. Some cities, such as New York City, have even boasted on their websites that
film industry employees have agreed to take wage cuts in order to retain
feature film production locally.230
The Hollywood Entertainment Labor Council reported in 2002 that
SAG members were losing not only current wages, but also future residual payments and contributions to their health and pension funds, to outsourced film production.231 In 2004, the SAG announced that it was even
raising the eligibility requirements for its health plan. 232 Among the
reasons cited for this action were not just the expected skyrocketing
costs of prescriptions and medical treatment but runaway production and
its resulting decline in contributions to the plan’s funding from current
members’ earnings.233
Of course, the major stars typically do not sacrifice their salaries or
benefit packages in order to retain feature film production in the U.S.
They simply relocate to the applicable foreign country for the duration
of film shoots. Recently, though, even some of these people have been
affected by the increasing imports of subsidized feature films from Canada and other countries. For example, Arnold Schwarzenegger, when he
was running for Governor of California in 2003, agreed to take a massive $8.4 million reduction to his salary for starring in Terminator Three,
so that Warner Brothers would agree to shoot the movie in California
rather than in Canada.234
ployment).
230. The City of New York Mayor’s Office of Film, Theatre and Broadcasting, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/film/html/incentives/made_ny_incentive.shtml (last visited June 14, 2005,
however, language no longer appears on website).
231. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at
10 (citing Dave McNary, Cannes heat on SAG Rule 1, DAILY VARIETY (May 19, 2002)).
232. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 18 (citing Dave McNary, SAG forced to cut back health
plan, DAILY VARIETY (July 31, 2001)).
233. Id.
234. See Internet Movie Database, Terminator Three, available at http://www.imdb.com/tital/
tt0181852/news (published on March 7, 2002) (last visited on March 30, 2006). Since becoming
Governor of California, Swartzenagger has also formed a commission, together with Governor
Pataki of New York, to investigate methods of retaining film production in the U.S., including
granting additional state and local tax incentives to film companies that shoot their films in those
states.
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(b) Reduction of Other Direct Costs of Film
Production
A wide variety of feature film production support companies, such
as film development laboratories, talent agencies, costume rental companies, and hotels and restaurants have suffered serious economic harm
as a result of outsourced feature film production. These companies, like
the film production workers themselves, have attempted to reduce their
fees and costs in order to retain feature film production in the U.S., but
many such companies have gone out of business in any case. Many examples of the hardships faced and concessions made by these companies
are discussed below in the section entitled “Utilization of Capacity.”
These price reductions offered by such support companies clearly contribute to the depression of the costs of feature film production in the
U.S.
(c) Reduction of Feature Film Production Costs
through Government Subsidies in U.S.
As discussed above, a number of state and local governments in the
U.S., in an effort to retain feature film production in the U.S. (and also to
develop their own feature film production industries), have provided a
wide range of types of assistance to film companies. These subsidies include, for example, reduction or elimination of fees for items such as police protection, reduced costs for stage and studio rentals, low interest
loans, loan guarantees, reduction or elimination of various taxes, including, for example, reduction or elimination of sales taxes charged by
businesses such as hotels and restaurants catering to the film industry,
and outright grants of funds.
Warner Brothers, for example, received from North Carolina, New
Hanover County, and Wilmington an outright grant of $750,000 to
maintain the production of the television series “One Tree Hill” in Wilmington instead of move it to Canada.235 Obviously, such subsidies reduce the costs of producing films in the U.S. as the reduction of U.S
costs is the rationale for the provision of the subsidies in the first place.
Again, though, U.S. taxpayers, in particular those living in locations especially affected by runaway production, ultimately have to pay for
these government services and subsidies. By way of example,
“[a]lthough steadily employed on the [One Tree Hill] show, one local

235. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 14 (citing Bashirah Muttalib, Watering WB’s ‘Tree:’ N.C.
Beats Out Vancouver for New Series, DAILY VARIETY (June 19, 2003)).
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taxpayer [in the Wilmington area even] referred to . . . [the $750,000
payment to Warner Brothers] as “extortion.”236
Similarly, the State of Wyoming attempted to raise $900,000, at the
request of a line producer at Focus Films, in order to entice it to film
Brokeback Mountain (Annie Proulx’s novel about Wyoming) in that
state. However, Wyoming was able to raise only $100,000, and Focus
Films concluded this was an insufficient amount and filmed this movie
in Calgary, Canada, instead, where it received significantly more generous subsidies.237 As stated above, by late 2004, even the U.S. Government had established a tax incentive for feature film producers who
shoot smaller-budget films in the U.S.
The above-discussed sacrifices made by film production workers,
owners and workers in film support companies, and U.S. taxpayers to
retain feature film production in the U.S. have been quite substantial.
Also, without question, these sacrifices have lowered the costs of producing feature films in the U.S. Unfortunately, as discussed in this article, all of these sacrifices together have been insufficient to stem the outsourcing of U.S. feature film production to other countries offering very
generous film subsidies.
(4) Impact of the Subsidized Imports on the Domestic
Industry
The great majority of economic factors and indices that should be
analyzed, according to the SCM Agreement, indicate that the subsidized
Canadian-origin feature films have seriously detrimentally affected the
U.S. feature film production industry. Data on “cash flow” and “the
ability to raise capital or investments” in the U.S. feature film industry is
not readily available, so these factors are not addressed. In addition, the
number of feature films produced in the U.S. and maintained in U.S.
film makers “inventory” decreases by definition when the number of
U.S.-developed feature films produced in the U.S. declines. Accordingly, the decline in the “inventory” of such films maintained by U.S.
film producers is not discussed separately from the decrease in the “output” of the U.S. feature film production industry. Each of the other factors listed in Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement as bearing on the issue
of material injury, is discussed in turn, below.

236. Id.
237. Id. at 15.
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(a) Actual and Potential Decline in Output
The production of U.S.-developed feature films in Canada has
grown significantly in recent years. It is reasonable to assume that the
great majority of this production otherwise would have occurred in the
U.S. In 2004, the production of U.S.-developed feature films in Canada
did decrease, but it appears that this decrease has largely been made up
for by increases in production of U.S.-developed films in other countries. Furthermore, given the recent increase in several Canadian provinces’ production incentive percentages, the Canadian federal government believes that Canada has had some success in stemming its own
runaway production problem. Accordingly, the output of the feature film
production industry in the U.S. has been negatively affected on account
of Canada’s PSTC film incentives. Also, the U.S. feature film production industry has actually suffered an absolute decline in recent years.
This measure of the impact of subsidized feature film imports from Canada appears to demonstrate material injury to the U.S. feature film production industry.
(b) Market Share
Given Canada’s tremendous growth in the production of U.S.developed feature films and the loss thereof in the U.S., the U.S.’ share
of the world market for feature film production has declined. The U.S.’
decline in world market share is demonstrated in Exhibits 5 and 6. In
particular, these Exhibits illustrate that the U.S. feature film industry has
declined from a 70% share of the world market in 1998 to a 58% share
of the world market in 2001. During these same years, Canada’ share of
the world market increased from 8% to 19%.
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EXHIBIT 5 238

Estimated Budgets of Domestic
Theatrical Releases ($Millions) 1998

Canada,
$430.00 , 8%
Other,
$1,200.00 ,
22%
U.S.,
$3,930.00 ,
70%

EXHIBIT 6 239
Estimated Budgets of Domestic
Theatrical Releases ($Millions) 2001

Canada,
$1,050.00 ,
19%

Other,
$1,309.00 ,
23%

U.S.,
$3,240.00 ,
58%

This transfer in world market share from the U.S. to Canada appears to have continued until recently, when Canada itself suffered a decrease in the production of feature films, primarily U.S.-developed feature films. Additionally, as noted above, it doesn’t appear that the U.S.’
share of the world market has increased as a result. Rather, it seems that
238. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration Of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report 10 (2002).
239. Id.
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Canada since 2004 has simply shared the production of U.S.-developed
films with a number of third countries. Exhibits 7, 8 and 9240 indicate
that, by 2004, only 35% of U.S.-developed feature films were being produced in the U.S. (Note that Exhibits 5 and 6 illustrate the percentage of
worldwide feature film production contributed by the U.S, Canada, and
all other countries as a group, while Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 show solely
where U.S.-developed feature films have been produced in recent years).
EXHIBIT 7 241
2002 Feature Film Production by U.S.
Companies

Britain 9%
Bulgaria 2%

Australia
3%
United States
44%

Canada 22%
Czech
Republic 2%
France 5%

Spain 2%
Romania 1%
Ireland 1%
South Africa
Italy 5%
Germany 4%
New Zealand 0%
0%

240. These exhibits were produced on May 15, 2005 through data base searches conducted
using the international movie data base maintained at www.imdb.com, and they are based on the
number of feature films rather than budget data. Specifically, the “pro’ version of imdb was used,
and the “Advanced Search” function was utilized. For each release year, the movies released by
U.S. film companies were queried. For “country and box office,” the “U.S.” was entered. For “filming location,” each country concerned (such as “Australia” or the “U.S”) was entered separately.
For “type of title,” “feature film” was entered. Again, as stated above, no effort was made not to
double-count films that were produced in multiple foreign locations, so the data compiled overstate
the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film industry to that extent. To repeat, though, feature films are
not commonly shot in multiple foreign locations. In addition, it should be emphasized that the data
reflected in each of these exhibits concerns the previous production year, as films released in a particular year typically were produced during the previous year. For example, the data reflected in
Exhibit 9 concern feature films produced during 2003 and released in 2004. Finally, note that while
the author is not aware of any manner in which the IMDB data base is incomplete or inaccurate, as
it is not known how or when data is entered into the data base, there is no guarantee that the data
contained therein is either complete or accurate.
241. Data base search conducted on May 15, 2005 using the international movie data base
maintained at www.imdb.com and based on numbers of films rather than budget data. As U.S.developed feature films constitute the great majority of feature films exhibited in the U.S, Canada,
and numerous third countries, Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 provide further support, even if indirect support,
for the conclusion that the U.S. has continued to lose significant market share in the U.S., Canada,
various third countries, and the worldwide market for feature films. Hence, this second measure of
the impact of the subsidized imports from Canada also indicates that the feature film production
industry in the U.S. has been materially injured by Canada’s PSTC film incentives.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

56

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

795

EXHIBIT 8 242
2003 Feature Film Production By U.S.
Companies

Australia 5%

United States
37%

Britain 8%
Bulgaria 2%
Canada 22%

Spain 3%
South Africa
Czech
France 8%
Italy 5%
1%
Republic
Romania 1%
2% Germany 2% Ireland 2%
New Zealand
2%

EXHIBIT 9 243
2004 Feature Film Production by U.S.
Companies

Australia 1%

United States
35%

Britain 12%
Bulgaria 2%
Canada 20%

Spain 1%

Czech Republic
3%
France 7%
Germany 4%

Italy 7%
Ireland 2%

South Africa 3%
Romania 2%

New Zealand 1%

(c) Factors Affecting Domestic Prices
As demonstrated above, “domestic prices” or, in other words, the
costs of producing feature films in the U.S., have declined or at least
been suppressed, so as to make feature films produced in the U.S. more
competitive when compared with subsidized feature films produced in
other countries, including Canada. Accordingly, this factor also demon242. Id.
243. Id.
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strates that the subsidized imports from Canada are causing material injury to the U.S. feature film production industry.
(d) Actual and Potential Negative Effects on
Employment
“We are creating the jobs your children want.” This is the rallying
cry that the Canadian Government has used over the last few years to
develop taxpayer support for the PSTC Programs established for the film
industry.244 This strategy involves moving jobs from the U.S. to Canada,
and it clearly has been exceedingly successful. As discussed further below, both government agencies and private groups in Canada and the
U.S. evidence this fact.
CFTPA, in its annual Profile Reports, reveals that the number of direct jobs producing U.S.-developed feature films in Canada has grown
from 3,528 employees in 1997 to 12,200 employees in 2003. The
CFTPA also estimates that for every direct job in the industry, 1.6 indirect jobs in Canada are also created. Indirect jobs include, for example,
jobs in the hotel, restaurant, and retail sale business catering to the film
industry. Thus, the CFTPA reports that the number of such indirect jobs
associated with the production of U.S.-developed feature films in Canada has grown from 5,645 in 1997 to 19,520 in 2003. The total number
of direct and indirect jobs associated with the feature film industry that
were outsourced from the U.S. to the Canadian feature film industry,
then, grew from 9,173 in 1997 to a whopping 31,720 in 2003. This
represents a 246% growth in U.S.-developed feature film jobs in Canada
over the course of this six-year period. This transfer of direct and indirect jobs in the feature film industry from the U.S. to Canada is illustrated in Exhibit 10.
As indicated above, in 2004, Canada experienced its own decrease
in feature film production, in particular the production of U.S.-developed
feature films. As Exhibit 10 indicates, CFTPA figures reveal that, during 2004, approximately 21,960 jobs (8,100 direct jobs and 12, 960 indirect jobs) were lost from the U.S. to Canada. Thus, feature film production jobs certainly are still being lost to Canada, but at a reduced amount.
Furthermore, as has been discussed above, there is some evidence to
suggest that Canada has at least started to reverse this downward trend in
its own feature film production industry.

244. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 8.
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EXHIBIT 10 245
Jobs Created in Canada and Lost in U.S. in Feature Film
Industry ($U.S. Millions)
Direct
Jobs
Indirect
Jobs
Total
Jobs

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

3,864

3,528

6,708

9,680

9,200

8,148

10,712

12,200

8,100

6,182

5,645

10,733

15,488

14,720

13,037

17,139

19,520

12,960

10,046

9,173

17,441

25,168

23,920

21,185

27,851

31,720

21,060

The CEIDR Report for 2001 (published in 2002) confirms that the
magnitude of the job loss in the U.S. feature film production industry is
quite significant. Specifically, it states that 27,313 jobs were lost in the
U.S. feature film industry in that year alone.246 The CEIDR Report for
2001, in fact, reveals that, in each of the four years covered by its studies, 1998-2001, an average of 25,000 jobs per year were lost in the U.S.
feature film production industry. 247
As discussed above, California and the Los Angeles area in particular have been especially hard hit by the outsourcing of the U.S. feature
film production industry. According to the California Employment Development Department, jobs in the feature film and video production industry in California fell from a high of 127,400 in 1999 to a low of
105,800 in 2002, and then rose only slightly to 106,300 in 2003.248
There was an increase to 118,600 in 2004.249 Similar job losses in the
motion picture and video production industry in Los Angeles County
during these years were reported by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.250
Statistics for the entire film industry (including TV shows, MOWs,
and commercials) are even more alarming. Jack Kyser, chief economist
245. CFTPA Profile 2005 Report, at 17 and CFTPA Profile 2006 Report, at 53, 55, in conjunction with the Association des producteurs de films et de télévision du Québec (APFTQ) and the Department of Canadian Heritage and Nordicity Group Ltd. (Total number of direct and indirect jobs
created in foreign location production attributed to feature film production in accordance with ratio
that foreign location feature film production bears to total foreign location production).
246. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at
3.
247. Id.
248. See Film Industry Profile, supra note 2, at 11 (citing California Employment Development Department statistics).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 12-13.
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for the LAEDC, “found a loss of 32,400 [total film] . . . business jobs in
the Los Angeles area between 1999’s peak employment figure of
146,000 and the final 2003 figure of 113,600, which was lower than his
original prediction for the year of 116,100. Film industry employment
in Los Angeles has been declining steadily every year in between, without any recovery: in 2000, it fell to 138,900, in 2001 to 126,100, and in
2002 to 121,000 . . . .” 251 “The problem with the film industry, [according to Kyser,] is that everyone sees it in the light of ‘Entertainment Tonight’ and ‘Access Hollywood’ – all the glitz and glamour – and they
don’t see that the bulk of the industry is below the line and that’s what’s
hurting.”252
UCLA Anderson Forecast senior economist Christopher Thornberg
confirmed Kyser’s figures and predictions regarding the precipitous decline of the Hollywood film industry (including TV productions). In
September of 2003, he stated that “I don’t think the industry will leave
Los Angeles, but it looks as if local production jobs are slowly declining
and moving elsewhere. Los Angeles and New York remain the centers
for the industry’s deal-making, financing and advertising.”253 Of course,
as FTAC spokespeople (who, again, are dedicated to retaining film production in the U.S.) have noted:
The physical production of a feature film or television project is incredibly labor intensive, requiring large numbers of specialized, highly
skilled workers and artists in positions which far outnumber Thornberg’s “management jobs” with a studio or production company. A
shift in these numerous middle class jobs from cities in the United
States to foreign locations has severe adverse economic impact, and is
a serious problem.254

When U.S. film workers lose their jobs, they obviously are harmed
by the loss of the direct wages and salaries that they otherwise would
have derived from those jobs. In addition, “SAG members have lost residual payments, important safety protections, and significant contributions to their health and pension funds . . . because of work done out of
the country . . . .”255 And, again, some industry workers have been out
251. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 14-15, (citing Dave McNary, H’w’d Jobs Outlook ‘Less
than Inspiring, DAILY VARIETY (February 9, 2003)); Jesse Hiestand, L.A.’s Showbiz Exodus Eases
Off: 2,500 Jobs May Be Lost in ‘04, About a Third of ‘03 Drop, Hollywood Reporter (February 9,
2004); Dave McNary, Jobs Picture Remains Grim, DAILY VARIETY (July 21, 2003)).
252. Id. at 14.
253. Id. at 14 (citing Dave McNary, Showbiz Jobs Dip in 3Q, DAILY VARIETY (December 11,
2003); Dave McNary, BizJobs Leaving, StudySez, DAILY VARIETY (September 24, 2003).
254. Id. at 14.
255. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at
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of work so long that they no longer even qualify for unemployment insurance.256
That film production workers have been suffering greatly in the
U.S. is further illustrated by the fact that requests by such employees to
the Directors’ Guild Foundation for short-term, no interest loans have
been increasing.257 Similarly, a number of film workers have applied for
financial aid to the Motion Picture Fund in the past several years.258 A
number of Hollywood film industry veterans report that they have been
able to survive only because they have been able to sell or refinance
their mortgages in Southern California where real estate values have
been escalating.259
It certainly appears that the outsourcing of the U.S. feature film
production industry, to Canada and elsewhere, has effectively destroyed
the livelihoods of many people who formerly were employed in the industry. Even more ominously, it appears that the future dominance of
the U.S. in the feature film industry is jeopardized, as our children’s jobs
in this industry are outsourced to workers in other countries through the
use of exceedingly generous foreign subsidies. In other words, for the
most part, it does not appear that Canada and other countries are “creating” jobs for their children in the entertainment industry but rather are
stealing them from the U.S. This factor of “Actual and Potential Negative Effects on Employment” illustrates, perhaps more dramatically than
any other factor, that the subsidized feature film imports from Canada
seem to be causing material injury to the U.S. feature film production
industry.

10.
256. See supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh,
and Ann Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)).
257. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 18 (citing Letter to Directors Guild members from Delbert
Mann, Directors Guild Foundation Chairman of the Board (October 2002)).
258. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 18.
259. Id. Again, even Canadian film industry employees have started to feel the sting of outsourced production, now that other countries around the world have copied Canada’s successful
film subsidy programs. In some cities, Canadian film workers have been out of work for several
weeks or months, and some Canadian film employees have made concessions on salary rates and
benefit levels in order to retain work in Canada. This boom-bust cycle is not surprising, of course,
as “foreign subsides do not create new jobs, they merely relocate existing jobs from one country to
another[,],” (FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 20), and, as Telefilm Canada executive director Wayne
Clarkson put it succinctly recently, “[b]uilding [the Canadian film] . . . industry based on foreign
production [was] . . . like building [a] house on quicksand . . . .” CFTPA Profile 2005 Report (see
supra Part VI.D.2.a.(2).(a) (CFTPA Reports), at 6; see also The Razor’s Edge: Canadian Producers
in the Global Economy, available at http://www.cftpa.ca/newsroom/pdf_profile/profile2004english.pdf (January 2004) (last visited May 4, 2006).
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(e) Actual and Potential Negative Effects on Wages
As discussed above, wages in the feature film production industry
have declined in recent years. This is not surprising, given the large
number of industry workers who have lost their jobs completely or are
only occasionally employed in the industry. That is, those still actively
seeking employment in the industry have very little bargaining power in
the marketplace, and this weak bargaining power manifests itself in the
form of lower wages, salaries, residuals, and other benefits received by a
worker when employed, as SAG and other employee representatives
have made clear. Examples of SAG members and other industry employees agreeing to wage decreases or at least wage freezes in order to
retain feature film production in the U.S. were discussed above. In the
spring of 2006, the producers of Home of the Brave, which was being
filmed in Spokane, Washington, moved the production in the middle of
filming up to Vancouver, Canada, on account of a labor dispute over
whether union wage rates should be paid to certain below-the-line workers.260 This action demonstrates very dramatically that U.S. film workers have very little bargaining power to resist wage decreases. If a producer isn’t happy with the wages rates in the U.S., there is always the
opportunity for the producer to escape to Canada or another country,
where government subsidies dramatically reduce the effective wage rates
for below-the-line workers. Hence, this factor, like all of those discussed above, indicates that the increasing subsidized feature film imports from Canada are materially injuring the U.S. feature film production industry.
(f) Utilization of Capacity
Given the great decline of the feature film production industry in
the U.S., capacity in the industry is underutilized. This is demonstrated
by the great numbers of unemployed feature film workers (discussed
above), little-used stages and sound studios in several cities around the
U.S., and the number of companies that have stopped catering exclusively to the film industry or have gone out of business entirely. The
underutilization of capacity in the industry is also demonstrated by the
fact that the major movie studios have removed five cities from their list
of “production centers,” a large number of state and regional film offices

260. See Union Dispute Brings Movie Shoot to Vancouver, ASSOCIATED PRESS (March 28,
2006), available at http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060328/movie_vanco
uver_0603 (last visited March 31, 2006).
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have closed completely, and almost every state has cut funding for its
film office.261
As indicated above, there are a great many anecdotal examples of
companies dedicated to the film industry suffering financially or closing
their doors. For example, in June of 2004, the Oregon Film Office reported that “[o]ur film lab just closed, smaller grip and lighting companies have closed, and one of the two remaining is on the ropes. Our
crew depth has gone from three crews deep to one and a half because
crews have left for other areas or left the business altogether.”262 Similarly, the Washington Film Office reported in June of 2004 that “[w]e
have several vendors who are holding on by a thread, including equipment suppliers and talent agencies. Half of our crew base has either
moved to LA or gotten out of the business entirely.”263
FTAC spokespeople reported during the same time period that
[i]n Hollywood, long-established businesses which service the motion
picture industry with rentals of various items have gone out of business
or, if surviving, report huge losses. Some typical examples: Alpha
Medical, which rents medical equipment solely for film industry use as
props and set dressing, says it has downsized its staff from 25 to 15
employees.264 Independent Studio Services, a well-known prop rental
and fabrication company, reports its sales are down $1.5 million and
that 2003 was the first year it has ever lost money. It has downsized
from 90 to 25 regular employees and has had to reduce the size of its
physical plant. Nights of Neon, a neon fabrication and rental company
which also does some business outside the film industry, has lost 50%
of its studio business, and has contracted in size from 10 to 5 employees.265

FTAC also has noted that training opportunities for young actors in
the U.S. are disappearing. As indicated above, Canada’s actors’ union,
ACTRA, offers a workshop to teach Canadian actors how to use American accents, so that fewer American actors need be hired on any film
production in Canada. As a result, young actors in the U.S. who normally would have received training in minor roles in U.S. feature films
261. The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration of Feature Film
Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at
10-11.
262. FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 15 (quoting June 18 2004 e-mail from Veronica Rinard,
Oregon Film & Video Office in response to a request for information on state losses from outsourced production).
263. Id. (quoting June 18, 2004 e-mail from Suzy Kellett, Washington State Film Office, in
response to a request for information on state losses from outsourced production).
264. Id. at 18.
265. Id. at 19.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

63

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
WRIGHT1.DOC

802

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:739

now are not receiving that training, and the pool of talented young U.S.
actors is shrinking.266 The evaporation of jobs for promising new U.S.
actors was demonstrated quite clearly during the filming of the U.S.developed movie Cold Mountain in Romania. Reportedly, American
tourists were grabbed off the streets and offered parts in the movie because there were not enough American actors available in Romania to
fill the spots.267
All of these examples of the underutilized capacity in the U.S. feature film industry also lead to the conclusion that the subsidized feature
film imports from Canada are causing material injury to the U.S. feature
film production industry.
(g) Producer Profits
The Motion Picture Association of America (the MPAA) has argued that the PSTC film incentives actually increase film producers’
profits by lowering their production costs, and thus the incentives are not
inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. If producers’ profits were the
only criterion for a showing of material injury listed in the SCM Agreement, the MPAA might have a point. The growth or decline in producers’ profits, however, is only one criterion among many other criteria
listed in the SCM Agreement for determining whether a U.S. industry is
being materially injured by foreign subsidies, and the WTO Members
quite clearly would not have included all of the above-discussed criteria
if they had considered such criteria irrelevant to a finding of material injury.
Furthermore, the WTO Panel in Indonesia –Autos,268 considered
whether the United States could claim it was suffering “serious prejudice” in the context of the SCM Agreement solely on the basis that certain U.S. companies were producing automobiles outside of the U.S. for
sale in Indonesia, where they had to compete with automobiles subsidized by the Government of Indonesia. The WTO Panel in that case
ruled emphatically in the negative on that question, on the ground that
the WTO rules do not protect national companies but rather national industries and national products.269 The strongest evidence that the
MPAA’s argument is incorrect is that Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement provides that, in a determination of “material injury,” the term
“domestic industry” may be interpreted as excluding those producers
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing Phelim McAleer, That Big Break Awaits in Romania, Los Angeles Times
(January 2, 2004)).
268. WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59, WT/DS64/R (adopted on July 2, 1998).
269. Id. at paras. 14.198-14.204, 15.1(e).
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who are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves the importers of the allegedly subsidized product. Hence, the fact that film
producers’ profits increase when they shoot their films outside of the
U.S. essentially is irrelevant. In any case, the factor of producers’ profits
is the only factor discussed that indicates that the subsidized imports
from Canada are not materially injuring the U.S. feature film production
industry.
In summary, the PSTC film incentives that Canada is providing are
quite substantial, and the great majority of the above-discussed factors
show significant contractions in the U.S. feature film production industry, especially since commencement of the PSTC Program in Canada in
1998. As stated above, in order for a WTO Member’s subsidies to be
found to contravene the SCM Agreement, those subsidies need be only
one cause of the material injury or threat of material injury being suffered by the relevant domestic industry in another WTO Member.270 In
light of all of the above, the conclusion seems inescapable that the PSTC
film incentives in Canada are causing or, at the very least, are threatening to cause material injury to the U.S. feature film production industry.
Accordingly, Canada’s PSTC film subsidies (especially when considered in conjunction with film subsidies provided by other countries)271
likely are causing “adverse effects” to the U.S. feature film industry on
this basis and hence likely are inconsistent with Canada’s obligations
under the SCM Agreement.
b. Serious Prejudice
Additionally, it appears that Canada’s PSTC film incentives are seriously prejudicing the U.S. feature film production industry. To repeat,
“ ‘[s]erious prejudice to the interests of another Member’ is used in . . .
[the SCM] Agreement in] the same sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of
Article XVI of GATT 1994, and includes threat of serious prejudice.”272
Furthermore, Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement provides that serious
prejudice exists where:
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a
like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing
Member;
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a
270. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 34, at 728.
271. Subsidies provided by various countries can be aggregated in a material injury determination. See SCM Agreement, Article 15.3.
272. SCM Agreement, Article 5, n. 13.
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like product of another Member from a third country market;
(c) the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the
subsidized product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression,
price depression or lost sales in the same market; or
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of
the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or
commodity[ ] as compared to the average share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend
over a period when subsidies have been granted.273

As indicated, the relevant industry in a “serious prejudice” analysis
is that industry in the complaining WTO Member that produces a “like
product,” just as in the case of a “material injury” analysis. As explained above, in the section entitled “Like Product to Subsidized Feature Films,” the industry in the U.S. producing a like product to the feature films subsidized by the Canadian governments is the feature film
production industry. Accordingly, the serious prejudice analysis provided in this article focuses on that industry. Note further, that, for the
purpose of Article 6, paragraph 3(b):
[T]he displacement or impeding of exports shall include any case in
which . . . it has been demonstrated that there has been a change in the
relative shares of the market to the disadvantage of the non-subsidized
product (over an appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate clear trends in the development of the market for the product
concerned, which, in normal circumstances, shall be at least one year).
[“]Change in relative shares of the market” shall include any of the following situations: (a) there is an increase in the market share of the
subsidized product; (b) the market share of the subsidized product remains constant in circumstances in which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined; (c ) the market share of the subsidized
product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been in the case
in the absence of the subsidy.274
273. SCM Agreement, Article 6.3, paras (a)-(d).
274. SCM Agreement, Article 6.4. Note that serious prejudice will not be found in any case
where there is a “voluntary decrease in the availability for export of the product concerned from the
complaining Member (including, inter alia, a situation where firms in the complaining Members
have been autonomously reallocating exports of this product to new markets)[.]” SCM Agreement,
Article 6.7(e). This latter provision could be interpreted to cover the instant situation, where many
U.S. film companies are voluntarily choosing to reduce their feature film production in the U.S. and
instead conduct their production operations in Canada and other countries. However, the WTO
Panel in Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179, at para. 14.203, found that each of the various para-
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To repeat, if any one of the four effects set forth in paragraphs (a) –
(d), above, has occurred in connection with the U.S. feature film production industry as a result of Canada’s combined PSTC film subsidies,
Canada’s PSTC film incentives are causing “serious prejudice” to the
U.S. feature film production industry. In fact, however, it appears that
most, if not all, of these effects are occurring as a result of Canada PSTC
film incentives.
As indicated above, market share data can be determinative on the
issue of whether serious prejudice is demonstrated on the basis of paragraph (b) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.275 Market share data is
also highly relevant on the issue of whether serious prejudice is illustrated on the basis of paragraph (a) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.276 As the above section regarding “material injury” to the U.S.
feature film production industry makes clear, during each of the four
years 1998 – 2001, Canada’s share of the world market for feature film
production increased and the U.S.’ share of the world market for feature
film production decreased. Specifically, in 1998, Canada’s share of the
world’s feature film production market was 8%, and by the end of 2001,
its share of this market was 19%. In contrast, the U.S. share of the world
market for feature film production in 1998 was 70%, and at the end of
2001, it was 58%. Again, Exhibits 5 and 6, above, illustrate this 11%
increase in Canada’s market share of the worldwide feature film production industry and the concomitant 12% loss in the U.S.’ share of this
market.277
graphs of Article 6.7 clearly assumes that the product allegedly being replaced by the subsidized
product has, in fact, first been produced in the complaining Member (in this case, the U.S.). In
other words, the provisions of Article 6.7 refer to restrictions on domestic exports, not restrictions
on domestic production. This is consistent with Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement, which provides that the “domestic industry” in an analysis of “material injury” can exclude domestic producers who are “related[ ] to the exporters or importers or are themselves the importers of the allegedly
subsided product or a like product from other countries . . . .” Again, the SCM Agreement protects
products that are produced within a particular WTO Member, not producers who are located within
that WTO Member. Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179, at paras. 14.198-14.204, 15.1(e).
275. See Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179, at paras. 14.208-14.211.
276. Id.
277. The Canadian Government has been candid that “foreign location production” has been
responsible for the phenomenal growth in its own feature film industry, with “foreign location production” being defined by the Canadian Government as “the production of a feature film in Canada
where the copyright of that film is owned by a non-Canadian.” See supra notes 198-200. It has also
pointed out that the overwhelming majority (often reaching 95%) of foreign location projects over
the last decade have been U.S.-developed projects. See 2001-02 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities
and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2001 to March 31, 2002, at 20
(2002); 2002-03 Activity Report: Activities and Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period
April 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003, at 16 (2003), and 2003-04 CAVCO Activity Report: Activities and
Programs Administered by CAVCO for the Period April 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004, at 16 (2004)
(stating that the overwhelming majority (95%) of foreign location production is U.S.-developed).
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Comprehensive market share data for the worldwide feature film
production industry since 2001 has not been readily available in the last
few years.278 Still, private industry groups in Canada, as well the Canadian federal government, have claimed that the feature film production
industry in Canada continued to grow during the 2002 – 2003 period.
Specifically, according to these sources, the volume of Canadian feature
film production grew from $US 824 million in 2002 to $US 1.04 billion
by the end of 2003.279 Again, during those same years, it appears that
the volume of U.S. feature film production declined. This latter point is
difficult to confirm, as national U.S. statistics on the industry have not
been published. 280 What does appear to be true, however, is that feature
film production industry in the Los Angeles area declined significantly
during those years, and the Los Angeles area unquestionably is the center of feature film production in both California and the U.S. as a whole.
Specifically, California’s share of production of U.S.-developed feature
As most feature films shown in many countries of the world are U.S.-developed (note: not necessarily produced), the fact that Canada has produced a greater percentage of U.S.-developed films
should result in Canada obtaining a larger percentage of many countries’ feature film market during
each of those years. See, e.g., France proposes ‘European Cinema Weeks’ to Fight Hollywood
Domination, Associated Press (November 18, 2005) (French Culture Minister Renaud Donnedieu
de Vabres asked in an address in 2005 that Europeans promote European films in the form of
‘European cinema weeks’, “in order to see more European films and because 70 percent of films
shown
in
EU
movie
theatres
are
American”),
available
at
http://www.breitbart.com/news/2005/11/18/051118191
730.tms64jw7.html (last visited May 4, 2006); The Business of Media Violence, Media Awareness
Network (2006) (“Already, almost 80% of movies sold overseas came from the U.S. movie industry. Increasingly, U.S. firms are buying up screens and production entities around the word.”),
available at http://www.mediaawareness.ca/english/issues/violence/business_media_violence.cfm
(last visited May 4, 2006); Minoru Sugaya, The Development of Film Policy in Canada and Japan,
28 Keio Communication 53, 64 (2006) (“[T]he share of Canadian films in the box office sale between January and September 2004 was 4.8 percent, while that of U.S. films was 87.2 percent.”),
available at www.mediacom.keio.ac.jp/publication/pdf2006/review28/02_Minoru%20SUGAYA.
pdf (last visited May 4, 2006).
278. In early 2006, The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Reports (CEDIR) began
compiling a new report regarding the status of the entire U.S. film industry as of the end of 2005.
This report should be publicly available soon. Author’s Interview with Steve Katz, author of this
new CEIDR Report (April 8, 2006); see also Scott Kaye, Report on the June 2005 National Executive Board Meeting, International Cinematographers Guild (July 20, 2005) (“Our [National Executive Board] NEB adopted a resolution calling for the commission of a new [CEIDR] report, spending up to $15,000 to help fund it . . . .”), available at www.cameraguild.com/news/guild/05_07_20
_executive_board_meeting.html (last visited May 4, 2006); Local 44 Newsreel, Volume 16, Issue 8,
Newsletter of IATSE Local 44 (November, 2005) (“The recent SAG election that put several new
members on their board and elected an active, progressive President has resulted in SAG’s donation
of $10,000 to fund the CEIDR report . . . . “), available at www.local44.com/content/newsreel/05N
OVEMBER%202005%20NEWSREEL%20for%20web.pdf (last visited May 4, 2006).
279. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(2)(a) (discussing CFTPA Reports).
280. A decline in film production in Los Angeles, for example, could be countered by a gain in
film production in New York City.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

68

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

807

films decreased by 5.5% from 31% in 2000 to 25.5% by the end of
2003.281 In 2000, California produced 212 out of U.S.-developed 683
feature films. By 2003, it only produced 151 out of 593 US.-developed
feature films.282
As discussed above, during 2004, Canada suffered a decline in its
own feature film production industry.283 At the same time, the U.S. feature film production industry does not appear to have been the beneficiary. To a large extent, it appears that third countries were able to entice
U.S. film producers to shoot more films in their locales, to the detriment
of both the U.S. and the Canadian feature film production industries.284
The Los Angeles Economic Development Corporation reported in
March of 2005 that 45% of all major studio films were shot outside the
U.S. in 2004,285 and Exhibits 7, 8 and 9 (produced based on data contained in the international movie data base maintained at
http://www.imdb.com) indicate that a whopping 65% of all U.S.developed feature films were produced outside of the U.S. by the 2004
release year.286 While these exhibits overstate the outsourcing of the
U.S. feature film production industry for the reasons discussed above in
Section VI.D.2.a.(4)((b) (Market Share), the sizeable magnitude of the
phenomenon and the consequent significant decrease in the U.S. share in
the worldwide market for the production of feature films are unmistakable.
Again, in late 2004 and early 2005, government representatives
throughout Canada warned that the various Canadian governments might
need to increase their PSTC film incentives in order to retain feature film
production in Canada.287 Then, a number of the provinces followed suit
281. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 15 (citing Hollywood Reporter).
282. Id.
283. CFTPA Profile 2006 Report at 39, 55.
284. Id. at 9-10. The CFTPA Profile 2006 Report states that total foreign location production
in Canada decreased 23% in 2004. Specifically, foreign location production for feature films decreased from $US 830 million to $US 606 million. See supra Exhibit 1. The Department of Canadian Heritage stated “a U.S. reaction against so called ‘runaway’ production and the implementation
of competitive state incentives” contributed to a decline in foreign location production between
2002-03 and 2003-04. In addition, its report noted “increased global competition” factored into the
decreased production. Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location
Production in Canada 1 (March 2005).
285. What is the Cost of Run-Away Production?, supra note 2, at 15 (citing Hollywood Reporter).
286. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(4).(b) (Market Share).
287. The Department of Canadian Heritage reported that in late 2004 and early 2005, several
Canadian provinces “increased their respective tax incentives for foreign location production.” Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 284, at 1. Canada estimates such increases in provincial
subsidies, added to the federal subsidy, “will help stem the decline experienced recently.” Id. In an

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

69

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
WRIGHT1.DOC

808

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[39:739

and increased their PSTC tax benefits in 2005, and Canadian industry
experts hope that these even more generous subsidies have at least stated
to reverse the decline of Canadian feature film production.288
In summary, the feature film production industry in Canada has experienced phenomenal growth since the commencement of the federal
PSTC program in 1998, and the U.S. feature film production industry
clearly has experienced a significant decline during that same time period. Moreover, the various Canadian governments have been forthright
that their PSTC film incentives have been largely responsible for this
shift in feature film production activities in North America.289 Both private industry groups in Canada and the Canadian federal government
have explained that the feature film production industry started to decline in Canada in 2004, in part because of a combination of (1) competing film subsidy programs offered by governments in third countries; (2)
competing film subsidy programs offered by the federal and state governments in the U.S.; (3) unusual external conditions such as the SARS
panic; and (4) an unfavorable exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar
making production in Canada more expensive.290
In light of all of the above, the connection between Canada’s PSTC
film incentives and the growth of the Canadian feature film production
industry through production of U.S.-developed projects is clear. In addition, as most feature films shown in Canada and many other countries
are, in fact, U.S.-developed films,291 it should not be difficult for the
U.S. to demonstrate that Canada’s PSTC film subsidies have caused the
displacement or impedance of imports of U.S.-origin feature films into
Canada as well as into numerous third countries.292 Accordingly, the
effort to retain foreign location production, the Canadian federal government raised its own incentive from 11% to 16%. See, e.g., Brendan Kelly, Fear of Flight, Canada Grapples With Its Own
Runaway Production, VARIETY (September 7, 2004), available at http://www.variety.com/article/
VR1117910185?categoryid=1753&cs=1 (last visited May 7, 2006).
288. Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 287, at 1 (noting current and anticipated
levels of foreign location production in provinces for 2005-06 were positive). See Appendix B for a
summary of the major PSTC film incentive programs in Canada, current as of March 2005.
289. The Canadian film industry has grown substantially due to the tax incentives it provides
for foreign location production. See supra note 129. Ninety-five percent of Canadian foreign location originates from the United States. See, e.g., 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT: ACTIVITIES
AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003 TO MARCH 31, 2004,
16 (2004).
290. Department of Canadian Heritage, supra note 287, at 1 (explaining contributing factors
for loss of total foreign location production, including television and feature film production); see
CFTPA Profile 2006 Report, at 55 (showing sudden loss in feature film foreign location production).
291. See supra note 275.
292. The “imports” referred to in Articles 6.3(a) and (b) of the SCM Agreement must refer to
products produced in the complaining WTO Member, rather than simply products of any origin ex-
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U.S. should be able to establish that its own feature film production industry has been “seriously prejudiced” on the basis of the adverse effects
set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement,
as set forth above.
In addition, as has been discussed at length above, the PSTC film
subsidies have, in fact, caused significant suppression of the production
costs (prices) of feature films produced in the U.S. so that they can compete with the U.S.-developed feature films that are produced in Canada
with the benefit of the PSTC incentives. Thus, the U.S. also should be
able to establish serious prejudice on the basis of the adverse effect set
out in paragraph (c) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement.
Finally, as a feature film is not a “primary product,” the serious
prejudice test set forth in paragraph (d), above, arguably is irrelevant.
Still, it is noteworthy that, as discussed above, Canada’s share of the
worldwide market for feature films clearly increased during the 19982001 period, while the U.S.’ share of the worldwide market for feature
films decreased during this period.293 In addition, as just discussed
above, this trend appears to have continued, at least through 2003. Accordingly, if paragraph (d) is relevant, the U.S. should also be able to establish serious prejudice to the U.S. feature film production industry
based on paragraph (d). Thus, given the combined effects of paragraphs
(a) – (d) of Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, it appears very likely that
the U.S. should prevail on a claim that the Canadian PSTC film incentives are causing, or at the very least, are threatening to cause, serious
prejudice to the U.S. feature film production industry.
It is also noteworthy that, when the SCM Agreement first went into
effect, the SCM Agreement provided that “the total ad valorem subsidization [ ] of a product exceeding 5 per cent[ ] . . . establishes a presumption of serious prejudice . . . .”294 This presumption of serious prejudice
based on a 5% ad valorem subsidization figure was abolished as of December 31, 1999 pursuant to Article 31 of the SCM Agreement,295 but it
is still useful to attempt to calculate the ad valorem subsidization figure
in this case to determine whether this 5% subsidization figure is met.

ported from that country. Again, the WTO Appellate Body in Indonesia – Autos, WT/DS54/R,
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R (adopted on July 2, 1998) made clear that the SCM
Agreement protects products made in the complaining WTO Member, not companies based in the
complaining WTO Member that choose to produce their products outside of that country. See supra
note 267.
293. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.a.(4).(b) (Market Share).
294. SCM Agreement, Article 6.1 (emphasis added.)
295. See, e.g., TN/RL/GEN/14, available at www.wto.org/docsonline/SearchDocuments/Sim
pleDocuments (last visited March 10, 2006).
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This ad valorem subsidization figure is to be calculated “ . . . in
accordance with Annex IV of the [SCM] Agreement[,]296 which
provides, inter alia, that:
1. Any calculation of the amount of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph 1(a) of Article 6 shall be done in terms of the cost to the granting
government.
2. Except as provided in paragraphs 3 through 5, in determining
whether the overall rate of subsidization exceeds 5 per cent of the
value of the product, the value of the product shall be calculated as the
total value of the recipient firm’s sales in the most recent 12-month period, for which sales data is available, preceding the period in which
the subsidy is granted.297
3. Where the subsidy is tied to the production or sale of a given product, the value of the product shall be calculated as the total value of the
recipient firm’s sales of that product in the most recent 12-month period, for which sales data is available, preceding the period in which
the subsidy is granted.
. . .
6. In determining the overall rate of subsidization in a given year, subsidies given under different programmes and by different authorities in
the territory of a Member shall be aggregated . . . . 298

As discussed above, the Canadian PSTC film subsidies are based on
a percentage of “qualifying labor costs” incurred in Canada during the
production of a film. Hence, as the subsidies are tied to the production of
a given product - a film – Annex IV of the SCM Agreement indicates
that the “value of the product” for each relevant company should be cal296. SCM Agreement, Article 6, n. 14.
297. In the case of tax-related subsidies, the value of the product is to be calculated as the total
value of the recipient firm’s sales in the fiscal year in which the tax-related measure was earned.
Annex IV, paragraph 2; SCM Agreement, n. 64. Given the reference to a “fiscal year,” this particular provision appears to refer to an income tax-related subsidy. Id. As stated, in the case of the Canadian PSTC film subsidies, the tax credits are technically earned by Canadian film companies
when the companies produce the films in question and utilize Canadian labor in the films. However, some or all of the funds are provided to the film companies at or near the commencement of
filming. Hence, it makes more sense to calculate the 5% subsidization rate in accordance with each
recipient firm’s “sales” of the product in the most recent 12-month period for which sales data is
available.
298. SCM Agreement, Annex IV, paras 1-3, 6.
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culated, as set forth in paragraph 3, above. This paragraph, again, provides that the subsidization figure should be calculated in accordance
with the total value of that company’s “sales of subsidized films” in the
most recent 12-month period, for which sales data is available, preceding
the period in which the subsidy is granted. Reference to the preceding
12-month period of sales in this paragraph is an acknowledgment of the
fact that subsidies based on the production or sale of a particular product
would in most cases will be granted to recipient firms following the production or sale of that product. In other words, it takes into account the
time gap between the production/sale of the product and the payment of
the corresponding subsidy. As stated above, however, in the case of the
PSTC incentives, however, a large portion of the incentive is provided to
the film maker prior to or at the commencement of production, with any
remaining amount due to the film company provided at the end of production.299
Given that the Canada’s PSTC film subsidies are directly tied to the
production costs of the films produced by each recipient firm, the subsidization figure arguably should be calculated with reference to those
production costs, rather than with reference to the “sales” of those films
to the companies importing the films into the U.S. This is particularly
the case, as it is possible that the phrase “production costs” simply was
inadvertently omitted from paragraph 3, above, when both “production”
and “sales” were referred to at the beginning of the paragraph.
Moreover, U.S. film companies often establish a separate entity for
the production of any feature film, whether it is produced in the U.S. or
Canada.300 The copyright to the film usually is not transferred to the
Canadian entity, and accordingly the Canadian entity generally does not
make a profit by “selling” the film itself to the U.S. copyright owner.301
The Canadian entity is simply paid a processing fee, and at the conclusion of production, the separate corporate entity established for the film
generally is abolished.302 In any case, it would also be exceedingly difficult to derive an arm’s length price for a U.S.-developed film produced
in Canada, as the finances of U.S. film companies are notorious for being shrouded in mystery and all but impossible to decipher.303
299. See supra note 78, at 13-19 (discussing Canada Revenue Agency’s processing of PSTC
claims).
300. See, e.g., Jean Ross, BudgetBbrief, California Budget Project 3 (August 2005), available
at http://www.cbp.org/2005/0508_bbmoviecredits.pdf. (last visited May 7, 2006).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See, e.g, Pierce O’ Donnell, Dennis McDougal, Fatal Subtraction: The Inside Story of
Buchwald v. Paramount, Audio Literature (2d ed., June 1996) (an inside review of movie industry
finances detailing humorist Art Buchwald’s and partner Alain Bernheim’s lawsuit against Para-
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For all of these reasons, it makes sense to calculate the subsidization figure with respect to production costs, rather than sales revenues.
Furthermore, it should not be difficult for the U.S. to establish that the
total subsidization of each subsidized film shot in Canada is quite significant and certainly totals more than 5% of the production costs, in at
least the great majority of cases.
To begin with, it is clear from the face of both the federal and provincial PSTC laws that each such government is prepared to provide
subsidies amounting to substantially more than 5% of the production
costs of each film. Again, at the present time, the federal government
provides a tax credit equal to 16% of the qualifying labor costs incurred
in Canada and it does not impose any upper limit on the percentage of
production costs that it will reimburse. The provincial governments
provide additional subsidies of between 18% and 50% of qualifying labor costs, and while some of the provincial governments do have an upper limit on the percentage of production costs that can be reimbursed,
the lowest such maximum is 15% of production costs enforced by the
Province of Prince Edward Island.304 Therefore, it is certainly possible
for the subsidies provided with respect to any film to total significantly
more than 5% of the production costs incurred in Canada.
Furthermore, as discussed above, both the federal and provincial
governments in Canada advertise that their combined PSTC subsidies
will cover a significantly higher percentage of the production costs of a
film,305 and numerous articles and studies have reported that the PSTC
subsidies constitute between 7% and 15% of the production costs of a
film shot in Canada.306 CAVCO, for example, indicates that qualifying
labor costs are approximately 50% of a typical budget associated with a
PSTC film presented for CAVCO approval, and thus, according to
mount Pictures based on Paramount’s refusal to pay them any proceeds from the movie Coming to
America (starring Eddie Murphy) on the basis that the box office blockbuster allegedly had failed to
make any profit).
304. See Appendix B.
305. See, e.g., CANADIAN AUDIO-VISUAL CERTIFICATION OFFICE (CAVCO) , Film or Video
Production Services Tax Credit (PSTC), available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/acca/progs/bcpac-cavco/progs/cisp-pstc/index_e.cfm (August 02, 2004) (last visited March 28, 2006);
British Colombia Film Commission, Tax Credits, available at http://www.bcfilmcommission.com/
finance (last visited March 28, 2006).
306. See, e.g., The Center for Entertainment Industry Data and Research, The Migration Of
Feature Film Production From the U.S. to Canada and Beyond: Year 2001 Production Report, supra note 203, at 10; Department of Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA), Final Destination: A Comparison of Film Tax Incentives in Australia and Canada 2-4 (June 2003), available at
www.dcita.gov.au/home/publications (last visited May, 2006); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
supra note 5, at 19; Directors Guild of America, Runaway Production Update – October 2004 (October 2004), available at http://www.dga.org/thedga/leg_rp_updte-101104-a.php3 (last visited May
7, 2006).
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CAVCO, the federal PSTC subsidy prior to 2003 alone would have been
equal to 11% of 50%, or 5.55% of total production costs, and the federal
PSTC subsidy alone after 2003 would have been equal to 16% of 50% ,
or 8% of total production costs.307 Also, movie house executives at both
the major and the independent studios have justified their outsourcing of
film production to Canada by pointing to the substantial percentage of
production costs covered by the PSTC subsidies.308
Most important, application of a simple mathematical formula
makes clear that the 5% subsidization figure is almost certainly met with
respect to any U.S.-developed, subsidized feature film produced in Canada. This calculation is based on the fact that labor costs – funds spent
on the wages and salaries of those working to produce the film - constitute approximately 50% of the production costs of a film.309 Also, below-the-line labor costs310 – those labor costs that tend to move to another country – typically constitute 60% of the total labor costs on a
film.311 Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that approximately 30%
of the budget of a feature film is comprised of below-the-line or “qualifying labor costs” (60% multiplied by 50%). Finally, today, as discussed
above, the lowest combined federal and provincial subsidy rate is 34%
(16% on the federal level plus 18% on the provincial level for British
Colombia and Ontario312 of “qualifying labor expenses” (those labor expenses incurred in Canada)).
307. See, e.g., 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY REPORT: ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS
ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003 TO MARCH 31, 2004, supra note 72, at
5-6.
308. See, e.g., FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 17 (reporting the comment “It’s all about money,”
allegedly made by Avi Lerner, co-chairman of Nu Image, at a June 17, 2004 meeting in Beverly
Hills, in explaining why Nu Image was planning to shoot only two of its 12 features in 2004 in the
U.S.).
309. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 72, available at
http://www.ftac.org/html/2a-dgasag.html (last visited May 5, 2006) (assuming that qualifying labor
expenditures in Canada total approximately 50% of production costs); 2003-04 CAVCO ACTIVITY
REPORT: ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY CAVCO FOR THE PERIOD APRIL 1, 2003
TO MARCH 31, 2004, supra note 73, at 5-6 (indicating that approximately 50% of budgets presented
for CAVCO approval consist of qualifying labor costs.)
310. The Monitor Company, supra note 5, at 28 (citing John W. Cones, Film Finance and Distribution: A Dictionary of Terms).
Below-the-line [labor costs are] . . . [f]ilm budget items relating to the technical expenses
and labor . . . involved in producing a film, i.e., relating to mechanical, crew, extras, art,
sets, camera, electrical, wardrobe, transportation, raw film stock, printing, and postproduction . . . The phrase “below-the-line” refers to the location of the specific expense
items/person on the budget.
Id.
311. Department of Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA), supra note 306, at 4 (Approximately 60% of a film’s budget is attributable to below-the-line costs).
312. See Appendix B.
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Hence, without even investigating individual film costs, one would
expect to find that at least 10.2% (34% of 30%) of the production costs
of a U.S.-developed film produced in Canada today is subsidized by the
applicable Canadian governments. For all of the above reasons, it appears very likely that the 5% subsidization figure is met, if production
costs are used in the calculation of the 5% subsidization figure.
In conclusion, then, the U.S. should be able to establish that Canada’s PSTC film subsidies are causing material injury or a threat thereof,
as well as serious prejudice or a threat thereof, to the U.S. feature film
production industry. Accordingly, the U.S. should be able to establish
that Canada’s PSTC film incentives constitute actionable subsidies provided to a specific industry that are causing adverse effects to the interests of the U.S. and hence they are not in compliance with Canada’s obligations under the SCM Agreement.
VII. REMEDIES, OBSTACLES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As is discussed above in Section VI, the evidence demonstrates that
Canada’s PSTC film incentives are inconsistent with its obligations under the SCM Agreement, because they cause adverse effects to the feature film production industry in the U.S. For this same reason, the U.S.
Government could impose countervailing tariffs on the subsidized films
when they enter the U.S., in accordance with 701 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended.313 This section of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended, is referred to as “Section 701.” Hence, U.S. interested parties
could both request the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (the
USTR) to have the U.S. initiate a dispute resolution proceeding in the
WTO as well as file a countervailing duty petition with the U.S. Department of Commerce under Section 701 (referred to as a “Section701
petition”). Furthermore, a domestic interested party could file a petition
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974314 with the USTR as a
method of prompting the U.S. Government to initiate a WTO dispute
resolution proceeding against Canada. Such a petition is referred to as a
“Section 301 petition,” and this section of the Trade Act of 1974 is referred to as “Section 301.” Each of these three remedies will be discussed in turn, below. Then, various obstacles facing interested parties
in successfully pursuing these remedies are discussed. Finally, recommendations on how domestic interested parties may best proceed to challenge these subsidies are provided.

313. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2005).
314. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (2005).
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A. Remedies
1. Initiate a WTO Proceeding
Interested parties in the U.S., in particular those feature film workers who have been harmed by the Canadian PSTC film subsidies, could
request that the USTR initiate a proceeding against Canada under the
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO, including the special dispute
settlement procedures set forth in the SCM Agreement.315 Such a request need not follow any particular format, but the U.S. Government, in
response to such a request, has complete discretion as to whether to pursue a dispute proceeding against another country in the WTO.316 The
USTR is not even obligated to respond in any fashion to such a request.
In fact, it is not unusual for such a request filed by domestic interested
parties to languish at the USTR for several years.317 The USTR might
also be especially tempted in this case to ignore such a request, as the
powerful MPAA appears to oppose any challenge to the subsidies.318
The USTR can self-initiate a dispute proceeding in the WTO.319

315. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33
I.L.M. 1226 (Apr. 5, 1994) (detailing the dispute over settlement procedures of the WTO). Additional dispute settlement procedures applicable to a WTO member’s subsidy program that allegedly
is inconsistent with the SCM Agreement on the ground that it adversely affects the interests of another WTO Member are found in the SCM Agreement, supra note 19, Article 7.
316. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Public Law 103-465, December 8, 1994, Section
102(c)(1)(A) (providing that only the United States has a cause of action or a defense under any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements).
317. See, e.g., USTR’s Zoellick Says WTO Biotech Case Aims to Quell Fears, International
Information Programs (May 13, 2003) (U.S. biotech industry waited many years for the U.S. bring a
case in the WTO against the EU challenging the EU’s moratorium on the importation of biotech
foods into the EU, as U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick acknowledged when the U.S. finally brought a case in 2003. At that time, he stated that “after nearly five years the United States is
finally acting to challenge in the World Trade Organization (WTO) the European Union (EU) moratorium on food derived from biotechnology because harm from the EU stalling has begun to spread
globally”), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-726528.html (last visited
May 2, 2006).
318. See, e.g., MPAA’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties
Pursuant to § 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as Amended (2001); Staff report to Mary J. Alford, City
Manager, Burbank, California, Runaway Production – Consideration of the Film and Television
Action Committee Resolution (March 15, 2005) (reviewing reasons for the MPAA’s opposition to
Burbank City Council’s resolution in favor of Section 301 petition), available at
http://www.ci.burbank.ca.us/agendas/ag_council/2005/sr031505_5.html (last visited May 7, 2006).
319. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2005).
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2. File a Section 301 Petition
Interested parties in the U.S., in particular those feature film workers who have been harmed by Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, could also
file a Section 301 petition with the USTR.320 The USTR can self-initiate
a Section 301 action,321 but, in practice, the USTR rarely does so. There
are two subparts of Section 301 that are relevant – Subpart (A) and
Subpart (B). Each of these subparts is discussed separately.
a. Section 301(A)
Section 301(A) provides a method for the USTR to identify unfair
trade practices harming U.S. producers and request reform of those practices by the responsible foreign governments, backed up by the threat of
sanctions.322 Under Section 301(A), the USTR would determine
whether an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country: (i) violates, or is
inconsistent with, the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to the
U.S. under, any trade agreement, or (ii) is unjustifiable and burdens or
restricts U.S. commerce.323 In the instant case, the petitioners would allege that Canada’s PSTC film subsidies are inconsistent with Canada’s
obligations under the SCM Agreement because the subsidies adversely
affect the U.S. feature film production industry.324
After a Section 301 petition is filed, the USTR is required to decide
within 45 days whether to “initiate an investigation.”325 Hence, the main
advantage of a Section 301(A) action is that it would force the USTR to
take some action regarding Canada’s PSTC film subsidies. However, it
is important to point out that the USTR still could decide not to initiate
an investigation of Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.326
Technically, reasonably tight time limits apply for the completion
of Section 301 investigations.327 Today, however, the USTR must extend the deadlines for every Section 301 investigation, because the U.S.
has agreed to suspend any investigation initiated under Section 301 until
the completion of a WTO dispute proceeding on the same issue. Specifically, in the WTO Panel on U.S. – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act

320. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (2005).
321. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(1) (2005).
322. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2005).
323. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2412(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii) (2005).
324. See supra Part VI, Section D.2.(Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be
Causing Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry).
325. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (2005).
326. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(3) (2005).
327. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(4) (2005).
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of 1974,328 the U.S. asserted that its Statement of Administrative Action
(the SAA) accompanying passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act329 had clarified that the U.S. would not conduct a Section 301 investigation in such a manner as to unilaterally determine whether another
country is violating a WTO Agreement such as the SCM Agreement.330
Based on this assertion, the Panel in this case approved Section 301 actions as being consistent with the WTO dispute resolution scheme.331
Hence, if the USTR did agree to initiate a Section 301 investigation
of Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, it would then hold its investigation in
abeyance, initiate a dispute resolution proceeding against Canada in the
WTO, and then finally conclude its own investigation based on the WTO
decision. In essence, therefore, a Section 301(A) petition today is simply a method of forcing the USTR to consider initiating a dispute proceeding against another country in the WTO.
b. Section 301(B)
Interested parties in the U.S., in particular the feature film workers
who have been harmed by Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, could also file
a Section 301(B) petition with the USTR.332 In such a case, these parties
would be asking that the USTR investigate whether “an act, policy, or
practice of a country is unreasonable or discriminatory and burdens or
restricts United States commerce.”333 The USTR in such a case would
also have to decide whether action to correct the foreign practice would
be appropriate and feasible.334
Under Section 301(B), however, the USTR possesses even broader
discretion regarding whether to initiate an investigation and impose
sanctions against foreign countries.335 Therefore, domestic interested
parties are more likely to obtain relief via a Section 301(A) petition than
a Section 301(B) petition.
3. File a Section 701 Petition
Lastly, interested parties in the U.S., in particular the feature film
workers who have been harmed by Canada’s PSTC film subsidies, could
328. United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS/152/R, adopted on
December 22, 1999.
329. Public Law 103-465, December 8, 1994.
330. See International Information Programs supra note 317, at para. 4.539.
331. Id. at VIII (Conclusions).
332. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (2005).
333. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (2005).
334. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2) (2005).
335. See id.
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file a petition with the International Trade Administration of the U.S.
Department of Commerce (the DOC) requesting that it initiate an investigation into whether countervailing duties should be imposed on the
imports of subsidized feature films into the U.S.336 Again, such actions
are brought under Section 701.337 In such a case, the International Trade
Commission (the ITC) would first conduct a preliminary injury investigation into whether the PSTC film subsidies are materially injuring the
U.S. feature film production industry.338 If the ITC’s preliminary injury
investigation results in a positive determination, then the DOC would
conduct a preliminary subsidy investigation to determine if the subsidies
are actionable.339 Next, assuming that the DOC’s investigation results in
a positive determination, the DOC would proceed to conduct the final
subsidy investigation, and then finally the ITC would conduct the final
injury investigation.340 However, the U.S. has no power to order Canada
to abolish the subsidies at the conclusion of a Section 701 duty proceeding. Rather, the U.S. would calculate and impose a proper tariff rate to
counter the subsidies received by each Canadian film maker exporting
feature films to the U.S.
In a petition requesting a countervailing investigation, the domestic
interested parties would have to demonstrate to the DOC that at least
25% of the employees in the industry support the filing of the petition.341
This issue of standing arose in 2001, when FTAC and several film industry unions filed a Section 701 petition with the DOC.342 Predictably,
the MPAA opposed FTAC’s petition, based in part on this issue of
standing, arguing that the petitioners had shown that only 23.5% of film
workers in the U.S. supported the filing of such a petition at that time.343
The petitioners then withdrew their countervailing duty petition and they
have not refiled it since. Still, workers in the U.S. film industry clearly
seem to support the imposition of some type of trade sanction against
countries that provide illegal film subsidies.344

336. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b) (2005).
337. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2005).
338. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
339. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b) (2005).
340. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671d (2005).
341. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(4)(A)(i) (2005).
342. MPAA’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties Pursuant
to § 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended ( 2001).
343. Id.
344. See supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh,
and Ann Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)); see also FTAC’s website, available at
http://www.ftac.org/html/support.html (last visited May 11, 2006), which lists the various entertainment trade unions that support trade sanctions against Canada with respect to its film subsidies.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

80

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

819

It appears that the issue of standing could be overcome and a Section 701 petition could be successfully filed. In addition to the issue of
standing in Section 701 cases, however, countervailing investigations
often take several years to conclude. Furthermore, even assuming that
countervailing duties would be warranted, the imposition of such duties
on the importation of Canadian-origin feature films into the U.S. may be
counterproductive in the long run. This is the case, because if a countervailing tariff were imposed, the Canadian governments could simply respond by granting even more generous subsidies, which Canadian Government spokespersons appear willing to consider.345 While yet another
countervailing investigation could then be initiated and further countervailing tariffs imposed, this could simply result in yet another escalation
in the PSTC subsidy rates. In other words, there is the strong possibility
that this remedy would accomplish nothing more than another subsidy
spiral. At the same time, the imposition of countervailing duties on feature film exports to the U.S. could cause Canada to abolish the PSTC
film incentives or at least make them less generous.
Finally, it would be difficult to assess the countervailing duties on
the importation of feature films from Canada. The countervailing duty
rate for each film would be extremely high, and there would be a great
outcry from the MPAA, with the MPAA most likely claiming it would
have to raise movie ticket prices as a result of the imposition of such a
high tariff. Also, such a high tariff would lead to significant attempts by
U.S. importers to circumvent the tariff, for example by electronically
transmitting more films to the U.S., as such transmissions today generally are not considered importations346 and furthermore are difficult to
trace. All in all, the practical hurdles to establishing and collecting a
countervailing tariff are formidable.
B. Obstacles
1. MPAA Opposition
The MPAA argues that Canada’s PSTC film subsidies are consistent with Canada’s obligations under the SCM Agreement, and that, in
any case, it would be counterproductive for the U.S. to challenge the

345. See FTAC Letter, supra note 2, at 12 (citing Canadian Film and Television Production
Association, Profile 2003: An Economic Report on the Canadian Film and Television Production
Industry; Risky Business: Canadian Producers in the Global Economy 8 ( 2003), available at
http://www.cftpa.ca/newsroom/pdf_profile/profile2003-english.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006).
346. See supra notes 163, 167.
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subsidies.347 The MPAA’s most commonly voiced argument in this regard is that the producers constitute the “movie industry,” and the shareholders of the producers are not adversely affected by the subsidies.348
Surely, though, as indicated above, corporate shareholders are only one
component of any particular industry in a country, especially as the economic well-being of the shareholders is not necessarily consistent with
the economic well-being of other components of a national industry,
such as the workers in that industry. In fact, the WTO Panel in Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry,349 ruled that
the WTO laws protect national products rather than national companies,
and thus the SCM Agreement did not protect the U.S. in that case because no producers of U.S.-origin automobiles were being harmed by
Indonesia’s automobile subsidy program.350 This decision provides
strong support for the conclusion that, under the SCM Agreement, the
shareholders in an industry, at most, should be treated as only one component of a domestic industry. That the SCM Agreement is intended to
protect much more than just industry shareholders is also demonstrated
by the long list of factors which Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement
states should be considered on the issue of whether the domestic industry producing a “like product” in a complaining WTO Member is being
materially injured by foreign subsidies.351 Again, if company profits
were the only relevant factor, the WTO Members need not have included
any of the other factors listed in Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement.352
Furthermore, the MPAA could argue that a film is a “service”
rather than a “good” and thus claim that neither the SCM Agreement nor
U.S. countervailing duty law applies to Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.353 On the other hand, as discussed above, the MPAA has argued at
various times that a film is a “good” for tax purposes.354 The MPAA
members, of course, also routinely copyright their films, and a movie
347. See, e.g., Staff report to Mary J. Alford, City Manager, Burbank, California, Runaway
Production – Consideration of the Film and Television Action Committee Resolution (March 15,
2005), available at http://www.ci.burbank.ca.us/agendas/ag_council/2005/sr031505_5.html (last
visited May 9, 2006) (reviewing reasons for the MPAA’s opposition to Burbank City Council’s
resolution in favor of Section 301 petition).
348. See, e.g., MPAA’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for the Imposition of Countervailing Duties
Pursuant to §701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended (2001).
349. Indonesia – Autos, supra note 179.
350. Id. at paras. 14.198 - 14.201.
351. These factors include economic indicators such as the utilization of capacity, product
prices, wages, employment, and investment in the industry in the complaining member. SCM
Agreement, supra note 18, at Part V, Article 15.4.
352. Id.
353. See supra Part VI, Section B (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided in Connection
with the Manufacture, Production or Export of Goods – Namely, Feature Films).
354. See supra note 160.
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can be copyrighted in the first place only if it is capable of being manifested in some physical form.355 The MPAA has even succeeded in getting the USTR to initiate a Section 301(C) action known as a “Special
301 action” against foreign countries that allow their nationals to
download copies of the MPAA’s movies via the internet, thereby allegedly infringing their copyrighted movies.356 If a movie is only a service,
it is difficult to comprehend how it can be copied.
In light of all of the above, the MPAA’s support for Canada’s
PSTC film subsidies is more likely explained by the fact that these subsidies are extremely financially rewarding for the MPAA members.357
Accordingly, the MPAA members and other U.S. film makers can be
expected to continue to take advantage of these subsidies and continue to
outsource feature film production to other countries, if they are permitted to do so.
2. Lack of International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
(IATSE) Leadership Support
The leadership of one of the entertainment industry labor unions,
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE), currently does not support a legal challenge to Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.358 This is the case, even though many IATSE members themselves
do support such a challenge.359 The leadership of the IATSE maintains
that IATSE is an international union,360 and, for this reason, the leadership supports IATSE members in Canada who are benefiting from the
new film industry jobs in Canada. Therefore, the IATSE leadership explains, it doesn’t oppose Canada’s PSTC film subsidies. It is possible,
however, that the reason that the IATSE leadership does not oppose for355. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2005).
356. See, e.g., http://www.ftac.orghtml/impact.php (last visited May 7, 2006). Similarly, the
studios’ recent triumph in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Groktster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005), is based on the premise that one’s electronic copying of a
song via the internet constitutes copyright infringement.
357. See MPAA, Members Page, available at http://www.mpaa.org/AboutUsMembers.asp
(listing members as Buena Vista Pictures Distribution, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., Paramount Pictures Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios LLLP, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc) (last visited March 10, 2006).
358. IATSE, Made in USA, available at http://www.iatse.org/indexold.html (unofficial site
noting that official position is “members of our union are not being harmed” by runaway productions) (last visited November. 6, 2005).
359. Id; see also http://www.ftac.org/html/support.html (listing the various IATSE locals and
other entertainment trade unions that support trade sanctions against Canada with respect to its film
subsidies) (last visited May 5, 2006) .
360. IATSE National, Welcome to IATSE, http://www.iatse-intl.org/about/welcome.html (last
visited November 6, 2005).
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eign film subsidies is that IATSE makes more money through the payment of the initial dues paid by a new Canadian member of IATSE than
through the payment of on-going dues from a long-time U.S. member.361
While most large unions, like IATSE, have international alliances
with their fellow members in other countries, it is extremely unusual for
the leadership of a union in the U.S. to actually support the outsourcing
of a U.S. industry which is putting its own U.S. members out of work.
Moreover, as a union is supposed to be a democratic institution and thus
is supposed to represent the interests of its members, one could argue
that the failure of the IATSE leadership in the U.S. to represent its members’ interests can be ignored and what matters is the fact that individual
IATSE members support a challenge to Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.
This is especially the case, as a number of other entertainment industry
labor unions have endorsed a U.S. challenge to the PSTC film incentives.362 Given that the U.S. Government is not required to pursue a legal challenge to the PSTC film incentives, however, the failure of the
IATSE leadership to support such a challenge is a not insignificant obstacle to such a challenge.
3. Recent Data on the U.S. Feature Film Industry
During the last few years, neither U.S. government agencies nor
U.S. private entities have published comprehensive data on the state of
the entire U.S. feature film production industry. Various Canadian entities have published annual figures on the growth of the Canadian feature
film production industry and the concomitant decline of the U.S. feature
film production industry, and these figures have been presented in this
article. 363 Interested parties in the U.S., however, should not rely solely
on data published in Canada to support their legal challenge to Canada’s
PSTC film subsidies.
In the spring of 2006, the Center for Entertainment Industry
Data Reports (CEIDR) commenced work on a thorough review of the
entire U.S. film industry through 2005.364 This report should be publicly
available soon,365 and it is possible that it will provide much of the data
that is needed for a legal challenge to Canada’s PSTC film subsidies.
361. See, e.g., posting by “Charles,” Addressing Union Problems (July 7, 1999). “I’m sure that
the recent [IATSE] layoffs put a crimp into the lucrative aspect of new members and the revenues
that initiation fees and new membership dues generate.” Id., available at www.animationnation.
com/wwwboard/messages/514.html (last visited May 7, 2006).
362. See supra note 356.
363. See supra Part VI, Section D.2 (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives Clearly Appear to be
Causing Adverse Effects to the U.S. Feature Film Industry).
364. See supra note 275.
365. Id.
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C. Recommendations
1. Compile Recent Data on Adverse Effects to U.S. Feature Film
Production Industry
As the U.S. Government has the discretion not to pursue a legal
challenge to Canada’s PSTC film incentives, it is very important that interested parties in the U.S. present a very compelling case demonstrating
the adverse effects that the subsidies are causing to the U.S. feature film
production industry. The data presented in this article, much of which
was published by Canadian private and government agencies, document
such adverse effects. However, the most up-to-date data available in
both Canada and the U.S. on these adverse effects to the U.S. feature
film industry should be compiled and summarized in order to prepare the
strongest possible legal challenge to the PSTC film incentives. Again,
the report published by CEIDR and covering the period through 2005
may provide much, if not all, of this data.
2. Document Union Support, Particularly from IATSE, for a Legal
Challenge to the PSTC Film Incentives
As stated above, the leadership of IATSE, one of the entertainment
labor unions, does not support a legal challenge to the PSTC film incentives.366 While the U.S. Government might initiate a legal challenge to
the incentives without the MPAA’s support, there is a significant chance
that it would not do so if IATSE, in addition to the MPAA, opposes a
legal challenge to the incentives.
Therefore, if rank and file IATSE members do indeed support a legal challenge to the incentives (which, again, appears to be the case and
of course is logical), it is recommended that interested parties in the U.S.
first attempt to compile proof of these IATSE members’ support. This
proof should be included with any request filed by interested parties to
initiate a legal challenge to the incentives.
3. Prepare Response to MPAA’s Opposition
The MPAA most likely will oppose any legal challenge to the
PSTC film incentives. The MPAA’s main arguments are discussed
above.367 Thus, interested parties in the U.S. should be prepared to pro-

366. See supra note 355.
367. See supra Part VII, Section B.1 (MPAA Opposition).
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vide counterarguments to the MPAA’s main arguments. This article has
discussed some of the possible counterarguments.368
4. File a Section 301(A) Petition
It is recommended that interested parties in the U.S. file a Section
301 petition with the USTR as a method of requesting the initiation of a
WTO dispute resolution proceeding challenging the consistency of Canada’s PSTC film incentives with the SCM Agreement.369 This recommendation is based on the fact that the USTR must respond to a Section
301 petition and need not respond to a request for the commencement of
a WTO dispute resolution proceeding per se.370 At the present time,
FTAC and a group of entertainment unions are planning to file a Section
301(A) petition with the USTR on the issue of Canada’s film incentives.371 They have even been successful in getting several city councils,
including the City Councils of Santa Monica, Burbank, West Hollywood, and Glendale to pass a resolution in favor of such a filing.372
Unless the USTR declines to initiate an investigation of the PSTC
film incentives under Section 301A, it is recommended that interested
parties not file a Section 701 countervailing duty petition with the DOC.
While a Section 701 petition ultimately might prompt Canada to abolish
the PSTC film incentives or at least make them less generous, there are
many disadvantages to a Section 701 petition.373
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is strongly recommended that the U.S. Government pursue a legal
challenge testing the consistency of the foreign film subsidies, and in
particular the Canadian PSTC film subsidies, with the SCM Agreement
before the U.S. feature film production industry disappears completely.
This action is warranted on account of the material injury that the U.S.
368. Id.; see also supra Part VI, Section B (Canada’s PSTC Film Incentives are Provided in
Connection with the Manufacture, Production or Export of Goods – namely, Feature Films).
369. This procedure is outlined above. See supra Part VII, Section A.2 (File a 301 Petition).
370. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(2) (2005).
371. See FTAC’s website, available at http://www.ftac.org (last visited May 13, 2006); see
also supra note 16 (Author’s interview with FTAC members Gene Warren, Tim McHugh, and Ann
Champion, Burbank, California, (July 9, 2005)).
372. See Mark R. Madler, City Backs Production Probe, BURBANK LEADER (April 30, 2005);
Film and Television Action Committee, FTAC Wins Again, found at http://www.ftac.org (last visited November 6, 2005); available at http://www.weho.org/download/index.cfm?fuseaction=down
load&cid=3624 (last visited March 22, 2006) (City of West Hollywood City Council meeting agendas, including original agenda for July 18, 2005 meeting); see also generally, http://www.ftac.org/
html/support.html (last visited May 7, 2006).
373. See Part VII, Section A.3 (File a Section 701 Petition).
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feature film industry appears to be suffering and the fact that these subsidies appear to be inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under the
SCM Agreement. In addition, it likely would be counterproductive for
the U.S. Government to either impose countervailing tariffs on imported,
subsidized feature films or provide further domestic subsidies to the feature film industry. These latter actions in all likelihood would simply
lead other governments to raise their film subsidy rates yet again.
In particular, it is recommended that interested parties in the U.S.
file a Section 301(A) petition with the USTR as a method of prompting
the U.S. to initiate a WTO dispute resolution proceeding against Canada.
First, though, interested parties in the U.S should compile up-to-date
evidence of the adverse effects that the U.S. feature film production industry is suffering, secure proof of union support, especially IATSE
support, for a WTO dispute proceeding, and prepare counterarguments
to the MPAA’s likely opposition to such a proceeding.
The MPAA’s opposition to a legal challenge to the Canadian subsidies should not dissuade interested parties from challenging these subsidies. While film producers benefit financially from the subsidies, the
subsidies harm not only current and former industry workers, but also
U.S. taxpayers paying the price of maintaining competing federal, state
and local film subsidies in the U.S., as well as all U.S. citizens wishing
to retain a vibrant U.S. feature film production industry.
During the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations culminating in the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the U.S. took the position that U.S. workers should focus on providing high-paying services
and high technology goods containing intellectual property, and they
should leave the production of labor-intensive, low-tech goods to workers in other countries.374 Accordingly, the U.S. did not push for minimum labor standards in the WTO, which are applicable primarily to the
production of low-tech goods. As a result, many U.S. companies have
continued to outsource the production of low-tech goods to other countries where lower wage rates prevail. If the U.S. in those negotiations
also agreed that high-tech items containing intellectual property, such as
feature films and computer software, are services that are not protected
by the SCM Agreement and hence other countries can subsidize their
production with impunity, the U.S. arguably made a bad bargain during
the Uruguay Round.
In summary, Canada and other WTO Members should not be permitted to circumvent the SCM Agreement simply because the share374. See, e.g., Tad Crawford, The Copyright Impact of the World Trade Organization,
ALLWORTH PRESS (noting goal of United States was to strengthen copyright protection), available
at http://www.allworth.com/articles/article01.htm (last visited November 6, 2005).
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holders of U.S. movie houses benefit from these countries’ unfair trade
practices as well. A decision to forego a challenge to the foreign film
subsidies in order to satisfy the MPAA would go a long way toward confirming the conviction of the WTO’s critics that the WTO rules exist
solely to protect the interests of wealthy and powerful corporate shareholders. In contrast, a decision on the part of the U.S. Government to
challenge the foreign film subsidies would be consistent with the mission of the WTO, which to enforce the rules of fair and free trade among
the WTO nations so as to promote and protect the economic well-being
of all WTO Members and the national industries in those Members.
IX. APPENDICES

Year
2000

2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000

Appendix A
U.S. Feature Films Produced in Canada – 2000**
Title
Production
Distributors
Motion Picture
A Rumor of
Cinetel Films
Corporation of
Angels
America
Edward R. Press- Columbia TriStar
American Psyman Film CorpoHome Entertaincho
ration
ment
Castle Rock EnBait
Warner Bros.
tertainment
Battlefield ProBattlefield Earth
Warner Bros.
ductions LLC
Columbia TriStar
Beautiful Joe
Beautiful Films
Home Video
Castle Rock EnWarner Bros. DoBest in Show
tertainment
mestic Television
Paramount PicParamount Home
Bless the Child
tures
Video
Bonhoeffer:
NFP Teleart BerAgent of Grace
lin (I)
RomeroBruiser
Grunwald ProLions Gate Films
ductions
Bel Air EnterChain of Fools
Warner Bros.
tainment
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Budget
$17.2M
*
$8M
$35M
$73M
$17.2M
*
$6M
$40M
$17.2M
*
$5M
$20M
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Dracula 2000

Dimension Films
Beacon Communications LLC
PM Entertainment
Group Inc.

Dimension Films
Buena Vista Pictures
PM Entertainment
Group Inc.

2000

Duets

2000

Epicenter

2000

Fear of Flying

Trimark Pictures

Trimark Pictures

Final Destination
Finding Forrester

Hard Eight Pictures
Columbia Pictures Corporation

2000

Frequency

2000

2000

827

$28M
$15M
$17.2M
*
$17.2M
*

New Line Cinema

$23M

Columbia Pictures

$43M

New Line Cinema

New Line Home
Video

$31M

Get Carter

Carter Productions LLC

Warner Bros.

$40M

2000

Ginger Snaps

Copper Heart Entertainment

20th Century Fox
Home Entertainment

$5M

2000

Gossip

Outlaw Productions

Warner Bros.

$14M

2000

How to Kill
Your
Neighbor’s Dog

Lonsdale Productions

Artistic License

$7.3M

2000

Isn’t She Great

2000

Lakeboat

2000

Marine Life

2000

Mercy

Franchise Pictures

2000

Mission to Mars

Touchstone Pictures

Universal Home
Entertainment
Cowboy Booking
International
Crescent Releasing
Ltd.
Columbia TriStar
Home Video
Buena Vista Pictures

2000

MVP: Most
Valuable Primate

Film Incentive
B.C.

Keystone Family
Pictures

$17.2M
*

2000

My 5 Wives

Blue Rider Pictures

2000

No Alibi

Artisan Entertainment
Motion International

$17.2M
*
$17.2M
*

2000
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Mutual Film Corporation
Panorama Entertainment
Alliance Atlantis
Communications

$36M
$17.2M
*
$17.2M
*
$17.2M
*
$90M
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2000

Nostradamus

John Aaron Productions

2000

Reindeer Games

Dimension Films

2000
2000

Romeo Must
Die
Run the Wild
Fields

2000

Scary Movie

2000

Screwed

2000

Seventeen
Again

2000

Shanghai Noon

2000

Skipped Parts

2000

Snow Day

Regent Entertainment
Buena Vista Home
Video (BVHV)

$17.2M
*

Silver Pictures

Warner Bros.

$25M

Showtime Networks Inc.
Brillstein-Grey
Entertainment
Robert Simonds
Productions
Showtime Networks Inc.
Roger Birnbaum
Productions
Skipped Parts
Productions
Nickelodeon
Movies

Hallmark Entertainment

$17.2M
*

Dimension Films

$19M

Something Between Us
Steal This
Movie

Lakeshore International

2000

The 6th Day

Phoenix Pictures

2000

The Art of War
The Bone Ripper

Amen Ra Films

2000
2000

2000
2000

The Guilty

2000

The Highwayman
The Ladies Man

2000

The Loser

2000

The Magic of
Marciano

2000

The Skulls

2000
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Franchise Pictures
Dogwood Pictures Inc.

Universal Home
Entertainment
Showtime Networks Inc.
Buena Vista Pictures

$10M
$17.2M
*
$55M

Trimark Pictures

$17.2M
*

Paramount Pictures

$13M

Trimark Video
Columbia TriStar
Home Video
Warner Bros.
Columbia TriStar
Home Video
Eagle Pictures
S.p.a.

$17.2M
*
$17.2M
*
$82M

Paramount Pictures

$40M
$17.2M
*
$17.2M
*
$17.2M
*
$11M

Columbia Pictures

$20M

Outrider Pictures

$4.5M

MCA/Universal
Pictures

$15M

Lions Gate Films
SNL Studios
Branti Film Productions
Cape Atlantic
Productions
Newmarket Capital Group LLC

$36M
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The Spreading
Ground
The Weight of
Water
The Whole Nine
Yards
Thomas and the
Magic Railroad

Alpine Pictures
Inc.

Smooth Pictures

$17.2M
*

Canal+

Lions Gate Films

$16M

Franchise Pictures

Warner Bros.

$24M

Destination Films

Destination Films

$19M

2000

Trixie

Pandora Cinema

2000

Turn It Up
Urban Legends:
Final Cut
Waking the
Dead
Where the
Money Is

New Line Cinema

Columbia TriStar
Home Video
New Line Cinema
Sony Pictures Entertainment

$17.2M
*
$9M

USA Entertainment

$8.5M

Universal Pictures

$18M

X-Men

20th Century Fox

Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corporation

$75M

2000
2000
2000
2000

2000
2000
2000
2000

Original Film
Gramercy Pictures
Gramercy Pictures

$15M

2000 Total of Budgets: $1395.5M
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget information. The average was compiled using the available budget numbers
for the year.
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made
using information at http://www.IMDB.com. The search parameters
were “earliest release between January 2000 and December 2000, and
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’,
and display Production Companies, Distributors, budget, sorted by Title.”

Year
2001
2001
2001
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Appendix A
U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2001**
Title
Production
Distributors
3000 Miles to Grace- 3000 Miles
Warner Bros.
land
Productions
David Brown
Paramount
Along Came a Spider
Productions
Pictures
America’s SweetFace ProducColumbia
hearts
tions
Pictures

Budget
$62M
$28M
$48M
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Angel Eyes

Franchise Pictures

2001

Antitrust

Hyde Park Entertainment

2001

Blow

Apostle

2001

Blue Hill Avenue

2001

Bones

2001

Camouflage

2001

Cats & Dogs

2001

Chasing Holden

2001

Don’t Say a Word

Asiatic Associates
Hannah Rachel
Production Services.
Camouflage
Productions
Inc.
Mad Chance
Christopher
Eberts Productions
Further Films
3 Art Entertainment
Champs Productions Inc.
Silver Pictures
MysticArts Pictures

2001

Down to Earth

2001

Driven

2001

Exit Wounds

2001

Finder’s Fee

2001

Focus

Carros Pictures

2001

Freddy Got Fingered

New Regency
Pictures

2001

Get Over It

Ignite Entertainment

2001

Glitter

20th Century
Fox
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Warner Bros.
MetroGoldwynMayer Distributing
Corporation
New Line
Cinema
Artisan Entertainment

$38M

$30M

$30M
$1.2M

New Line
Cinema

$16M

Sunland Studios Inc.

$19.4M
*

Warner Bros.
Lions Gate
Films Home
Entertainment

$60M
$19.4M
*
$50M

Paramount
Pictures

$30M

Warner Bros.

$72M

Warner Bros.
Lions Gate
Films
Paramount
Classics
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Miramax
Films
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corpo-

$33M
$19.4M
*
$19.4M
*
$15M

$10M
$22M
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Kushner-Locke
Company
Universal Pictures

2001

Harvard Man

2001

Head Over Heels

2001

Hedwig and the Angry Inch

2001

Heist

2001

Iris

2001

Jason X

2001

Jet Boy

2001

Josie and the Pussycats

2001

Kill Me Later

2001

Knockaround Guys

2001

L.A.P.D.: To Protect
and to Serve

2001

Little Shop of Erotica

2001

MVP 2: Most Vertical Primate

2nd Banana
Productions
Inc.

2001

On the Line

Miramax Films

2001

One Eyed King

2001

Out Cold

2001

Out of Line

2001

Picture Claire
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Killer Films
Franchise Pictures
Mirage Enterprises
Crystal Lake
Entertainment
Inc.

ration
Cowboy Pictures
Universal
Pictures
Fine Line
Features
Warner
Home Video
Miramax
Films
New Line
Cinema

831

$5.5M
$14M
$6M
$35M
$5.5M
$14M
$19.4M
*

Marc Platt Productions
Amazon Film
Productions
Lawrence
Bender Productions
Fries Film
Group

Cutting Edge
Entertainment
Donners’ Company
Curb Entertainment
Alliance Atlan-

MCA/Univer
sal Pictures
Lions Gate
Films
New Line
Cinema
Trinity Home
Entertainment
Inc.
Private
Screenings
Keystone Entertainment
Miramax
Films
Lions Gate
Films
Buena Vista
Pictures
Curb Entertainment
Serendipity

$22M
$19.4M
*
$19.4M
*
$19.4M
*
$19.4M
*
$19.4M
*
$10M
$6.5M
$11M
$19.4M
*
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tis Motion Picture Production
2001

Prozac Nation

2001

Rat Race

2001

Replicant

2001

Riding in Cars with
Boys

2001

Saving Silverman

Giv’en Films
Alphaville
Films
777 Films Corporation
Parkway Pictures (I)
Columbia Pictures Corporation

2001

Say It Isn’t So

20th Century
Fox

2001

Scotland, Pa.

Abandon Pictures

2001

See Spot Run

2001

Serendipity

2001

Snowbound

2001

Spy Game

2001

Swordfish

2001

Tangled

Ben’s Sister
Productions

2001

Tart

Interlight

2001

Texas Rangers

Greisman Productions
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Productions
Simon Fields
Productions
Nomadic Pictures
Beacon Communications
LLC
Jonathan Krane
Group
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Point Films

Miramax
Films
Paramount
Pictures
Artisan Entertainment
Columbia
Pictures
Sony Pictures
Entertainment
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Sundance
Channel
Home Entertainment
Warner
Home Video
Miramax
Films
Buena Vista
Pictures
Universal
Pictures
Warner
Home Video
Buena Vista
Home Video
(BVHV)
Lions Gate
Films
Dimension
Films

$19.4M
*
$9M
$48M
$17M
$48M
$22M

$25M

$19.4M
*
$16M
$28M
$19.4M
*
$92M
$80M
$19.4M
*
$3.3M
$38M
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2001

The Bunker

Millennium
Pictures

MTI Home
Video

2001

The Caveman’s Valentine

Franchise Pictures

MCA/Univer
sal Pictures

2001

The Pledge

Franchise Pictures

Warner Bros.

$45M

2001

The Proposal

Front Street
Productions

Buena Vista
Home Video
(BVHV)

$19.4M
*

2001

The Safety of Objects

Killer Films

IFC Films

$19.4M
*

2001

The Score

Eagle Point
Production

2001

The Shipping News

Miramax Films

2001

The Ties That Bind

CineSon Entertainment

Paramount
Pictures
Miramax
Films
Universal
Studios
Home Video

2001

The Whole Shebang

2001

Thir13en Ghosts

2001

True Blue

2001

Original Voices
Inc.
13 Ghosts Productions Canada Inc.

$19.4M
*
$19.4M
*

$68M
$35M
$22M

2 Match

$19.4M
*

Warner Bros.

$20M

Sandstorm
Films

Columbia
TriStar Home
Video

$19.4M
*

Valentine

Cupid Productions Inc.

Warner Bros.

$10M

2001

Viva Las Nowhere

Franchise Pictures

2001

Who Is Cletis Tout?

Itasca Pictures

Viva Las
Nowhere
Productions
Paramount
Classics

$19.4M
*
$19.4M
*

2001 Total of Budgets: $1747.2M
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget information. The average was compiled using the available budget numbers
for the year.
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made
using information at http://www.IMDB.com. The search parameters
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were “earliest release between January 2001 and December 2001, and
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’,
and display Production Companies, Distributors, budget, sorted by Title.”

Year
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

Appendix A
U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2002**
Title
Production
Distributors
40 Days and 40
Miramax
Milo Productions
Nights
Films
Bedford Falls
Paramount
Abandon
Productions
Pictures
Canyon CinAscension
Zuno Films
ema
Columbia
Avenging AnCinema Holdings
TriStar Home
gelo
Video
Ballistic: Ecks
Dante EntertainWarner Bros.
vs. Sever
ment
Behind the Red
Blue Rider PicDEJ ProducDoor
tures
tions
New Line CinBlade II
Amen Ra Films
ema
Black Sky EnterLions Gate
Cabin Fever
tainment
Films
DreamWorks
Catch Me If You Amblin EnterDistribution
Can
tainment
LLC
Destination
Cheats
Bender-Spink Inc.
Films
Miramax
Chicago
Miramax Films
Films
MGM Home
City of Ghosts
Banyan Tree
Entertainment
Confessions of a Kushner-Locke
Miramax
Dangerous Mind Company
Films
Buena Vista
Cypher
Gaylord Films
Home Video
(BVHV)
D-Tox
Capella InternaColumbia
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Budget
$17M
$25M
$500K
$24.5M
*
$70M
$24.5M
*
$55M
$1.5M
$52M
$24.5M
*
$45M
$17.5M
$29M
$7.5M
$55M
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tional

2002

Daybreak

Stainless Steel
Productions
Gullwing Entertainment Inc.

2002

Death to
Smoochy

Mad Chance

2002

Edge of Madness

Lions Gate Films

2002

Even Steven

2002

FeardotCom
Federal Protection

2002

A Dreamin’ Production
ApolloMedia
Chariot Communications Inc.
Dark Castle Entertainment

TriStar Home
Entertainment
$24.5M
*
Warner Home
Video
Lions Gate
Films

Warner Bros.
DEJ Productions
Warner Bros.

$35M

Ghost Ship

2002

Halloween: Resurrection

Dimension Films

2002

I Spy

C-2 Pictures

2002

Insomnia

Alcon Entertainment

Buena Vista
International
Columbia Pictures
Buena Vista
International

2002

Interstate 60:
Episodes of the
Road

Seven Arts Pictures

Screen Media
Films LLC

2002

John Q

Burg/Koules Productions

2002

Julie Walking
Home

Art Oko Film

2002

K-19: The Widowmaker

National Geographic Society

2002

Life or Something Like It

Davis Entertainment

2002

Lone Hero

2002

Minority Report

New Line Cinema
First Look
Home Entertainment
Paramount
Pictures
20th Century
Fox Netherlands
DEJ Productions
Twentieth
Century Fox

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

$55M
$24.5M
*
$24.5M
*
$42M
$24.5M
*

2002

Home Box Office
(HBO)
Amblin Entertainment

835

$15M
$70M
$46M
$7M
$36M
$5M
$100M
$24.5M
*
$24.5M
*
$102M
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Corporation
2002

My Big Fat
Greek Wedding

Big Wedding

IFC Films

2002

My Little Eye

Universal Pictures

Focus Features

$24.5M
*

2002

Narc

Cruise/Wagner
Productions

Cutting Edge
Entertainment

$7.5M

2002

National Lampoon’s Van
Wilder

Myriad Pictures
Inc.

Artisan Entertainment

$6M

2002

No Good Deed

Seven Arts Pictures

2002

Paid in Full

Dimension Films

2002

Pressure

Curb Entertainment

2002

Resident Evil

New Legacy

2002

Rollerball

2002

Snow Dogs

2002

Stark Raving
Mad

A Band Apart

The Adventures
of Pluto Nash
The Burial Society

Castle Rock Entertainment
Davis Entertainment Filmworks

2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

Atlas Entertainment
Galapagos Productions

The House Next
Door
The Mallory Effect
The Santa Clause
2: The Mrs.
Clause

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

Columbia
TriStar Home
Video
Dimension
Films
Curb Entertainment
Columbia
TriStar Home
Entertainment
MGM Home
Entertainment
Buena Vista
Pictures
Columbia
TriStar Home
Entertainment
Warner Bros.
Regent Releasing
Trinity Home
Entertainment
Inc.

$12M
$24.5M
*
$24.5M
*
$32M
$70M
$35M
$5M
$100M
$1.5M
$24.5M
*
$24.5M
*

Fire Fly Films
Boxing Cat Films

$5M

Buena Vista
Pictures

$60M
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2002

The Sum of All
Fears

Paramount Pictures

2002

The Tuxedo

Blue Train Productions

2002

They

Focus Features

2002

Trapped

Columbia Pictures

2002

Triggermen

Ballpark Productions Ltd.

2002

Try Seventeen

Emmett/Furla
Films

2002

Undercover
Brother

Imagine Entertainment

2002

Virginia’s Run

Holedigger Films
Inc.

2002

WiseGirls

Anthony Esposito

2002

Wish You Were
Dead

New Line Cinema

2002

You Stupid Man

ApolloMedia

Paramount
Home Video
DreamWorks
Distribution
LLC
Dimension
Films
Columbia Pictures
Franchise Pictures
Try Seventeen
Productions
Inc.
Universal Pictures
Virginia’s Run
Productions
Inc.
Lions Gate
Films Home
Entertainment
Alive & Kicking Productions
01 Distribuzione

837

$68M
$60M
$17M
$30M
$12M
$24.5M
*
$25M
$24.5M
*
$11M
$24.5M
*
$24.5M
*

2002 Total of Budgets: $1886M
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget information. The average was compiled using the available budget numbers
for the year.
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made
using information at http://www.IMDB.com. The search parameters
were “earliest release between January 2002 and December 2002, and
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’,
and display Production Companies, Distributors, budget, sorted by Title.”
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2003
2003
2003
2003
2003

2003

2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
2003
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Appendix A
U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2003**
Title
Production
Distributors
Metro-GoldwynMGM Home
A Guy Thing
Mayer (MGM)
Entertainment
Motion Picture
Barely Legal
After School
Corporation of
Productions
Special
America
LLC
Agent Cody
Dylan Sellers
MGM Home
Banks
Productions
Entertainment
Paramount
Beyond Borders
Camelot Pictures
Pictures
Holedigger Films
MGM Home
Blizzard
Inc.
Entertainment
MetroBulletproof
GoldwynFlypaper Press
Mayer DisMonk
tributing Corp.
Cold Creek
Cold Creek
Buena Vista
Manor ProducManor
Pictures
tions
DEJ ProducCrime Spree
Hannibal Pictures
tions
Castle Rock EnDreamcatcher
Warner Bros.
tertainment
Guy Walks into a
New Line CinElf
Bar Productions
ema
Cloud Ten PicCloud Ten PicEnd Game
tures
tures
Accent EnterCCI EnterFast Food High
tainment Corporatainment
tion
Final Destination
New Line CinNew Line Cinema
2
ema
New Line CinFreddy Vs. Jason Avery Pix
ema
Jim Henson PicMGM Home
Good Boy!
tures
Entertainment
Columbia Pictures Warner Home
Gothika
Corporation
Video

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4
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Budget
$20M
$24.1M
*
$26M
$35M
$24.1M
*
$52M

$24.1M
*
$10M
$68M
$33M
$24.1M
*
$4.5M
$26M
$25M
$18M
$40M

100

Wright: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home
WRIGHT1.DOC

2006]

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

INTERNATIONAL TRADE REMEDIES TO BRING HOLLYWOOD HOME

2003

Honey

2003

Hope Springs

2003

House of the
Dead

Marc Platt Productions
Buena Vista Pictures
Mindfire Entertainment

2003

How to Deal

Focus Features

How to Lose a
Guy in 10 Days
It’s All About
Love

Paramount Pictures

2003
2003

CoBo Fonds
Columbia Pictures
Corporation
Bigel/Mailer
Films

2003

Levity

2003

Lost Junction

2003

My Boss’s
Daughter

Dimension Films

2003

Open Range

Beacon Pictures

2003

Paycheck

Davis Entertainment

2003

Rhinoceros Eyes

Directors Program

2003

Scary Movie 3

2003

Shanghai
Knights

2003

Shattered Glass

2003

Spinning Boris

2003

Stealing Sinatra

2003

The Core

Core Prods. Inc.

2003

The Event

Emotion Pictures

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

Brad Grey Pictures
All Knight Productions LLC
Baumgarten Merims Productions
Showtime Networks Inc.
Ron Ziskin Productions Inc.

Universal Pictures
Buena Vista
Pictures
Artisan Entertainment
New Line Cinema
Paramount
Pictures
Strand Releasing

839

$17M
$24.1M
*
$7M
$16M
$50M
$24.1M
*

Studio Canal

$7.5M

MGM Home
Entertainment
Buena Vista
Home Video
(BVHV)
Buena Vista
Pictures
Paramount
Home Entertainment
Madstone
Films
Dimension
Films
Buena Vista
Pictures
Lions Gate
Films
Showtime
Networks Inc.
Showtime
Networks Inc.
Paramount
Pictures

$24.1M
*

ThinkFilm Inc.

$14M
$26M
$60M
$24.1M
*
$45M
$50M
$6M
$24.1M
*
$24.1M
*
$74M
$24.1M
*
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2003

The Human
Stain

Lakeshore Entertainment

Miramax
Films

2003

The In-Laws

Franchise Pictures

Warner Bros.

2003

The Italian Job

De Line Pictures

2003

The League of
Extraordinary
Gentlemen

20th Century Fox

2003

The Lizzie
McGuire Movie

Teen Life Productions

2003

The Recruit

Birnbaum/Barber

2003

Timeline

2003

Water’s Edge

2003

Willard

2003

Wrong Turn

DCP Wrong Turn
Productions

2003

X2

20th Century Fox

Donners’ Company
Front Street Productions
Hard Eight Pictures

Paramount
Home Entertainment
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Buena Vista
Pictures
Buena Vista
Pictures
Paramount
Home Video
Lions Gate
Films
New Line Cinema
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation

[39:739

$24.1M
*
$24.1M
*
$60M

$78M

$17M
$24.1M
*
$80M
$24.1M
*
$22M

$10M

$110M

2003 Total of Budgets: $1468.5M
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget information. The average was compiled using the available budget numbers
for the year.
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made
using information at http://www.IMDB.com. The search parameters
were “earliest release between January 2003 and December 2003, and
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’,
and display Production Companies, Distributors, budget, sorted by Title.”
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Appendix A
U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2004**
Title
Production
Distributors
A Different LoyLions Gate
Lions Gate Films
alty
Films
A Fate Totally
Universal
The Bubble FacWorse Than
Home Entertory
Death
tainment

2004

A Hole in One

Beech Hill Films

2004

A Home at the
End of the World

Hart-Sharp Entertainment

2004

Adam & Evil

Extraordinary
Films Ltd.

2004

Against the
Ropes

2004

Blade: Trinity

2004

Catwoman

2004

Cavedweller

2004

Cellular

2004

Christmas with
the Kranks
Confessions of a
Teenage Drama
Queen

Paramount Pictures
Marvel Enterprises
DiNovi Pictures
Showtime Networks Inc.
Electric Entertainment
1492 Pictures

Warner Independent Pictures
Velocity
Home Entertainment
Paramount
Pictures
New Line Cinema
Warner Bros.
Pictures Inc.
Showtime
Networks Inc.
New Line Cinema
Columbia Pictures
Buena Vista
Pictures

Dawn of the
Dead
Day of the Scorpion

Spyglass Entertainment
New Amsterdam
Entertainment Inc.
Gum Spirits Productions

Universal Pictures
Universal Pictures

2004

Godsend

2929 Productions

2004

Harold & Kumar

Endgame Enter-

2004
2004
2004

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

Connie and Carla

Budget
$13M
$22.2M
*
$22.2M
*

Confessions Productions

2004

841

$6.5M
$22.2M
*
$22.2M
*
$65M
$85M
$22.2M
*
$25M
$60M
$15M
$22.2M
*
$28M
$1K

New Line Cin-

$22.2M
*
$9M

103

Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 3, Art. 4
WRIGHT1.DOC

842

6/1/2006 2:40:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

Go to White
Castle
Head in the
Clouds

tainment

2004

I, Robot

20th Century Fox

2004

Jersey Girl

Beverly Detroit

2004

Mean Girls

Broadway Video

2004

Miracle

Mayhem Pictures

2004

My Baby’s
Daddy

Brillstein-Grey
Entertainment

My Brother’s
Keeper
New York Minute

Little Ricky Productions Inc.

2004

2004
2004

Arclight Films

ema
Sony Pictures
Classics
Twentieth
Century Fox
Home Entertainment
Miramax
Films
Paramount
Pictures
Buena Vista
Pictures
Miramax
Home Entertainment

$22.2M
*
$105M

$35M
$17M
$22.2M
*
$22.2M
*
$22.2M
*

DiNovi Pictures

Warner Bros.

$30M

Screen Media
Films LLC
First Independent Pictures
Innovation
Film Group
(IFG)

$22.2M
*

2004

Noel

Neverland Films
Inc.

2004

Pursued

Andrew Stevens
Entertainment Inc.

2004

Riding the Bullet

2004

Saved!

2004

Scooby Doo 2:
Monsters
Unleashed

2004

Secret Window

2004

See This Movie

2004

Shall We Dance

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4
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Motion Picture
Corporation of
America (MPCA)
Infinity International Entertainment

$22.2M
*
$5M

MGM Home
Entertainment

$5M

Mosaic Media
Group

Warner Bros.
Pictures Inc.

$22.2M
*

Columbia Pictures
Corporation
Camp Kellner
Media
Miramax Films

Columbia Pictures
Illuminare Entertainment

$40M
$22.2M
*
$40M
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2004

SuperBabies:
Baby Geniuses 2

ApolloMedia

Sony Pictures
Home Entertainment

$22.2M
*

2004

Taking Lives

Atmosphere Pictures

Warner Bros.

$22.2M
*

2004

The Aviator

Appian Way

2004
2004

The Butterfly
Effect
The Chronicles
of Riddick

Bender-Spink Inc.
One Race Productions

2004

The Day After
Tomorrow

2004

The Karate Dog

2004

The Lazarus
Child

Crystal Sky
Worldwide
Eagle Pictures
S.p.a.

2004

The Notebook

Avery Pix

2004
2004

The Perfect
Score
The Prince and
Me

20th Century Fox

MTV Films
Lions Gate Films

2004

The Terminal

Amblin Entertainment

2004

Vendetta: No
Conscience, No
Mercy

Shooting Spree
Films

2004

Walking Tall

Burke/Samples/Fo
ster Productions

2004

We Don’t Live
Here Anymore

Front Street Productions

Welcome to
Mooseport
What Lies
Above

Mooseport Productions
Shavick Entertainment Inc.

2004
2004

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

Miramax
Films
New Line Cinema
Universal Pictures
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Screen Media
Ventures LLC
Warner Bros.
New Line Cinema
Paramount
Home Video
Lions Gate
Films
DreamWorks
Distribution
LLC
Ardustry
Home Entertainment LLC
MGM Home
Entertainment
Warner Independent Pictures
Fox Film Corporation

$116M
$13M
$110M

$125M
$22.2M
*
$22.2M
*
$30M
$22.2M
*
$22.2M
*
$60M
$22.2M
*
$56M
$3M
$26M
$22.2M
*
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2004

White Chicks

2004

Wicker Park

Gone North Productions Inc.
Lakeshore Entertainment

Columbia Pictures
MGM Home
Entertainment

[39:739

$22.2M
*
$30M

2004 Total of Budgets: $1685.4M
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget information. The average was compiled using the available budget numbers
for the year.
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made
using information at http://www.IMDB.com. The search parameters
were “earliest release between January 2004 and December 2004, and
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’,
and display Production Companies, Distributors, budget, sorted by Title.”

Year
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005

Appendix A
U.S. Feature Films produced in Canada - 2005**
Title
Production
Distributors
A History of
New Line CinBender-Spink Inc.
Violence
ema
Alone in the
Lions Gate
AITD Productions
Dark
Films
An American
Freestyle ReAfterDark Films
Haunting
leasing LLC
An Unfinished
Initial EntertainMiramax
Life
ment Group (IEG) Films
Are We There
Columbia PicCube Vision
Yet?
tures
Assault on PreBiscayne Pictures Rogue Pictures
cinct 13
entitled enterAurora Borealis
tainment
Blood + Kisses
Llama Pictures
First IndeBob Productions
Bob the Butler
pendent PicLtd.
tures
Pony Canyon EnBooth
terprises (I)
Brokeback
Focus Features
Focus Features
Mountain

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

Budget
$32M
$20M
$14M
$30M
$32M
$20M
$14.6M
*
$500K
$14.6M
*
$14.6M
*
$14M
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2005

Cake

First Look Media

Lions Gate
Films

2005

Capote

A-Line Pictures

Sony Pictures
Classics

2005

Chasing Ghosts

The Syndicate

2005

Cheaper by the
Dozen 2

20th Century Fox

2005

Cinderella Man

2005

Dark Water

2005

Darkest Hour

2005

Deepwater

2005

Devour

Bigel/Mailer
Films

2005

Edison

Edison Productions Inc.

Imagine Entertainment
Pandemonium
Productions
Moviehouse Pictures
Halcyon Entertainment

2005

Elektra

20th Century Fox

2005

Fantastic Four

1492 Pictures

2005

Fever Pitch

ELC Productions
Ltd.

2005

Fierce People

Industry Entertainment

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2006

Sony Pictures
Home Entertainment
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Universal Pictures
Buena Vista
Pictures

845

$14.6M
*
$7M

$2M

$14.6M
*
$88M
$30M
$300K

Deepwater
LLC
Sony Pictures
Home Entertainment

$14.6M
*
$14.6M
*
$25.1M

Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Twentieth
Century Fox
Film Corporation
Lions Gate
Films

$43M

$100M

$39.7M
$14.6M
*
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2005

Ice Princess

2005

Insecticidal

2005

It Waits

Di Bonaventura
Pictures
Cent Productions
Inc.
Robert Simonds
Productions
Skate Away Productions Ltd.
Way Below the
Line Productions
Centaurus Films

2005

Just Friends

Bender-Spink Inc.

2005

King’s Ransom

2005

Land of the Dead

2005
2005
2005

2005
2005

Four Brothers
Get Rich or Die
Tryin’
Herbie: Fully
Loaded

Left Behind:
World at War
Mem-o-re

Alter Ego Entertainment
Atmosphere Entertainment MM
LLC
Columbia Pictures
Corporation
3210 Films

2005

Missing in
America

Angel Devil Productions Inc.

2005

Neverwas

Kingsgate Films

2005

Pokemon: Destiny Deoxys

4 Kids Entertainment

2005

Rent

1492 Pictures

2005

Runt

2005

Santa’s Slay

2005

Saw II

Twisted Pictures

2005

Slow Burn

Bonnie Timmermann Productions

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

Joseph A. English
Productions
Media 8 Entertainment

Paramount
Pictures
Paramount
Pictures
Buena Vista
Pictures
Buena Vista
Pictures

New Line Cinema
New Line Cinema
Universal
Home Entertainment
Columbia Pictures

[39:739

$40M
$40M
$50M
$14.6M
*
$14.6M
*
$1.2M
$14.6M
*
$14.6M
*
$15M
$4.6M
$3.5M

First Look
Home Entertainment
Neverwas
Productions
Inc.
Miramax
Home Entertainment
Sony Pictures
Releasing

$14.6M
*
$14.6M
*
$14.6M
*
$40M
$500K

Lions Gate
Films
Lions Gate
Films
DEJ Productions

$14.6M
*
$4M
$14.6M
*
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Lions Gate
Films

2005

Tamara

Armada Pictures

2005

The Ballad of
Jack and Rose

Elevation Filmworks

2005

The Big White

2005

The Deal

2005

The Exorcism of
Emily Rose

Firm Films

2005

The Fog

David Foster Productions

Ascendant Pictures
Front Street
Productions
Screen Gems
Inc.
Columbia Pictures

2005

The Greatest
Game Ever
Played

Fairway Films
Ltd.

Buena Vista
Pictures

2005

The Jacket

2929 Productions

2005

The Long Weekend

Gold Circle Films

2005

The Man

New Line Cinema

2005

The Pacifier

2005

The Perfect Man

2005

2005

The Prize Winner of Defiance,
Ohio
The Sisterhood
of the Traveling
Pants

Ascendant Pictures
Front Street Productions

Spyglass Entertainment
Marc Platt Productions

$4.75M
$1.5M

IFC Films

Warner Bros.
Pictures Inc.
Gold Circle
Films
New Line Cinema
Buena Vista
Pictures
Universal Pictures

$18M
$14.6M
*
$20M
$18M
$14.6M
*
$29M
$14.6M
*
$14.6M
*
$56M
$10M

ImageMovers

DreamWorks
SKG

$14.6M
*

17th Street Productions

Warner Bros.
Pictures Inc.

$25M

Iron Horse Entertainment
Universal Pictures
Miramax
Films

2005

Three Bad Men

2005

Two for the
Money

Iron Horse Entertainment
Cosmic Entertainment

2005

Underclassman

Miramax Films

2005

When Hearts
Run Wild

Arabella Films
LLC
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$650K
$20M
$14.6M
*
$10M
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2005

Where the Truth
Lies

2005

White Noise

Serendipity Point
Films
Endgame Entertainment

[39:739

ThinkFilm Inc.

$25M

Universal Pictures

$14.6M
*

2005 Total of Budgets: $1284.7M
*Average budget used for the film in light of missing budget information. The average was compiled using the available budget numbers
for the year.
** The feature films listed herein were the result of a search made
using information at http://www.IMDB.com. The search parameters
were “earliest release between January 2005 and December 2005, and
only movies, and USA country and filming locations match ‘Canada’,
and display Production Companies, Distributors, budget, sorted by Title.” However, these figures may be incomplete, as they were compiled
during 2005.
Appendix B
Canadian Provincial Production Incentives
PROVINCE
ALBERTA

PSTC
N/A

BRITISH
COLUMBIA

18% of eligible
BC labour

MANITOBA

45% of eligible
MB labour

NEW
BRUNSWICK
NEWFOUND
LAND
NOVA
SCOTIA

40% of eligible
NB labour
40% of eligible
labour
40% of eligible
NS labour

ONTARIO

18% of eligible
ON labour

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

20% of production costs (this is a
non-recoupable grant, not a tax credit)
6% regional bonus
15% digital animation or video effects
bonus
Additional 5% if 50% of shooting
days are 40 km or more outside of
Winnipeg’s centre
Additional 5% if third film shot
within 2-year period
Capped at 50% of production costs.
Capped at 25% of production costs
40% for productions shot outside
Halifax
50% bonus for returning within a
2-year period
3% regional bonus
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PRINCE
EDWARD
ISLAND

35% - 50%
of eligible
labour
(this is a rebate, not a
tax credit)

Capped at 15% of production costs

QUEBEC

20% of eligible
QC labour

N/A

849

* Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location
Production in Canada, March 2005, at Annex B, p. 25.
Appendix B
Canadian Provincial Incentives*
Canadian Provincial Production Incentives
PROVINCE
SASKATCHE
WAN
YUKON

PSTC
35% of eligible
SK labour

35% of eligible YK
labour
(this is a rebate not a
tax credit)

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

Capped at 50% of production costs
5% regional bonus
50% travel rebate
35% training rebate

* Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO), Department of Canadian Heritage, Study of the Decline of Foreign Location
Production in Canada, March 2005, at Annex B, p. 25.
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Appendix C
Major U. S. Production Incentives*
STATE

INCENTIVE

DESCRIPTION

ARIZONA

Income tax
credit

FLORIDA

Film industry
rebate program

GEORGIA

Income tax
credit

20% transferable income tax credit on
in-state production expenditures on
projects spending $3 million or more
(10% when spending under $3 million).
50% sales and use tax rebate on purchase or lease of tangible property on
productions spending $1 million or
more. To qualify, a production must
hire a minimum number of AZ residents.
15% reimbursement of qualified Florida expenditures for production
spending at least $850,000.
Funded at $10 million per year.
9% transferable income tax credits on
all costs spent in Georgia, plus:
3% credit on wages paid to GA residents, plus:
2% credit for TV productions that
spend more than $20 million annually, plus:
3% credit for productions in distressed areas.

ILLINOIS

Transferable
wage credit

25% transferable income tax credit on
first $25,000 of wages paid to Illinois
residents.

LOUISIANA

Investor tax
credit, employment and
labor tax cred,
sales & use tax
exclusion

25% transferable tax credit on Louisiana spending (if spending exceeds $8
million, otherwise 10% credit ) plus:
10% credit on total aggregate payroll
of Louisiana residents (excluding
salaries in excess of $1 million) plus:
4% sales and use tax exclusion.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss3/4
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*Current as of June 10, 2005. Source: California Film Commission, reported in Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation, What Is the Cost of Run-Away Production? Jobs, Wages, Economic Output and State Tax Revenue at Risk When Motion Picture
Productions Leave California, August 2005, Appendix A – Production
Incentives.
Appendix C
Major U. S. Production Incentives*
STATE
MARYLAND

INCENTIVE
Film production activity

DESCRIPTION

Wage rebate up to $12,500 per eligible employee for projects spending
over $500,000. Funded at $4 million
per year.

12% refundable tax credit on up to
$50,000. in wages paid to Montana
residents.
8% credit on total in-state spending.
10% refundable tax credit of qualiNEW YORK
Film production tax credit fied expenditures, capped at $100
million over 4 years.
City of New York offers the same
incentive with a refundable tax credit
equal to 5% of qualified expenditures capped at $37.5 million for 3
years.
15% of eligible in-state costs.
OKLAHOMA Rebate program
Capped at $2 million per year.
Sales tax exemption on tangible
property and services.
OREGON
Production
10% rebate on in Oregon costs,
investment
capped at $250,000 per film producfund sales
tion.
exemption
No sales tax on all purchases.
labor rebate
6.2% rebate on Oregon wages (pending).
*Current as of June 10, 2005. Source: California Film Commission.
MONTANA
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Appendix C
Major U. S. Production Incentives*
STATE
PENNSYLV
ANIA

INCENTIVE
Income tax
credit.

DESCRIPTION

20% assignable tax credit of qualified
Pennsylvania costs when spending
60% of production costs in state ($10
million annual cap).

Production
project tax
credit

40% transferable labor tax credit
(paid to Puerto Rican residents). At
least 50% of the shooting must take
place in Puerto Rico.
RHODE
Transferable
25% tax credit for all Rhode Island
tax credit, in- spending when spending is over
ISLAND
vestor tax
$300,000.
credit (non
Investor will receive 15% tax credit
transferable)
for budgets between $300,000 and $5
million. For budgets over $5 million,
investor will receive 25% tax credit.
15% rebate of total aggregate payroll
SOUTH
TRANSFER
for employees who are subject to
ABLE TAX
CAROLINA
REBATES
South Carolina withholding, if instate
spending is at least $1 million. Plus:
7% sales tax exemption for purchases
of in-state goods and services. Plus:
15% rebate program for in-state purchases/rentals.
Capped at $10 million annually.
*Current as of June 10, 2005. Source: California Film Commission.
PUERTO
RICO

Appendix D
Sample of Other International Production Incentives*
Australia
The Australian Federal Government has a refundable tax offset
worth 12.5% of the production’s Qualifying Australian Production Expenditure. This is claimed by the production company through the com-
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pany’s tax return. A fact sheet, guidelines and application forms are
available from See http://www.dcita.gov.au/filmtaxoffset.
In addition, the Australian State Agencies offer generous financial
support and assistance through payroll tax rebates or exemptions, cast
and crew wage rebates, location attraction grants and the provision of
free or subsidized public service resources.
Contact details for all States
available at http://www.ausfilm.com.au
Melbourne Incentives
In addition to the Australian Government’s 12.5% film tax offset,
the Melbourne Film Office offers two highly competitive financial incentive programs.
Available at
http://www.film.vic.gov.au/programs/Program_Pages/MFO_Incentive.shtml

Queensland Incentives
There are many financial benefits in basing your next production in
Queensland, including the generous suite of incentives offered by the
Queensland Government through the PFTC. These include:
*Payroll Tax Rebates
*Head of Department Rebates
*Cast & Crew Salary Rebates
Furthermore, a 12.5% refundable tax offset is available from the
Australian Federal Government for projects that spend a minimum
$15M AUD on qualifying production activity in Australia.
Available at http://www.pftc.com.au
South Australia Incentives
A 10% employment rebate is available on all eligible SA labour
expenditure on any eligible film or television production. The employment rebate is not a tax rebate and therefore is not tied to a year-end tax
return. It can be paid in installments, with the first (potentially largest)
installment paid on the first day of principle photography. This means
that the production is provided with additional cash flow when it is most
useful – during the shoot. This rebate is in addition to the 6% payroll tax
exemption and the tax offset rebate. The 10% employment rebate is
available for drama productions intended for television or theatrical release that have not received production investment from the SAFC and
is available to projects with at least 50% of the shoot occurring in South
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Australia.
A payroll tax exemption on eligible productions shot in SA reduces
the film’s payroll total by approximately 6 per cent. Note that this is an
up-front exemption, not a rebate. To be eligible for the exemption, projects must be produced wholly or substantially within South Australia,
employ SA residents, and provide significant economic benefits to the
State.
Source: Data as of March 6, 2006. Association of Film Commissioners International, International Incentives, March 2006, found at
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf (accessed
April 26, 2006).
Production queries regarding the South Australian Film & Television Employment Rebate can be directed to the Head of Studio Services,
Rory McGregor at mcgregorr@ safilm.com.au or 088348 9308.
Available at http://www.safilm.com.au/content.aspx?p=16
__________________________________________________________
Belgium
Belgium provides a tax shelter for qualifying films.
Available at http://www.vaf.be/frames.asp?page=1&lang=1
Available at en.antwerpen.be/acfo
__________________________________________________________
Brazil
Available at http://www.minasfilmcommission.com.br
Available at http://www.riofilme.com.br
__________________________________________________________
Canada
TAX CREDITS
The Canadian Federal Government’s Film or Video Production
Services Tax Credit is primarily for foreign production and has been increased to 16% of Canadian labour costs from 11%.
The Canadian Film or Video Production Tax Credit amounts to
25% of expenditures for services provided by Canadians. In order to
qualify for this tax credit, either the director or screenwriter and one of
the two highest paid actors must be Canadian. Moreover, the production
must earn at least six points based on key personnel being Canadian.
CO-PRODUCTION
Canada has entered into co-production treaties that are in effect for
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58 countries. The treaties set minimum standards for financial and creative participation, and are administered by Telefilm Canada. Qualifying
co-productions are eligible for all government incentives and benefits
accorded Canadian Films. For more information contact: Canadian Audio-Visual Certification Office (CAVCO)
Toll Free: (888) 433-2200
Available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/cavco
Calgary (Province of Alberta) Incentives
Productions in the Calgary region can access provincial and federal
programs providing eligibility requirements are met.
Available at http://www.calgaryeconomicdevelopment.com
British Columbia Incentives
Available at http://www.filmcolumbiashuswap.com
New Brunswick Incentives
40% Labour Tax Credit
Available at http://www.nbfilm.com
Okanagan (Province of British Columbia) Incentives
Productions in British Columbia can access a variety of provincial
and federal tax credit programs and if eligibility requirements are met, a
producer can combine them to access exceptional savings. Please contact
us for details.
Available at
http://www.okanaganfilm.com/tax_incentives/index.htm
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of
March 2006. Source: Association of Film Commissioners International,
International Incentives, March 2006, available at
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf (accessed
April 26, 2006).
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Ontario Incentives
The province of Ontario offers an 18% refundable tax credit on Ontario labour through the Ontario Production Services Tax Credit
(OPSTC), in addition to the Canadian government 16% rebate.
Also available is the Ontario Computer Animation and Special Effects Tax Credit, (OCASE), a refundable tax credit to Ontario-based Canadian and foreign-controlled corporations of 20% of qualifying Ontario
labour expenditures for film and television digital animation and digital
visual effects.
Available at http://www.omdc.on.ca/English/Tax-Incentives.html
Yukon Incentives
Available at http://www.reelyukon.com.
______________________________________________________
Fiji
Tax Rebate (similar to Australian tax offset): If a fully-funded production expends in Fiji a minimum F$250,000 of qualifying Fiji expenditure representing at least 35% of the budget, then it can claim back
15% of its Fiji expenditure.
Available at http://www.fijiaudiovisual.com
______________________________________________________
France
In the Co-production Framework, many sources of financing are
available through French producers.
Available at http://www.filmfrance.net
__________________________________________________________
Germany
Bavaria Incentives
Funding can be applied for at FilmFernsehFonds Bayern GmbH
Available at http://www.fff-bayern.de
Available at http://www.film-commission-bavaria.de
Berlin Brandenburg Incentives
In Germany, a German producer or the German Co-producer can
ask for money at the regional film funding institution. The Berlin Brandenburg Film Commission BBFC is a department of the Medienboard,
which is the regional film funding institution in Berlin and Brandenburg.
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On top of that there are strong production service companies like Studio
Babelsberg that can co-finance due to state guarantees. For further information, please, contact the Berlin Brandenburg Film Commission
BBFC.
Available at http://www.medienboard.de
Hamburg Incentives
See FilmFörderung Hamburg’s website for funding guidelines.
Available at http://www.ffhh.de.
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of
March 2006. Source: Association of Film Commissioners International,
International Incentives, March 2006.
Available at
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf
Schleswig-Holstein Incentives
Available at http://www.m-s-h.org
__________________________________________________________
Ireland
18% tax break on Irish spend
Experienced Irish co-producers
No sales tax
12.5% corporate tax rate
Network of Film Commissions offering free support
Available at http://www.filmboard.ie
__________________________________________________________
County Louth
Our unique position means producers can avail of both Section 481
in the Republic of Ireland and Sale and Leaseback in the North of Ireland without leaving the Film Commission region. There are many financing schemes including Made in N.I. Lottery Fund and the Regional
Support Fund Loan which can work in our region. You won’t need to
move Production Office!
Available at http://www.filmcommission.ie
__________________________________________________________
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Italy
Campania Incentives
Local Film Fund: (70.000 euros per Feature Film); (20.000 euros
per Documentary Film) and (3.000 euros per Short Film) Other programs include: tax rebate, free shooting permits and authorizations, and
lots and lots of discounted services.
Available at http://www.campaniafilmcommission.org
__________________________________________________________
Jamaica
15% rebate on all goods and services purchased in Jamaica
http://www.investjamaica.com
__________________________________________________________
Netherlands
Rotterdam Incentives
The office of the Rotterdam Film Commissioner, established in
1999, strives to be a facilitative focus for the increasing number of domestic and foreign producers who wish to film and work in the Rotterdam region. It provides information about locations, studios, local services that are available, and professionals active in the film industry. It
mediates during the establishment of contacts and applications for financial support and is an intermediary between producers and municipal
services. The office does this free of charge and with a minimum of unnecessary red tape.
Available at http://www.rff.rotterdam.nl
__________________________________________________________
New Zealand
The Large Budget Screen Production Grant (LBSPG) scheme
whereby an eligible project will be granted a sum totalling 12.5% of the
Qualifying New Zealand Production Expenditure (QNZPE). Where the
value of the QNZPE is between NZ$15 million and NZ$50 million,
QNZPE must be at least 70 per cent of the film’s total production expenditure.
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of
March 2006. Source: Association of Film Commissioners International,
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International Incentives, March 2006, found at
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf.
Where the value of the QNZPE is NZ$50 million or more it will
qualify for the grant regardless of the percentage ratio of QNZPE to the
screen production’s total production expenditure.
For television series, individual episodes, which have completed
principal photography within any 12 month period and with a minimum
average spend of NZ$500,000 per commercial hour, may be bundled to
achieve the total of NZ$15 million.
Available at http://www.filmnz.com/grantscheme/index.html
__________________________________________________________
Spain
Barcelona Incentives
Available at http://www.barcelonafilm.com
Tenerife Incentives
The Canary Islands Special Zone offers special incentives to those
companies that set up a company in the Canary Islands
Available at http://www.tenerifefilm.com
__________________________________________________________
Sweden
Dalarna Incentives
For free during tree days we can offer you full support with location
scouting. We can also help you with all the preparations including transports, living arrangements, organising permits, information from local
contacts and authorities, all in order to get the production off to a successful start.
Available at http://www.filmidalarna.se
__________________________________________________________
United Kingdom
Productions which qualify as British films are eligible to apply for
national funding and for the benefits of the UK’s tax relief structures.
There are two ways that a film may qualify as British – either via Schedule 1 or an official coproduction. Sale and leaseback is currently the
mechanism through which the UK’s tax breaks are channelled. Section
48 allows benefits for films with budgets of less than £15,000,000 and
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Section 42 allows benefits for films with any budget. The UK Government recently announced plans for the future of UK tax relief for film:
Section 48: A new tax credit for qualifying films with budgets of
under £20m will replace Section 48 in 2006. The relief will apply to
100% of the film’s budget and will be worth approximately 20% of production costs. Section 48 will continue to be available for films in production by 1st April 2006 and completed by 1st January 2007.
Section 42: Section 42 will be replaced in 2006 with a new tax
credit similar to the proposed replacement for Section 48. Section 42
will continue until the new relief is in place.
http://www.ukfilmcouncil.org.uk (Select Filming in the UK, British
Qualification)
Guernsey - Channel Islands Incentives
For short shoots the Film Commissioner will act as a Location
Manager and pre-shoot will act as a location scout. The services of the
commission are free and there is no permitting scheme operating in the
Islands. Many locations are available free of charge.
Available at http://www.guernseyfilms.com
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of
March 2006. Source: Association of Film Commissioners International,
International Incentives, March 2006, available at
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf (accessed
April 26, 2006).
__________________________________________________________
England – North West Vision Incentives
Free film liaison service with experienced staff
Funding and co-production opportunities
On-line crew and facilities database and searchable locations library
(from April 05)
Printed production guide
Competitive facility & crew rates (30% cheaper than London)
Film Friendly infrastructure
International airport
Available at http://www.northwestvision.co.uk/funding
__________________________________________________________
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Scotland Film Incentives
Scottish Screen runs a range of funding schemes, from script development and short film funds, to production funding and new media initiatives. Funding is to support the Scottish film industry, and there are
always co-funding opportunities with Scottish producers. So far there
have been a number of successful co-productions with European countries.
Available at http://www.scottishscreen.com
__________________________________________________________
Puerto Rico
40% Tax Credit
Available at http://www.puertoricofilm.com
__________________________________________________________
Venezuela
Available at http://www.diatriba.net/venezuelafilmcommission
* Sample of feature film incentives available outside the U.S. as of
March 2006. Source: Association of Film Commissioners International,
International Incentives, March 2006.
Available at
http://www.afci.org/documents/InternationalIncentives.pdf
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